Group 42-Sells Out! - The Information Archive/Group 42 Sells Out (Group 42) (1996).iso/zines/phrack/phrack27.txt

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                               ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 1 of 11

                   Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXVII Index
                   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                                June 20, 1989


     Greetings and welcome to Issue 27 of Phrack Inc.  The pressure is on with
SummerCon '89 just a couple short days away.  We're sorry it has taken so long
to get this issue out, but summer break has created more responsibilities and
busy schedules than we have ever had to deal with while in school.  Still, I
think you will agree that this issue was worth the wait.

     This issue we feature a new updated NUA and Datex-P list from Oberdaemon
of Switzerland and Chapter 7 of the Future Transcendent Saga (taking into
account that the SPAN and NSFnet files were chapters 5 and 6).  We also present
the second part of the COSMOS file written by King Arthur.

     Before we get to the main contents of the issue, we have a few comments to
make regarding security and Phrack Inc.'s Internet access;

     Thanks to a friend, we at Phrack Inc. have become aware of one of the main
techniques that the National Security Agency (NSA) uses to perform surveillance
on the wide area networks.

     In certain messages that certain government agencies distribute, special
phone numbers are included; WATS (800) numbers, to be more specific.  As these
messages are distributed around the continent via various netmail and file
transfer schemes, they are passed through several surveillance stations.  All
of their stations perform one function, and in Unix terms, that function is
called "grep."

     Grep stands for G>lobal R>egular E>xpression search and P>rint.  The grep
does simple string matching.  Every instance of these special 800-numbers in an
email message (or batch of them) is flagged, recorded, and the record is mailed
to certain intelligence agencies by the surveillance stations.

     Here are the networks that we are reasonably certain that this practice is
performed on:

* USEnet  : Email is only checked in certain places, but ALL netnews (including
            alt and any other nonstandard newsgroups) are flagged by a single
            government domain SUN-3 that shall remain nameless.
* ARPAnet : All mail going through a standard BBN (Bolt, Bernack, and
            Neumann... a Cambridge/MIT spinoff) Internet controller will be
            flagged, but the only information recorded by the controller is the
            source and destination TCP/IP addresses of the message.  But when
            you consider that this involves ***ALL*** DARPA mailing lists, you
            get a visualization of the magnitude.  The reason more complex
            information is NOT recorded is that this network is the only
            AUTHORIZED place that these messages with the hot WATS are supposed
            to appear.  You will see what this means in a moment.
* BITnet  : Large IBM mainframe with I/O channel cycles to spare should have no
            problem scanning mail from one of the most publically accessable
            "free" networks.
* Fidonet : The Secret Service scans this for credit card and other violations.
            It is not too hard for them to check for the (800)'s, too.
* W.Union : All international telex lines are scanned to match a whole lot of
            stuff, especially drug-related information.  The phone numbers are
            on their list.

     We have other suspicions, but we are withholding them for now.

     The other news is equally disturbing because it strikes us a little close
to home.  We are temporarily losing our network access.  As of June 27, 1989
through August 28, 1989 we will not have access to our accounts on UMCVMB
mainframe system.  Make no attempt to mail us to our addresses there until
August 28, 1989.  However, every cloud has a silver lining and this is no
exception.  For networks people who wish to submit files to Phrack Inc. during
this time period we proudly present our friend and associate, Hatchet Molly.
He can be reached at "[e-mail]" and/or
"[e-mail]".

     So here is to another great issue of Phrack Inc!

               Taran King                        Knight Lightning

                                 Hatchet Molly
                              [e-mail]
                      [e-mail]
_______________________________________________________________________________

Table of Contents:

1.  Phrack Inc. XXVII Index by Taran King and Knight Lightning
2.  Operating The IBM VM/SP CP by Taran King
3.  Introduction To MIDNET: Chapter Seven Of The FTS by Knight Lightning
4.  NUA List For Datex-P And X.25 Networks by Oberdaemon
5.  COSMOS:  COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS (Part Two) by King Arthur
6.  Looking Around In DECnet by Deep Thought
7.  The Making Of A Hacker by Framstag
8.  Sending Fakemail In Unix by Dark OverLord
9.  The Postal Inspection Service by Vendetta
10. Phrack World News XXVII/Part 1 by Knight Lightning
11. Phrack World News XXVII/Part 2 by Knight Lightning
12. Phrack World News XXVII/Part 3 by Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 2 of 12


                          Operating the IBM VM/SP CP

             (IBM Virtual Machine System Product Control Program)

                     An information article researched by

                                  Taran King

                                 May 18, 1989


This article is for the purpose of understanding the Control Program (CP)
portion of IBM's VM/SP.  This is basically a separate section of VM/CMS known
as CP (with full screen editors, the CP level is indicated in the lower right
hand corner of the screen and for line-by-line editors, before the command line
and after hitting carriage returns, it should say "CP") and it's purpose is to
manage real resources.  Any command that involves something outside of your
virtual machine must communicate with CP.  If CMS does not recognize a command
you give it, it will give it to CP.

The user generally enters the CP stage after a program flops or if you get
disconnected.  You can also enter the CP stage by hitting PA1 which is a
function key of sorts.  PA1 toggles between CP and CMS while on-line and if you
re-login after being disconnected, PA1 can be used besides the BEGIN command
which will be spoken about later in this article.

Generally, VM/CMS systems are well equipped with help files so if anything I
print becomes unclear to you, from CMS mode, type HELP CP XXX where XXX is the
CP command you want information on.

To start this article off, I'm printing off the IBM-Defined Class and the
Function Types as listed in the IBM VM/SP CP manual.  This essentially tells
you what privileges you have with your assigned class.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
IBM-Defined      Function         User &
   Class           Type          Functions
~~~~~~~~~~~      ~~~~~~~~        ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     A               O           Operations:  The primary sysop can issue all
                                 class A commands.  The class A user controls
                                 the VM/SP system.  Class A is assigned to the
                                 user at the VM/SP system console during IPL.
                                 The primary sysop is responsible for the
                                 availability of the VM/SP system and its
                                 communication lines and resources.  In
                                 addition, the class A user controls system
                                 accounting, broadcast messages, virtual
                                 machine performance options, and other
                                 command operands that affect the overall
                                 performance of the VM/SP.  The sysop controls
                                 operation of the real machine using the
                                 system control panel and console device.
                                 NOTE:  The class A sysop who is automatically
                                 logged on during CP initialization is
                                 designated as the primary sysop.

     B               R           Resource:  The system resource operator can
                                 issue all class B commands.  The class B user
                                 controls allocation and deallocation of all
                                 the real resources of the VM/SP system,
                                 except those controlled by the primary sysop
                                 and spooling operator.

     C               P           Programmer:  The system programmer can issue
                                 all class C commands.  The class C user
                                 updates certain functions of the VM/SP
                                 system.  The system programmer can modify
                                 real storage in the real machine.

     D               S           Spooling:  The spooling operator can issue
                                 all class D commands.  The class D user
                                 controls spool data files and specific
                                 functions of the system's unit record
                                 equipment.

     E               A           Analyst:  The system analyst can issue all
                                 class E commands.  The class E user displays
                                 the contents of real storage, performs the
                                 functions required to generate saved systems
                                 and discontiguous saved segments, and
                                 controls the collecting and recording of
                                 performance measurement data.  This class of
                                 user can display specified real storage areas
                                 on the virtual operator's console or on a
                                 spooled virtual printer, but cannot modify
                                 real storage.

     F               C           Customer Engineer:  The service
                                 representative can issue all class F
                                 commands.  The class F user obtains, and
                                 examines, in detail, certain data about input
                                 and output devices connected to the VM/SP
                                 system.  The service representative can
                                 establish extensive recording mode for one
                                 I/O device at a time and can cause the
                                 recording of repressible machine check errors
                                 to be initiated or resumed.

     G               G           General:  The general user can issue all
                                 class G commands.  The class G user controls
                                 functions associated with the execution of
                                 his virtual machine.  A general user cannot
                                 display or modify real storage.

    ANY             ANY          The ANY classification is given to certain CP
                                 commands that are available to any user.
                                 These are primarily for the purpose of
                                 gaining and relinquishing access to the VM/SP
                                 system.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The following is the list of commands available along with a brief description
as to what they do and/or formatting and then ending with the IBM-Defined
Class and Function Type.

* : From CP, one may use the * command to annotate the terminal console sheet
~   or the terminal display screen with a comment.  In other words, type * and
then any string of characters you would, for some reason, to be present on the
screen thereafter.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  N/A

#CP : This command is used to execute a CP Command while in a virtual machine
~~~   command environment without first signaling attention to get to the CP
command environment which means that when typing P <command> to perform a CP
operation, CP directly receives the command whereas CP <command> merely queues
the command from CP.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  ANY

ACNT : The ACNT command is used to create accounting records for logged on
~~~~   users and to reset accounting data.  It also closes a spool file that
is accumulating accounting records.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

ADSTOP : The ADSTOP command is used to halt the execution of a virtual machine
~~~~~~   at a virtual instruction point.  The hexloc variable may be placed
after the word ADSTOP which is a 6 character hexadecimal representation of the
virtual instruction address where the execution is to be halted.  The OFF
option of the ADSTOP command cancels any previous ADSTOP setting.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

ATTN : Use the ATTN command to make an attention interruption pending at your
~~~~   virtual console.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

AUTOLOG : This command allows the user to log on any virtual machine defined
~~~~~~~   in the directory.
Privilege Level:  A, B
Function Type:  O

BACKSPAC : The BACKSPAC command is used to restart or reposition the current
~~~~~~~~   output on a real punch or printer.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

BEGIN or B : The BEGIN command by itself from CP mode will return the user to
~~~~~~~~~~   CMS mode in the place where he/she left off before he/she was
disconnected or thrown into CP.  The BEGIN command can also be followed by a
hex location as to where to start in the case of the user wanting to be doing
something other than what was previously occurring.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

CHANGE or CH : In use of the CHANGE command, there are subcommands with
~~~~~~~~~~~~   variables.  Generally, the "name" variable is 1 to 4 characters
in length.  The following are the subcommands with functions and formatting:

  o  READER or RDR : changes reader spool files.
  o  PRINTER or PRT : changes printer spool files.
  o  PUNCH or PCH : changes punch spool files.
  o  CLASS c1 : designates an existing class where c1 is a 1-character
                alphanumerical field from A to Z or 0 to 9.
  o  spoolid : spoolid number of file that is to be changed.
  o  FORM form1 : 1 to 8 character alphanumeric form name used to select files
                  to be changed (form1).
  o  ALL : changes all of your spool files.
  o  HOLD : prevents a file from being printed, punched, or read until
            released.
  o  NOHOLD : releases the specified file from the user's HOLD status.
  o  DIST dist : changes the distribution code to variable "dist".
  o  COPY(*)nnn : specifies number of copies of the file you want spooled,
                  which is valid only for printer or punch files.  "nnn" is a
                  number from 1 to 255 and the "*" is  present in the case of
                  a 3800 printer being used so that copies will be made in the
                  printer internally.
  o  FLASH name nnn : signifies that a form's overlay contained in the 3800
                      printer is to be superimposed onto certain pages of
                      output.  "nnn" is a number from 0 to 255 representing
                      the number of copies to be superimposed.
  o  MODIFY name (n) : allows text alteration by preventing information
                       printing or by adding labels to output.  "n" selects a
                       keyword in CHARS to be used for copy modification text.
  o  CHARS name1 (name2(name3(name4)))
     CHARS name1(CH names2(CH names3(CH names4))) : specifies character
                       arrangement table when printing a file.  There can be
                       up to 4 names.
  o  FCB name : controls vertical spacing of output on a page.
  o  FORM form2 : changes spool form name of file to form2.
  o  NAME fn (ft) : assigns identification to spool file in CMS format
                    filename and filetype.
  o  NAME dsname : assigns identification to spool file in non-CMS format
                   where "dsname" is from 1 to 24 characters, suitable for
                   specifying OS or DOS files.
Privilege Class:  S, G
Function Type:  D, G

CLOSE or C : The CLOSE command terminates spooling activity on any virtual
~~~~~~~~~~   spooled unit record or console device.  It Contains the following
subcommands to be followed by the letter C or the word CLOSE:

   o  READER or RDR
   o  PRINTER or PRT
   o  PUNCH or PCH
   o  FORM form1
   o  HOLD
   o  NOHOLD
   o  DIST dist
   o  NAME fn (ft)
   o  NAME dsname
   o  vaddr : virtual address (cuu) of device to be closed.
   o  CONSOLE : closes virtual machine's console spool file which makes it a
                printer spool file.
   o  PURGE : closes and immediately purges from the virtual machine the
              output spool files.  No output file is produced.
   o  CHAIN : only valid for VM/SP HPO Release 4.2 and Profs Spool File
              Enhancement PRPQ.  Indicates that the punchfile is to be
              chained.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

COMMANDS or COMM : Use COMMAND to list the commands and diagnose codes you are
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   authorized to use.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  ANY

COUPLE : Using the COUPLE command connects your virtual non-dedicated
~~~~~~   channel-to-channel device to another user's virtual device of the
same type or to another one of your own virtual devices of the same type.  The
format of this command is in the form of COUPLE vaddr1 TO userid vaddr2.  The
variable vaddr1 is your virtual address and the variables userid vaddr2
identify the userid and virtual address of that userid to be connected to.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

CP : The CP command may precede the command to be processed, but it is not
~~   necessary.  Generally, the CP command is used from CMS mode to queue CP
functions by typing CP <command>.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  ANY

CPTRAP : The CPTRAP command creates a reader file of a selected trace table,
~~~~~~   CP interface, and virtual machine interface entries for problem
determination.
Privilege Class:  C
Function Type:  P

DCP : This command displays the contents of real storage locations at the
~~~   terminal.
Privilege Class:  C, E
Function Type:  P

DEFINE or DEF : The DEFINE command in CP is used to alter your virtual machine
~~~~~~~~~~~~~   configuration or channel operating mode.  There are a LOT of
subcommands that are used with the DEFINE command such as RDR or PRT or PCH
and the list goes on and on.  If you want details, there is a help file (type
HELP CP DEF) that is almost 600 lines that goes into detail on each
subcommand.
Privilege Class:  B, G
Function Type:  R, G

DETACH or DET : The DETACH command is used to remove a virtual device from the
~~~~~~~~~~~~~   virtual machine.  The subcommands are as follows:

  o  vaddr (vaddr...) : used for multiple addresses to be detached where vaddr
                        is the virtual address (cuu) of the device to be
                        detached.
  o  vaddr-vaddr : used to detach a range of addresses.
  o  CHANNEL c : detaches the real address of the channel.
Privilege Class:  B, G
Function Type:  R, G

DIAL : Using the DIAL command logically connects a switched line, leased line,
~~~~   locally attached, or remote Binary Synchronous (BSC) terminal to a
previously logged-on multiple-access virtual machine.  It is in the format of
DIAL userid (vaddr) where the userid is that to be connected to and the
vaddr is the optional virtual address.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  ANY

DISABLE : The DISABLE command prevents low speed communications lines from
~~~~~~~   accessing the system.
Privilege Class:  A, B
Function Type:  R

DISCONN or DISC : The DISCONNECT command is used to disconnect your terminal
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   from the system while the virtual machine continues
operation.  Using the DISC HOLD or DISC HO option, you specify that the
communications line is not to be disabled which allows you to avoid re-dialing
the system.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  ANY

DISPLAY or D : The DISPLAY command allows you to display virtual machine
~~~~~~~~~~~~   components at your terminal.  Depending on what variable
follows the D or DISPLAY command from CP, you can display virtual storage
locations, storage keys, general registers, floating-point registers, control
registers, vector registers, VAC (Vector Activity Counter), VSR (Vector Status
Register), VMR (Vector Mask Register), PSW (Program Status Word), CAW (Channel
Address Word), and CSW (Channel Status Word).
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

DMCP : This command prints the contents of real storage locations on a user's
~~~~   virtual spooled printer.
Privilege Class:  C, E
Function Type:  P

DRAIN : The DRAIN command stops spooling operations on a specified real unit's
~~~~~   read devices after the file currently being processed has been
completed.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

DUMP or DU : Use the DUMP command to print the contents of various components
~~~~~~~~~~   of the virtual machine on the virtual spooled printer.  Depending
on what variable is placed after the DUMP or DU command, the items printed
include virtual PSW (Program Status Word), general registers, floating-point
registers, control registers, storage keys, and virtual storage locations.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

ECHO or EC : Defaulted at 1, the ECHO command places the terminal in the echo
~~~~~~~~~~   environment in which any line entered is transmitted unchanged
back to the terminal a specified number of times, depending on the variable
entered immediately after the word ECHO or EC.
Privilege Type:  G
Function Type:  G

ENABLE : Use the ENABLE command to enable the previously disabled or nonabled
~~~~~~   devices so users may access the system.
Privilege Class:  A, B
Function Type:  R

EXTERNAL or EXT : The EXTERNAL command allows the user to simulate an external
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   interrupt to the virtual machine and to return control to
that machine.  The hexadecimal code following the word EXTERNAL or EXT is
associated with the external interrupt, the default being the number 40 which
is associated with the external interrupt button on a system console.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

FLUSH : The FLUSH command halts and immediately purges on hold the current
~~~~~   output on a specified unit record device.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

FORCE : This command forces a logoff of any user of the system.
~~~~~
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

FREE : Use the FREE command to remove a set of spool files belonging to a
~~~~   specified user from a system hold status.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

HALT : The HALT command terminates any active channel program on a specified
~~~~   real device.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

HOLD : The HOLD command places user spool files in a system hold status.
~~~~
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

INDICATE or IND : At your terminal, you can display the use of and contention
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   for major system resources with the INDICATE command.  The
following variables that follow the word INDICATE or IND show the following
data:

  o  LOAD : shows number of users in queue 1 and queue 2, the usage of real
            storage, and the ratio of active users to users being serviced.
            This is done by returning values that indicate operating load on
            the system.
  o  USER : displays the amounts of system resources used by your virtual
            machine in the current terminal session.
Privilege Class:  A, E, G
Function Type:  O, A, G

IPL or I : Generally used to return to CMS via the IPL CMS  or I CMS command,
~~~~~~~~   the IPL command simulates an initial program load function for a
virtual machine.  Subcommands are as follows:

  o  vaddr : virtual address (cuu) of the device that contains the nucleus to
             be loaded.
  o  cylno : cylinder containing the IPL data which defaults to 0.
  o  nnnnn : block address containing the IPL data which defaults to 0.
  o  CLEAR : sets virtual storage space to binary zeros before the operating
             system is loaded.
  o  NOCLEAR : allows contents of your virtual storage space to remain
               unchanged prior to program load.
  o  STOP : halts the virtual machine during the IPL procedure just before the
            initial PSW is loaded.
  o  ATTN : generates an attention interrupt to the virtual machine during the
            IPL procedure.
  o  PARM p1 (p2...) : processes up to 64 bytes of data to your virtual
                       machine's general registers starting with the high
                       order byte of general register 0.
  o  systemname : simulates IPL function when loading a named system that was
                  previously saved.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

LINK : The LINK command is used to make a device that is associated with
~~~~   another virtual machine available at your virtual machine configuration
based upon info in that user's directory entry.  This command is in the format
of LINK TO userid vaddr1 AS vaddr2 (mode) ((PASS=) password(1)).
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

LOADBUF : On a 1403 printer, the LOADBUF command loads the Universal Character
~~~~~~~   Set (UCS) with a specified print train or chain image.  On a
3203, 3211, 3212, 4245, or 4248 printer, it loads the UCS or the Forms Control
Buffer (FCB) with a specified image.  On a 3289 Model 4 printer, it loads the
Font Offset Buffer (FOB) with the image print belt and the FCB.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

LOADVFCB : This command specifies the forms control buffer image for different
~~~~~~~~   virtual spooled printers.  The variables that follow it include:

  o  vaddr
  o  FCB : required reserved keyword meaning Forms Control Buffer.
  o  name : a name that is system defined.
  o  INDEX (nn) : place initial printing position in number nn for the 3211
                  printer.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

LOCATE : Use the LOCATE command to find the addresses of CP control blocks
~~~~~~   associated with a particular user, a user's device, or a real system
device.
Privilege Class:  C, E
Function Type:  P

LOCK : This command permanently locks in selected pages of real storage.
~~~~
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

LOGOFF or LOGOUT or LOG : Used to terminate a virtual machine session and
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   disconnect your virtual machine from the system,
this command can be used with the HOLD option (i.e.  LOG HOLD) for retaining
the connection allowing for a switched communications line to enable one to
log on without re-dialing the system.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  ANY

LOGON or LOGIN or L : Obvious enough, the LOGIN or LOGON command is used to
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   identify yourself to the system and to access that
system.  Following the words LOGIN or LOGON or L, type your userid which is
the identifier assigned to you in the system.  If the system you are logging
onto does NOT have password suppression, your password can follow directly
after your userid.  NOTE:  If the system you are on does have password
suppression (i.e.  it does not echo to your screen what you type when you type
your password), you will get a system error message if you try to put it on
the same line as your userid.  The NOIPL option, which would follow your
password and userid, specifies that the IPL device or name in the directory
should not be used for an automatic IPL.
Privilege Class:  ANY
Function Type:  ANY

MESSAGE or MSG or M : Use the MESSAGE command to transmit message text to a
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   specified userid or to the primary system operator
userid.  MSG userid msgtext sends msgtext to the userid specified after
userid. If userid is replaced with *, the text is sent to yourself.  Also, if
the userid is replaced with OPERATOR, the message text is sent to the primary
system operator regardless of his userid.
Privilege Class:  A, B, ANY
Function Type:  O, ANY

MIGRATE : The MIGRATE command activates the normal page/swap table migration
~~~~~~~   routines or forces a particular user's pages to a secondary device
even if that user is currently active.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

MONITOR : To initiate or override the system-generated function or to
~~~~~~~   terminate the recording of events occurring in the real machine, use
the MONITOR command.
Privilege Class:  A, E
Function Type:  O

MSGNOH : The MSGNOH command allows a service virtual machine to send messages
~~~~~~   to specified users without the standard header associated with the
MESSAGE command.
Privilege Class:  B
Function Type:  R

NETWORK : The NETWORK command allows you to load, dump and control operation
~~~~~~~   of a 3704 or 3705 and to control operation of a 3725 control program
operating in 270x emulation mode (EP).  Also, it allows control of remote 3270
devices via binary synchronous lines.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

NOTREADY or NOTR : Using the NOTREADY command causes the virtual device, which
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   is specified after the NOTREADY statement via cuu address,
to appear as if it had changed from ready to not ready status.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

ORDER or ORD : ORDER is used to place your closed spool files in a specific
~~~~~~~~~~~~   order by device type.  These spool files include READER,
PRINTER, and PUNCH files and can be sorted by CLASS, FORM, and spoolid.
Privilege Class:  D, G
Function Type:  S, G

PER : PER allows one to monitor certain events as they occur during program
~~~   execution in the user's virtual machine.  This command can monitor the
fetching and execution of an instruction, the execution of a successful branch
instruction, the instruction of an instruction that alters a specific general
purpose register, and the execution of an instruction in the virtual machine
that alters storage.
Privilege Class:  A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Function Type:  G

PURGE or PUR : Use the PURGE command to remove your own closed spool files
~~~~~~~~~~~~   from the system before they are printed or punched by the
spooling devices, or before they are read by a user.  The spool file
specifications include READER, PRINTER, and PUNCH files as well as the ALL
option which purges all of the above mentioned files.
Privilege Class:  D, G
Function Type:  S, G

QUERY or Q : Also available in CMS mode, the QUERY command is used to
~~~~~~~~~~   determine your system status and machine configuration.
Although there are far too many subcommands of the QUERY command, the
following is a list of items that may be queried.  I recommend, for full
detail, using the HELP CP QUERY command as it is quite thorough (over 1000
lines) in explaining the QUERY command.

  o  The time you have used during a terminal session.
  o  The number of closed input and output spool files associated with
     your virtual machine.
  o  The current settings of the color and/or extended highlight values
     in effect for your virtual machine console.
  o  The current settings of the SET command functions.
  o  The current settings of the TERMINAL command functions.
  o  The status of all the devices on your virtual machine.
  o  The channel operating mode of your virtual machine, whether
     block-multiplexer or selector.
  o  A listing of all users who are linked to a given virtual address,
     together with their device addresses and access modes.
  o  Display of the secondary user (secuser) that is specified in the
     CONSOLE directory statement.
  o  Identification and attributes associated with your virtual
     PRINTER, PUNCH, and READER spool files.
  o  The identification of your virtual processor.
  o  The mode of processor operation of your VM/SP HPO installation:
     uniprocessor mode (UP), attached processor mode (AP), or
     multiprocessor mode (MP).
  o  The userid and system identifier.
  o  A listing of the PER traceset elements.
  o  The log messages of the day.
  o  The names of the users that are logged on.
  o  The number of users that are logged on or dialed to the system.

NOTE:  There are other operands you can use with the QUERY command if you
       have the privilege class required to use them.
Privilege Class:  A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Function Type:  O, R, P, S, A, C, G

QVM : Use this command to request the transition from the VM/SP environment to
~~~   native mode for a particular virtual machine.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

READY : In the format of READY vaddr, this command is used to set a device-end
~~~~~   interruption pending for the specified virtual device.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

REPEAT : Use the REPEAT command to increase the number of copies of an output
~~~~~~   file or to place the current output file in a hold status increasing
or not increasing the number of copies to be created.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

REQUEST or REQ : Simply use the REQUEST command to make an attention interrupt
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   at your virtual console.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

RESET : Also in the format of RESET vaddr, this command is used to clear all
~~~~~   pending interrupts from the specified virtual device.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

REWIND or REW : The REWIND command is used to rewind a real tape unit attached
~~~~~~~~~~~~~   to your virtual machine at a specified virtual device address
in the format REWIND vaddr.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

SAVESYS : This command allows you to save a virtual machine storage space with
~~~~~~~   registers and the PSW as they currently exist.  It is used in the
process of creating named systems.
Privilege Class:  E
Function Type:  A

SCREEN or SCRE : Use the SCREEN command to alter or change any extended color
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   and/or extended highlight definitions for your virtual
machine console.  You may issue the command from any IBM supported terminal or
from a PROFILE EXEC because the SCREEN command is not device dependent.
However, the SCREEN command is only valid when the Extended Color Feature has
been applied to the terminal controller.

You can assign extended color and extended highlighting values to six distinct
display screen areas:  the input area, the system status area, and the output
area that encompasses three other areas: CP output, virtual machine output,
virtual machine output, and an input redisplay area.  The physical attributes
of 3270 Information Display station screens vary according to model.

Because this command mainly applies to people who are not on dial-up, I have
elected not to detail all of the variables available with the SCREEN command.
Once again, I recommend you using HELP CP SCREEN for details.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

SEND : Using the Single Console Image Facility, the SEND command is used to
~~~~   pass commands and message replies for the secondary user's console to
disconnect virtual machines for execution.  This command is executed in the
format:  SEND (CP) userid (text).
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

SET : Use the SET command to control various functions within your virtual
~~~   system.  This command has a large number of variables that can be SET
and details for each of the variables can be obtained from the HELP CP SET
file.
Privilege Class:  A, B, E, F, G
Function Type:  O, R, A, C, G

SHUTDOWN : This command, of course, systematically ends all virtual machine
~~~~~~~~   functions and checkpoints the system for an eventual warn start.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

SLEEP or SL : To place the virtual machine in a dormant state but allow
~~~~~~~~~~~   messages to be displayed, use the SLEEP command in the format
of SLEEP nn (time-specification) where time-specification is SEC for seconds,
MIN for minutes, or HR for hours and nn is the number of the amount of time
for the machine to be in dormant state.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

SMSG or SM : The SMSG command is used to send a special message to a virtual
~~~~~~~~~~   machine programmed to accept and process the message.  The format
of this command is SMSG userid msgtext where userid is the userid to receive
the message and msgtext is the message to be sent to the userid.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

SPACE : Use the SPACE command to force the output on a specified printer to be
~~~~~   single spaced for the current active spool file regardless of the
carriage control commands in the actual file.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

SPMODE : SPMODE allows the system operator to establish or reset the single
~~~~~~   processor mode environment.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

SPOOL or SP : Use the SPOOL command to modify the spooling control options in
~~~~~~~~~~~   effect for a given virtual spooling device or for a group of
devices.  The SPOOL command can also start or stop the spooling of virtual
console input and output.  You can direct a file to a remote location by using
the SPOOL command in conjunction with the TAG command.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

SPTAPE : Use this command to dump spool files to tape or to load spool files
~~~~~~   from tape.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

START : The START command restarts a spooling device after it has been drained
~~~~~   or changes the output class that it may service.
Privilege Class:  D
Function Type:  S

STCP : To alter the contents of real storage but not real PSW or real
~~~~   registers, use the STCP command.
Privilege Class:  C
Function Type:  P

STORE or ST : The STORE command is used to alter the contents of specified
~~~~~~~~~~~   registers and locations of the virtual machine.  As well as
saving virtual machine data in low storage, the contents of the following can
be altered:

  o  Virtual storage locations
  o  General registers
  o  Floating-point registers
  o  Control registers
  o  Program Status Word (PSW)
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

SYSTEM or SYS : SYSTEM is used to simulate the action of the RESET and RESTART
~~~~~~~~~~~~~   buttons on the real computer console, and to clear storage.
The variables are as follows:

  o  CLEAR : clears virtual storage and virtual storage keys to binary zeros.
  o  RESET : clears all pending interrupts and conditions in the virtual
             machine.
  o  RESTART : simulates the hardware system RESTART function by storing the
               current PSW at virtual location eight and loading, as the new
               PSW, the doubleword from virtual location zero.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

TAG or TA : The TAG has many different variables that can be tagged, which are
~~~~~~~~~   too many to list here because of different settings for each one,
but it is used to associate file descriptive information with a spool file.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

TERMINAL or TERM : The TERMINAL command is used to control the following
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   functions associated with your virtual console:

  o  Logical line-editing symbols
  o  Masking of password
  o  The APL character set
  o  The Text character set
  o  Signaling of an attention interrupt
  o  Attention handling mode for your virtual console
  o  Line length for output on your virtual console
  o  Specifying terminal device type as 3101 or TTY
  o  Location of cursor preceding terminal read
  o  Scrolling rate for 3101 terminal
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

TRACE or TR : Use the TRACE command to trace specified virtual machine
~~~~~~~~~~~   activity and to record the results at the terminal, on a virtual
spooled printer, or on both terminal and printer.  If you issue more than one
TRACE command, the operands are cumulative; that is, operands specified for the
first time are activated, whereas those specified with new modifiers are
updated.  The RUN and NORUN operands, however, can be specified in different
tracing functions and do not cause a conflict.

You cannot issue the TRACE command while preferred machine assist is
operating, whether or not you have enabled the preferred machine assist
feature's control switch assist.
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

TRANSFER or TRAN : This command is used to transfer your closed spool files to
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   a specified user or queue, or to reclaim closed spool files
that you created.
Privilege Class:  D, G
Function Type:  S, G

UNLOCK : Use the UNLOCK command to unlock page frames previously locked by a
~~~~~~   LOCK command.
Privilege Class:  A
Function Type:  O

VARY : The VARY command marks a device available or unavailable for use by a
~~~~   user or the control program.
Privilege Class:  B
Function Type:  R

VMDUMP or VMD : The VMDUMP command dumps virtual storage that VM/SP HPO
~~~~~~~~~~~~~   creates for the virtual machine user.  VMDUMP dumps the
following:

  o  Virtual Program Status Word (PSW)
  o  General registers
  o  Floating-point registers
  o  Control registers
  o  Storage protection keys
  o  Virtual machine type identification
  o  Timer values
Privilege Class:  G
Function Type:  G

WARNING : Use the WARNING command to transmit high-priority messages to a
~~~~~~~   specified user or to all users.
Privilege Class:  A, B
Function Type:  O

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
This article is far from totally complete as far as in-depthness goes.  As I
have stated in numerous portions of this file, the VM/CMS system has a very
good HELP file system, and from CMS, the command HELP CP <command> will, in
most cases, allow you to read a relatively clear text file containing the
details and usage specifications of these commands.  I hope that, should you be
moving around a VM/CMS system, this file will assist you in the CP mode.

For those that wish to contact me for commentary on this file topic or other
topic conversation, you can send e-mail to my network addresses:

                    Internet:  [e-mail]
                      Bitnet:  [e-mail]

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 3 of 12

       <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
       <>                                                            <>
       <>                   Introduction to MIDNET                   <>
       <>                   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~                   <>
       <>        Chapter Seven Of The Future Transcendent Saga       <>
       <>                                                            <>
       <>               A More Indepth Look Into NSFnet              <>
       <>             National Science Foundation Network            <>
       <>                                                            <>
       <>                Presented by Knight Lightning               <>
       <>                        June 16, 1989                       <>
       <>                                                            <>
       <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>


Prologue
~~~~~~~~
If you are not already familiar with NSFnet, I would suggest that you read:

"Frontiers" (Phrack Inc., Volume Two, Issue 24, File 4 of 13), and definitely;
"NSFnet:  National Science Foundation Network" (Phrack Inc., Volume Three,
                                                Issue 26, File 4 of 11).


Table Of Contents
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*  Introduction
*  The DOD Protocol Suite
*  Names and Addresses In A Network
*  Telnet (*NOT* Telenet)
*  File Transfer
*  Mail


Introduction
~~~~~~~~~~~~
MIDNET is a regional computer network that is part of the NSFnet, the National
Science Foundation Network.  Currently, eleven mid-United States universities
are connected to each other and to the NSFnet via MIDnet:

UA  - University of Arkansas at Fayetteville
ISU - Iowa State University at Ames
UI  - University of Iowa at Iowa City
KSU - Kansas State University at Manhattan
KU  - University of Kansas at Lawrence
UMC - University of Missouri at Columbia
WU  - Washington University at St. Louis, Missouri
UNL - University of Nebraska at Lincoln
OSU - Oklahoma State University at Stillwater
UT  - University of Tulsa (Oklahoma)
OU  - University of Oklahoma at Norman

Researchers at any of these universities that have funded grants can access the
six supercomputer centers funded by the NSF:

John Von Neuman Supercomputer Center
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Cornell National Supercomputer Facility
National Center for Supercomputing Applications
Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center
San Diego Supercomputing Center

In addition, researchers and scientists can communicate with each other over a
vast world-wide computer network that includes the NSFnet, ARPAnet, CSnet,
BITnet, and others that you have read about in The Future Transcendent Saga.
Please refer to "Frontiers" (Phrack Inc., Volume Two, Issue 24, File 4 of 13)
for more details.

MIDnet is just one of several regional computer networks that comprise the
NSFnet system.  Although all of these regional computer networks work the same,
MIDnet is the only one that I have direct access to and so this file is written
from a MIDnet point of view.  For people who have access to the other regional
networks of NSFnet, the only real differences depicted in this file that would
not apply to the other regional networks are the universities that are served
by MIDnet as opposed to:

NYSERnet  in New York State
SURAnet   in the southeastern United States
SEQSUInet in Texas
BARRnet   in the San Francisco area
MERIT     in Michigan

           (There are others that are currently being constructed.)

These regional networks all hook into the NSFnet backbone, which is a network
that connects the six supercomputer centers.  For example, a person at Kansas
State University can connect with a supercomputer via MIDnet and the NSFnet
backbone.  That researcher can also send mail to colleagues at the University
of Delaware by using MIDnet, NSFnet and SURAnet.  Each university has its own
local computer network which connects on-campus computers as well as providing
a means to connecting to a regional network.

Some universities are already connected to older networks such as CSnet, the
ARPAnet and BITnet.  In principal, any campus connected to any of these
networks can access anyone else in any other network since there are gateways
between the networks.

Gateways are specialized computers that forward network traffic, thereby
connecting networks.  In practice, these wide-area networks use different
networking technology which make it impossible to provide full functionality
across the gateways.  However, mail is almost universally supported across all
gateways, so that a person at a BITnet site can send mail messages to a
colleague at an ARPAnet site (or anywhere else for that matter).  You should
already be somewhat familiar with this, but if not refer to;

"Limbo To Infinity" (Phrack Inc., Volume Two, Issue 24, File 3 of 13) and
"Internet Domains" (Phrack Inc., Volume Three, Issue 26, File 8 of 11)

Computer networks rely on hardware and software that allow computers to
communicate.  The language that enables network communication is called a
protocol.  There are many different protocols in use today.  MIDnet uses the
TCP/IP protocols, also known as the DOD (Department of Defense) Protocol Suite.

Other networks that use TCP/IP include ARPAnet, CSnet and the NSFnet.  In fact,
all the regional networks that are linked to the NSFnet backbone are required
to use TCP/IP.  At the local campus level, TCP/IP is often used, although other
protocols such as IBM's SNA and DEC's DECnet are common.  In order to
communicate with a computer via  MIDnet and the NSFnet, a computer at a campus
must use TCP/IP directly or use a gateway that will translate its protocols
into TCP/IP.

The Internet is a world-wide computer network that is the conglomeration of
most of the large wide area networks, including ARPAnet, CSnet, NSFnet, and the
regionals, such as MIDnet.  To a lesser degree, other networks such as BITnet
that can send mail to hosts on these networks are included as part of the
Internet.  This huge network of networks, the Internet, as you have by now read
all about in the pages of Phrack Inc., is a rapidly growing and very complex
entity that allows sophisticated communication between scientists, students,
government officials and others.  Being a part of this community is both
exciting and challenging.

This chapter of the Future Transcendent Saga gives a general description of the
protocols and software used in MIDnet and the NSFNet.  A discussion of several
of the more commonly used networking tools is also included to enable you to
make practical use of the network as soon as possible.


The DOD Protocol Suite
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The DOD Protocol Suite includes many different protocols.  Each protocol is a
specification of how communication is to occur between computers.  Computer
hardware and software vendors use the protocol to create programs and sometimes
specialized hardware in order to implement the network function intended by the
protocol.  Different implementations of the same protocol exist for the varied
hardware and operating systems found in a network.

The three most commonly used network functions are:

Mail          -- Sending and receiving messages
File Transfer -- Sending and receiving files
Remote Login  -- Logging into a distant computer

Of these, mail is probably the most commonly used.

In the TCP/IP world, there are three different protocols that realize these
functions:

SMTP   -- (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) Mail
FTP    -- (File Transfer Protocol) sending and receiving files
Telnet -- Remote login

How to use these protocols is discussed in the next section.  At first glance,
it is not obvious why these three functions are the most common.  After all,
mail and file transfer seem to be the same thing.  However, mail messages are
not identical to files, since they are usually comprised of only ASCII
characters and are sequential in structure.  Files may contain binary data and
have complicated, non-sequential structures.  Also, mail messages can usually
tolerate some errors in transmission whereas files should not contain any
errors.  Finally, file transfers usually occur in a secure setting (i.e. The
users who are transferring files know each other's names and passwords and are
permitted to transfer the file, whereas mail can be sent to anybody as long as
their name is known).

While mail and transfer accomplish the transfer of raw information from one
computer to another, Telnet allows a distant user to process that information,
either by logging in to a remote computer or by linking to another terminal.
Telnet is most often used to remotely log in to a distant computer, but it is
actually a general-purpose communications protocol.  I have found it incredibly
useful over the last year.  In some ways, it could be used for a great deal of
access because you can directly connect to another computer anywhere that has
TCP/IP capabilities, however please note that Telnet is *NOT* Telenet.

There are other functions that some networks provide, including the following:

- Name to address translation for networks, computers and people
- The current time
- Quote of the day or fortune
- Printing on a remote printer, or use of any other remote peripheral
- Submission of batch jobs for non-interactive execution
- Dialogues and conferencing between multiple users
- Remote procedure call (i.e. Distributing program execution over several
                              remote computers)
- Transmission of voice or video information

Some of these functions are still in the experimental stages and require faster
computer networks than currently exist.  In the future, new functions will
undoubtedly be invented and existing ones improved.

The DOD Protocol Suite is a layered network architecture, which means that
network functions are performed by different programs that work independently
and in harmony with each other.  Not only are there different programs but
there are different protocols.  The protocols SMTP, FTP and Telnet are
described above.  Protocols have been defined for getting the current time, the
quote of the day, and for translating names.  These protocols are called
applications protocols because users directly interact with the programs that
implement these protocols.

The Transmission Control Protocol, TCP, is used by many of the application
protocols.  Users almost never interact with TCP directly.  TCP establishes a
reliable end-to-end connection between two processes on remote computers.  Data
is sent through a network in small chunks called packets to improve reliability
and performance.  TCP ensures that packets arrive in order and without errors.
If a packet does have errors, TCP requests that the packet be retransmitted.

In turn, TCP calls upon IP, Internet Protocol, to move the data from one
network to another.  IP is still not the lowest layer of the architecture,
since there is usually a "data link layer protocol" below it.  This can be any
of a number of different protocols, two very common ones being X.25 and
Ethernet.

FTP, Telnet and SMTP are called "application protocols", since they are
directly used by applications programs that enable users to make use of the
network.  Network applications are the actual programs that implement these
protocols and provide an interface between the user and the computer.  An
implementation of a network protocol is a program or package of programs that
provides the desired network function such as file transfer.  Since computers
differ from vendor to vendor (e.g. IBM, DEC, CDC), each computer must have its
own implementation of these protocols.  However, the protocols are standardized
so that computers can interoperate over the network (i.e. Can understand and
process each other's data).  For example, a TCP packet generated by an IBM
computer can be read and processed by a DEC computer.

In many instances, network applications programs use the name of the protocol.
For example, the program that transfers files may be called "FTP" and the
program that allows remote logins may be called "Telnet."  Sometimes these
protocols are incorporated into larger packages, as is common with SMTP.  Many
computers have mail programs that allow users on the same computer to send mail
to each other.  SMTP functions are often added to these mail programs so that
users can also send and receive mail through a network.  In such cases, there
is no separate program called SMTP that the user can access, since the mail
program provides the user interface to this network function.

Specific implementation of network protocols, such as FTP, are tailored to the
computer hardware and operating system on which they are used.  Therefore, the
exact user interface varies from one implementation to another.  For example,
the FTP protocol specifies a set of FTP commands which each FTP implementation
must understand and process.  However, these are usually placed at a low level,
often invisible to the user, who is given a higher set of commands to use.

These higher-level commands are not standardized so they may vary from one
implementation of FTP to another.  For some operating systems, not all of these
commands make equal sense, such as "Change Directory," or may have different
meanings.  Therefore the specific user interface that the user sees will
probably differ.

This file describes a generic implementation of the standard TCP/IP application
protocols.  Users must consult local documentation for specifics at their
sites.


Names and Addresses In A Network
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In DOD Protocol Suite, each network is given a unique identifying number.  This
number is assigned by a central authority, namely the Network Information
Center run by SRI, abbreviated as SRI-NIC, in order to prevent more than one
network from having the same network number.  For example, the ARPAnet has
network number 10 while MIDnet has a longer number, namely 128.242.

Each host in a network has a unique identification so other hosts can specify
them unambiguously.  Host numbers are usually assigned by the organization that
manages the network, rather than one central authority.  Host numbers do not
need to be unique throughout the whole Internet but two hosts on the same
network need to have unique host numbers.

The combination of the network number and the host number is called the IP
address of the host and is specified as a 32-bit binary number.  All IP
addresses in the Internet are expressible as 32-bit numbers, although they are
often written in dotted decimal notation.  Dotted decimal notation breaks the
32-bit number into four eight-bit parts or octets and each octet is specified
as a decimal number.  For example, 00000001 is the binary octet that specifies
the decimal number 1, while 11000000 specifies 192.  Dotted decimal notation
makes IP addresses much easier to read and remember.

Computers in the Internet are also identified by hostnames, which are strings
of characters, such as "phrackvax."  However, IP packets must specify the
32-bit IP address instead of the hostname so  some way to translating hostnames
to IP addresses must exist.

One way is to have a table of hostnames and their corresponding IP addresses,
called a hosttable.  Nearly every TCP/IP implementation has such a hosttable,
although the weaknesses of this method are forcing a shift to a new scheme
called the domain name system.  In UNIX systems, the hosttable is often called
"/etc/hosts."  You can usually read this file and find out what the IP
addresses of various hosts are.  Other systems may call this file by a
different name and make it unavailable for public viewing.

Users of computers are generally given accounts to which all charges for
computer use are billed.  Even if computer time is free at an installation,
accounts are used to distinguish between the users and enforce file
protections.  The generic term "username" will be used in this file to refer to
the name by which the computer account is accessed.

In the early days of the ARPAnet which was the first network to use the TCP/IP
protocols, computer users were identified by their username, followed by a
commercial "at" sign (@), followed by the hostname on which the account
existed.  Networks were not given names, per se, although the IP address
specified a network number.

For example, "knight@phrackvax" referred to user "knight" on host "phrackvax."
This did not specify which network "phrackvax" was on, although that
information could be obtained by examining the hosttable and the IP address for
"phrackvax."  (However, "phrackvax" is a ficticious hostname used for this
presentation.)

As time went on, every computer on the network had to have an entry in its
hosttable for every other computer on the network.  When several networks
linked together to form the Internet, the problem of maintaining this central
hosttable got out of hand.  Therefore, the domain name scheme was introduced to
split up the hosttable and make it smaller and easier to maintain.

In the new domain name scheme, users are still identified by their usernames,
but hosts are now identified by their hostname and any and all domains of which
they are a part.  For example, the following address,
"[e-mail]" specifies username "KNIGHT" on host "UMCVMB".
However, host "UMCVMB" is a part of the domain "MISSOURI" " which is in turn
part of the domain "EDU".  There are other domains in "EDU", although only one
is named "MISSOURI".  In the domain "MISSOURI", there is only one host named
"UMCVMB".

However, other domains in "EDU" could theoretically have hosts named "UMCVMB"
(although I would say that this is rather unlikely in this example).  Thus the
combination of hostname and all its domains makes it unique.  The method of
translating such names into IP addresses is no longer as straightforward as
looking up the hostname in a table.  Several protocols and specialized network
software called nameservers and resolvers implement the domain name scheme.

Not all TCP/IP implementations support domain names because it is rather new.
In those cases, the local hosttable provides the only way to translate
hostnames to IP addresses.  The system manager of that computer will have to
put an entry into the hosttable for every host that users may want to connect
to.  In some cases, users may consult the nameserver themselves to find out the
IP address for a given hostname and then use that IP address directly instead
of a hostname.

I have selected a few network hosts to demonstrate how a host system can be
specified by both the hostname and host numerical address.  Some of the nodes I
have selected are also nodes on BITnet, perhaps even some of the others that I
do not make a note of due a lack of omniscent awareness about each and every
single host system in the world :-)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Numerical      Hostname                   Location                       BITnet
---------      --------                   --------                       ------
18.72.0.39     ATHENA.MIT.EDU             (Mass. Institute of Technology)     ?
26.0.0.73      SRI-NIC.ARPA               (DDN Network Information Center)    -
36.21.0.13     MACBETH.STANFORD.EDU       (Stanford University)               ?
36.21.0.60     PORTIA.STANFORD.EDU        (Stanford University)               ?
128.2.11.131   ANDREW.CMU.EDU             (Carnegie Mellon University)   ANDREW
128.3.254.13   LBL.GOV                    (Lawrence Berkeley Labrotories)   LBL
128.6.4.7      RUTGERS.RUTGERS.EDU        (Rutgers University)                ?
128.59.99.1    CUCARD.MED.COLUMBIA.EDU    (Columbia University)               ?
128.102.18.3   AMES.ARC.NASA.GOV          (Ames Research Center [NASA])       -
128.103.1.1    HARVARD.EDU                (Harvard University)          HARVARD
128.111.24.40  HUB.UCSB.EDU               (Univ. Of Calif-Santa Barbara)      ?
128.115.14.1   LLL-WINKEN.LLNL.GOV        (Lawrence Livermore Labratories)    -
128.143.2.7    UVAARPA.VIRGINIA.EDU       (University of Virginia)            ?
128.148.128.40 BROWNVM.BROWN.EDU          (Brown University)              BROWN
128.163.1.5    UKCC.UKY.EDU               (University of Kentucky)         UKCC
128.183.10.4   NSSDCA.GSFC.NASA.GOV       (Goddard Space Flight Center [NASA])-
128.186.4.18   RAI.CC.FSU.EDU             (Florida State University)        FSU
128.206.1.1    UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU        (Univ. of Missouri-Columbia)   UMCVMB
128.208.1.15   MAX.ACS.WASHINGTON.EDU     (University of Washington)        MAX
128.228.1.2    CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU            (City University of New York)  CUNYVM
129.10.1.6     NUHUB.ACS.NORTHEASTERN.EDU (Northeastern University)       NUHUB
131.151.1.4    UMRVMA.UMR.EDU             (University of Missouri-Rolla) UMRVMA
192.9.9.1      SUN.COM                    (Sun Microsystems, Inc.)            -
192.33.18.30   VM1.NODAK.EDU              (North Dakota State Univ.)    NDSUVM1
192.33.18.50   PLAINS.NODAK.EDU           (North Dakota State Univ.)    NDSUVAX

Please Note:  Not every system on BITnet has an IP address.  Likewise, not
              every system that has an IP address is on BITnet.  Also, while
              some locations like Stanford University may have nodes on BITnet
              and have hosts on the IP as well, this does not neccessarily
              imply that the systems on BITnet and on IP (the EDU domain in
              this case) are the same systems.

              Attempts to gain unauthorized access to systems on the Internet
              are not tolerated and is legally a federal offense.  At some
              hosts, they take this very seriously, especially the government
              hosts such as NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, where they do
              not mind telling you so at the main prompt when you connect to
              their system.

              However, some nodes are public access to an extent.  The DDN
              Network Information Center can be used by anyone.  The server and
              database there have proven to be an invaluable source of
              information when locating people, systems, and other information
              that is related to the Internet.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Telnet

~~~~~~
Remote login refers to logging in to a remote computer from a terminal
connected to a local computer.  Telnet is the standard protocol in the DOD
Protocol Suite for accomplishing this.  The "rlogin" program, provided with
Berkeley UNIX systems and some other systems, also enables remote login.

For purposes of discussion, the "local computer" is the computer to which your
terminal is directly connected while the "remote computer" is the computer on
the network to which you are communicating and to which your terminal is *NOT*
directly connected.

Since some computers use a different method of attaching terminals to
computers, a better definition would be the following:  The "local computer" is
the computer that you are currently using and the "remote computer" is the
computer on the network with which you are or will be communicating.  Note that
the terms "host" and "computer" are synonymous in the following discussion.

To use Telnet, simply enter the command: TELNET

The prompt that Telnet gives is:  Telnet>

(However, you can specify where you want to Telnet to immediately and bypass
the the prompts and other delays by issuing the command:  TELNET [location].)

There is help available by typing in ?.  This prints a list of all the valid
subcommands that Telnet provides with a one-line explanation.

Telnet> ?

To connect to to another computer, use the open subcommand to open a connection
to that computer.  For example, to connect to the host "UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU",
do "open umcvmb.missouri.edu"

Telnet will resolve (i.e. Translate, the hostname "umcvmb.missouri.edu" into an
IP address and will send a packet to that host requesting login.  If the remote
host decides to let you attempt a login, it prompts you for your username and
password.  If the host does not respond, Telnet will "time out" (i.e. Wait for
a reasonable amount of time such as 20 seconds) and then terminate with a
message such as "Host not responding."

If your computer does not have an entry for a remote host in its hosttable and
it cannot resolve the name, you can use the IP address explicitly in the telnet
command.  For example,

TELNET 26.0.0.73 (Note:  This is the IP address for the DDN Network Information
                 Center [SRI-NIC.ARPA])

If you are successful in logging in, your terminal is connected to the remote
host.  For all intents and purposes, your terminal is directly hard-wired to
that host and you should be able to do anything on your remote terminal that
you can do at any local terminal.  There are a few exceptions to this rule,
however.

Telnet provides a network escape character, such as CONTROL-T. You can find out
what the escape character is by entering the "status" subcommand:

Telnet> status

You can change the escape character by entering the "escape" subcommand:

Telnet> escape

When you type in the escape character, the Telnet prompt returns to your screen
and you can enter subcommands.  For example, to break the connection, which
usually logs you off the remote host, enter the subcommand "quit":

Telnet> quit

Your Telnet connection usually breaks when you log off the remote host, so the
"quit" subcommand is not usually used to log off.

When you are logged in to a remote computer via Telnet, remember that there is
a time delay between your local computer and the remote one.  This often
becomes apparent to users when scrolling a long file across the terminal screen
nd they wish to cancel the scrolling by typing CONTROL-C or something similar.
After typing the special control character, the scrolling continues.  The
special control character takes a certain amount of time to reach the remote
computer which is still scrolling information.  Thus response from the remote
computer will not likely be as quick as response from a local computer.

Once you are remotely logged on, the computer you are logged on to effectively
becomes your "local computer," even though your original "local computer" still
considers you logged on.  You can log on to a third computer which would then
become your "local computer" and so on.  As you log out of each session, your
previous session becomes active again.


File Transfer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

FTP is the program that allows files to be sent from one computer to another.
"FTP" stands for "File Transfer Protocol".

When you start using FTP, a communications channel with another computer on the
network is opened.  For example, to start using FTP and initiate a file
transfer session with a computer on the network called "UMCVMB", you would
issue the following subcommand:

FTP UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU

Host "UMCVMB" will prompt you for an account name and password.  If your login
is correct, FTP will tell you so, otherwise it will say "login incorrect."  Try
again or abort the FTP program.  (This is usually done by typing a special
control character such as CONTROL-C.  The "program abort" character varies from
system to system.)

Next you will see the FTP prompt, which is:

Ftp>

There are a number of subcommands of FTP.  The subcommand "?" will list these
commands and a brief description of each one.

You can initiate a file transfer in either direction with FTP, either from the
remote host or to the remote host.  The "get" subcommand initiates a file
transfer from the remote host (i.e. Tells the remote computer to send the file
to the local computer [the one on which you issued the "ftp" command]).  Simply
enter "get" and  FTP will prompt you for the remote host's file name and the
(new) local host's file name.  Example:

Ftp> get
Remote file name?
theirfile
local file name?
myfile

ou can abbreviate this by typing both file names on the same line as the "get"
subcommand.  If you do not specify a local file name, the new local file will
be called the same thing as the remote file.  Valid FTP subcommands to get a
file include the following:

get theirfile myfile
get doc.x25

The "put" subcommand works in a similar fashion and is used to send a file from
the local computer to the remote computer.  Enter the command "put" and FTP
will prompt you for the local file name and then the remote file name.  If the
transfer cannot be done because the file doesn't exist or for some other
reason, FTP will print an error message.

There are a number of other subcommands in FTP that allow you to do many more
things.  Not all of these are standard so consult your local documentation or
type a question mark at the FTP prompt.  Some functions often built into FTP
include the ability to look at files before getting or putting them, the
ability to change directories, the ability to delete files on the remote
computer, and the ability to list the directory on the remote host.

An intriguing capability of many FTP implementations is "third party
transfers."  For example, if you are logged on computer A and you want to cause
computer B to send a file to computer C, you can use FTP to connect to computer
B and use the "rmtsend" command.  Of course, you have to know usernames and
passwords on all three computers, since FTP never allows you to peek into
someone's directory and files unless you know their username and password.

The "cd" subcommand changes your working directory on the remote host.  The
"lcd" subcommand changes the directory on the local host.  For UNIX systems,
the meaning of these subcommands is obvious.  Other systems, especially those
that do not have directory-structured file system, may not implement these
commands or may implement them in a different manner.

The "dir" and "ls" subcommands do the same thing, namely list the files in the
working directory of of the remote host.

The "list" subcommand shows the contents of a file without actually putting it
into a file on the local computer.  This would be helpful if you just wanted to
inspect a file.  You could interrupt it before it reached the end of the file
by typing CONTROL-C or some other special character.  This is dependent on your
FTP implementation.

The "delete" command can delete files on the remote host.  You can also make
and remove directories on the remote host with "mkdir" and "rmdir".  The
"status" subcommand will tell you if you are connected and with whom and what
the state of all your options are.

If you are transferring binary files or files with any non-printable
characters, turn binary mode on by entering the "binary" subcommand:

binary

To resume non-binary transfers, enter the "ascii" subcommand.

Transferring a number of files can be done easily by using "mput" (multiple
put) and "mget" (multiple get).  For example, to get every file in a particular
directory, first issue a "cd" command to  change to that directory and then an
"mget" command with an asterisk to indicate every file:

cd somedirectory
mget *

When you are done, use the "close" subcommand to break the communications link.
You will still be in FTP, so you must use the "bye" subcommand to exit FTP and
return to the command level.  The "quit" subcommand will close the connection
and exit from FTP at the same time.


Mail
~~~~
Mail is the simplest network facility to use in many ways.  All you have to do
is to create your message, which can be done with a file editor or on the spur
of the moment, and then send it.  Unlike FTP and Telnet, you do not need to
know the password of the username on the remote computer.  This is so because
you cannot change or access the files of the remote user nor can you use their
account to run programs.  All you can do is to send a message.

There is probably a program on your local computer which does mail between
users on that computer.  Such a program is called a mailer.  This may or may
not be the way to send or receive mail from other computers on the network,
although integrated mailers are more and more common.  UNIX mailers will be
used as an example in this discussion.

Note that the protocol which is used to send and receive mail over a TCP/IP
network is called SMTP, the "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol."  Typically, you
will not use any program called SMTP, but rather your local mail program.

UNIX mailers are usually used by invoking a program named "mail".  To receive
new mail, simply type "mail".

There are several varieties of UNIX mailers in existence.  Consult your local
documentation for details.  For example, the command "man mail" prints out the
manual pages for the mail program on your computer.

To send mail, you usually specify the address of the recipient on the mail
command.  For example: "mail [e-mail]" will send the
following message to username "knight" on host "umcvmb".

You can usually type in your message one line at a time, pressing RETURN after
each line and typing CONTROL-D to end the message. Other facilities to include
already-existing files sometimes exist.  For example, Berkeley UNIXes allow you
to enter commands similar to the following to include a file in your current
mail message:

r myfile

In this example, the contents of "myfile" are inserted into the message at this
point.

Most UNIX systems allow you to send a file through the mail by using input
redirection.  For example:

mail [e-mail] < myfile

In this example, the contents of "myfile" are sent as a message to "knight" on
"umcvmb."

Note that in many UNIX systems the only distinction between mail bound for
another user on the same computer and another user on a remote computer is
simply the address specified.  That is, there is no hostname for local
recipients.  Otherwise, mail functions in exactly the same way.  This is common
for integrated mail packages.  The system knows whether to send the mail
locally or through the network based on the address and the user is shielded
from any other details.


                  "The Quest For Knowledge Is Without End..."
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 4 of 12

               :.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:
               :.:                                           :.:
               :.:  NUA-List For Datex-P And X.25 Networks   :.:
               :.:                                           :.:
               :.:               by Oberdaemon               :.:
               :.:                                           :.:
               :.:               April 9, 1989               :.:
               :.:                                           :.:
               :.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:

 _____________________________________________________________________________
|                                                                             |
|  Key:                                                                       |
|                                                                             |
|  A    = successfully connected                                              |
|  B    = sources say that it works                                           |
|  C    = officially closed                                                   |
|  D    = disconnected/no circuit or permanently busy                         |
|  I    = illegal address or invalid call                                     |
|  O    = out of order                                                        |
|  r    = R-NUA                                                               |
|  T    = time-out                                                            |
|  X    = sources say that it should work but it doesn't (or is permanently   |
|         busy)                                                               |
|  Y    = barred (=?)                                                         |
|  Z    = sources say that it should not work                                 |
|      = including the following digits gives you another number             |
|  n/a  = not yet tested                                                      |
|  ?    = error on a subsequent communication system                          |
|                                                                             |
| Remark: I have also included some obviously misstyped NUAs which have been  |
|         found in widely circulating lists.  There are also numbers which do |
|         not form a valid NUA but a common prefix (e.g. 0202 2  Helpak).     |
|                                                                             |
| Format: Each NUA in this list consists of the following fields:             |
|                                                                             |
|         cccc naa aaa aaa... oooo...      ddd....                            |
|                                                                             |
|  cccc       is the country prefix (e.g. 0262 Germany). This prefix can be   |
|             omitted when calling and called party have both the same prefix.|
|  naa        are the first three digits of the address. n often specifies a  |
|             certain network in that country.                                |
|  aaa aaa... are the other digits of the address.                            |
|  oooo...    are some extra digits/letters which should be added after the   |
|             NUA. The correct syntax depends on your PAD. This list uses any |
|             syntax - usually depending on the notation the author of the    |
|             source used. The oooo... field is usually empty.                |
|  ddd...     is a short description of the service.                          |
|                                                                             |
| If you find two NUAs who differ only in the number of trailing zeroes, but  |
| connect to the same service, you may safely throw away the longer one.      |
|                                                                             |
|  !!  Please note that most PADs don't accept spaces inside a NUA  !!        |
|_____________________________________________________________________________|


  0200                  GR         Greece
  0202
  0202 2                           Helpak (enkelriktad trafik)
X 0202 452 241 24104
  0204                  NL         Netherlands
  0204 0                           Datanet (1?)
  0204 1                           Datanet (1?)
A 0204 129 001 3                   ? (Netz ?)
A 0204 129 001 4                   X.25
A 0204 129 003 1                   NONOBY
A 0204 129 003 4                   Searchline
D 0204 129 004 33       SARA       National Institute for High Energy Physics
                                   (NIKHEF) SARA network
D 0204 129 004 34       NIKHEF     National Institute for High Energy Physics
                                   (NIKHEF) SARA network
D 0204 129 005 6        MCVAX      MCVAX, HOLLAND
A 0204 129 005 675      HARING     MCVAX Line 2
   0204 129 400 2                   DUPHAR WEESP,HOLLAND
A 0204 134 014 80500               Utrecht ?
  0204 303 0                       EPOIS EPO Den Haag
  0204 304 0                       DSAMISOOM SAMSON
  0204 4                           Dabas
  0206                  B          Belgium
  0206 2                           DCS
A 0206 210 300 003                 Eigebib
A 0206 222 100 6        BBDA       Brussels DEC A
A 0206 222 101 2        ?          Ministry of economic affairs
A 0206 222 102 6                   celex
A 0206 224 001 903      PRLB2      Belgium Unix Backbone
  0206 3                           Euronet
A 0206 228 821 0                   DGxiiiF
  0208                  F          France
  0208 0                TRANSPAC   French Transpac
A 0208 006 040 010                 Telesystemes 1
A 0208 006 040 201                 Telesystemes 2
A 0208 026 020 843                 ?
A 0208 034 020 036      CNUSC      CNUSC (France)
A 0208 034 020 258      CNUSC      CNUSC Montpelier
A 0208 038 020 100                 CICG Grenoble
A 0208 038 020 676                 ILL VEGA VAX 8700 VMS 4.7
I 0208 044 001 645                 ?
A 0208 057 040 540                 QSD (Chat system)
I 0208 069 021 258
A 0208 075 000 087      IRCAM      IRCAM-ERIK VAX 11/780 4.2 BSD
I 0208 075 000 355                 ?
I 0208 075 001 281*D    CCPN       Computing Centre Nuclear Physics
I 0208 075 002 314                 GRF
A 0208 075 020 655      LITP       LITP Unix 4.3 BSD (France)
A 0208 075 041 280                 Pasteur MV8000
A 0208 078 020 118      INRIA      INRIA, Rocquencourt (France) Multics
B 0208 078 020 16901    INRIA      Institute National de Recherche en
                                   Informatique
  0208 078 081 67304    INRIAUU    INRIA - UUCICO
I 0208 091 000 270*DCISICISI3      IBM - TSO
I 0208 091 000 309*DCISICISI1      IBM - TSO
I 0208 091 000 519*DCISICISI2      IBM - TSO
I 0208 091 010 320      CJRCE
I 0208 091 040 047      SACLAY     Saclay - France
I 0208 091 040 532                 Pascal
A 0208 091 190 258                 LURE, VAX 11/780 VMS 4.6, Synchrotron
                                   source (SES)
  0208 1                           NTI
A 0208 101              TEXTFRA    Text Generator, FRANCE
  0214                  E          Spain
  0214 1                SPAIN      Spanish data network (NID/CTNE)
  0214 5                           Iberpac
O 0214 521 202 5022
A 0214 521 302 1020                ETSITM (EANNET) VAX 11/750 VMS 4.5
  0222                  I          Italy
  0222 2                           Itapac
A 0222 262 002 1        ESAIRS1    ESA-QUEST, IRS 1
I 0222 262 002 2        ESAIRS2    ESA-IRS 2
O 0222 262 003 2                   IASI VAX
A 0222 262 004 3                   VAXLNF (INFNET) VAX 8650
O 0222 263 200 4                   NUA-Information ?
A 0222 265 014 0                   Techni-Link
I 0222 306 3                       Progetto-Sirio
I 0222 306 700                     European Space Agency
I 0222 306 9*D          CNUCE      CNUCE
I 0222 307 0                       CILEA
I 0222 307 1                       CED Datenbanksysteme Rom
I 0222 307 2*D          RTC20      JRC
I 0222 307 7*D QUESTD5  ESA        ESA
D 0222 307 8*D QUESTD5  ESA2       ESA
  0228                  CH         Switzerland
D 0228 310 1*DN         DATASTAR   Data-Star, Switzerland
  0228 4                           Telepac
A 0228 462 110 0101                Cigy IBMA
A 0228 462 110 0102                Cigy DEC1091
A 0228 462 110 09                  EDP Basel
A 0228 462 110 23                  ?
A 0228 462 110 34                  ?
A 0228 462 110 36                  ?
A 0228 462 110 52                  DANZA'S 11/785 VMS 4.4
A 0228 462 110 61                  PKK node RBPK00
A 0228 462 110 66                  PROGNOS Basel (CIERR 1402)
A 0228 462 110 70                  ?
A 0228 462 110 84                  (CIERR 1402)
Y 0228 462 170 02                  INFOTEX PTT
I 0228 464 109 06                  GD PTT Schweiz (ring with CTRL G)
A 0228 464 110 10       DM         DATAMAIL (RSAG)
A 0228 464 110 110      DSTAR2     Datastar (2nd. Line)
A 0228 464 110 112                 RSAG
Z 0228 464 110 113                 RSAG
A 0228 464 110 115      DATASTAR   Data-Star, Switzerland (Pharmadatenbank ?)
A 0228 468 113 150                 Management Joint Trust
D 0228 468 114 05       CERN       CERN (=CERNXX?)
A 0228 468 114 0505                CS Group LAVC on node UXCOMS
A 0228 468 114 0510     CER        CERN, Geneva
A 0228 468 114 0510     CERNVAX    CERN X25 Multigate
B 0228 468 114 0510*DLO CERNLO     CERN 300 bps     OUTDIAL (where ???)
B 0228 468 114 0510*DME CERNME     CERN 1200 bps    OUTDIAL (where ???)
B 0228 468 114 0510*DHI            CERN ?
A 0228 468 114 0514                4.2 BSD UNIX (Mint)
A 0228 468 114 0515                Cern LS Group LAVC VXGIFT
A 0228 468 114 0520                Cern
A 0228 468 114 0532                Cern
A 0228 468 114 0533                L3 test beam VAX-750 VXC3
A 0228 468 114 0534                UXINFN
A 0228 468 114 0538                CS Group LAVC on node UXCOMS
A 0228 468 114 054                 Cern
A 0228 468 114 0545                Cern
A 0228 468 114 0551                VXCERN VMS 4.6
A 0228 468 114 0553                VXCERN VMS 4.6
A 0228 468 114 0556                VXCERN VMS 4.6
A 0228 468 114 0560                CERN VXNA31
A 0228 468 114 0561                CERN VXNA31
A 0228 468 114 0562                L3 VAX 11/750 VXC3MU
A 0228 468 114 0572                ISOLDES VAX 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0574                ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0581                ?
A 0228 468 114 0583                %Merit:X.25 (Merit Computer Network, see
                                   appendix)
A 0228 468 114 0584                Develcon
A 0228 468 114 0587                ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0588                ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0589                ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0592                Princeton University High Energy Physics
                                   Group Vax 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0593                University of Michigan Physics Vax 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0596                N.U. Physics Vax 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0597                Harvard University High Energy Physics Lab.
                                   Vax 8650
A 0228 468 114 0598                MIT-LNS*PIERRE
A 0228 468 114 0599                DoD, Distributed Databases Coordination
                                    Center (JMILLER,X0TF3AP)
D 0228 468 114 18                  BIOGEN (=GODEL?)
A 0228 468 114 23                  EDCHUB::
A 0228 469 110 02                  EPFL (something)
A 0228 469 110 0202                EPFL HELP
D 0228 469 110 0203                EPFL DE.VAX
D 0228 469 110 0204                EPFL GC.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0205                EPFL DP.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0206                EPFL ME.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0207                EPFL GR.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0208                EPFL MA.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0209                EPFL DI.VAX
D 0228 469 110 0210                EPFL IMAC.PDP
D 0228 469 110 0211                EPFL CGL.VAX
D 0228 469 110 0212                EPFL DE.MVAX
A 0228 469 110 0213                EPFL CC.VAX
A 0228 469 110 03                  EPFL Cyber 855
Ar0228 469 110 0301                EPFL Cyber
A 0228 475 110 02                  HSG St.Gallen
Ar0228 479 104 00                  Cern
A 0228 479 110 23                  I.P.Sharp (CA)
X 0228 479 110 86                  KOMETH (ETH ZH)
A 0228 479 110 650                 KOMETH (ETH ZH)
I 0228 479 111
A 0228 479 111 06                  GRS
I 0228 479 111 086
I 0228 479 111 11
I 0228 479 111 18                  ZEV-Mailbox Zuerich
A 0228 479 111 750                 ComNet (R-Nua)
A 0228 479 311 49                  KOMETH Output (ETH ZH)
A 0228 499 111 02001               KOMETH (Entry Uni)
  0228 9                           Radio-Suisse
  0232                  A          Austria
  0232 2                           Datex-P
O 0232 242 210 91
? 0232 242 211 42*DMAI             Sysnet Wien (Gast,Gast)
A 0232 252 310 000                 Uni Wien
  0232 9                           Radio Austri
A 0232 911 602 323                 Inpadoc
  0234                  GB         United Kingdom
  0234 1                IPSS       IPSS UK network
A 0234 110 020 02018               BT DIALCOM GROUP (PRESTEL ?)
  0234 2                           PSS
  0234 198 061 60                  Queen Marry C.
B 0234 207 920 002                 SWVA
  0234 211 920 100515              Hostess Doc.
  0234 212                         Dialnet
O 0234 212 080 105
I 0234 212 080 110      EPSONUK    Epson (UK)
A 0234 212 300 120      DIALNET    IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 12011    DIALNET    LRS-DIALOG 2   Dialog via London
Ar0234 212 300 12013    DIALMRC    LRS-Dialmail   (Reverse Charging)
A 0234 212 300 120*D@   DIALNET    IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 2920                GeoNet GEO2
B 0234 212 301 161                 OPTEL
  0234 212 301 186                 GEOSYSTEMS
  0234 212 301 187                 CAP GROUP LTD.
  0234 212 301 18722    CAP        CAP Industry Ltd.
  0234 212 301 281                 ONE TO ONE COMMS
O 0234 212 302 02192    PSSCLK     PSS Clock
B 0234 212 399 12013    DIALMAL    Dialmail via London
A 0234 212 900 115      STL        STL : ACER (BSD UNIX 4.2)
  0234 213 000 11
  0234 213 000 151      COMPUTAS   Computas Ltd
  0234 213 000 1511                COMPUTAS LTD.
D 0234 213 900 10150   ALVEY      Alvey Mail and FTP.
  0234 214 200 162      GLAXO      Galaxo Industries
  0234 214 400 12                  CONTROL DATA LTD.
  0234 215 000 11600    C3
  0234 215 710 104                 Consultans Ltd
  0234 216 700 127      PFIZER     Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12701    PFIZER1    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12702    PFIZER2    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12703    PFIZER3    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12704    PFIZER4    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12706    PFIZER6    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 218 801 00300               British Telecom Hotline
  0234 2                           PSS
  0234 198 061 60                  Queen Marry C.
B 0234 207 920 002                 SWVA
  0234 211 920 100515              Hostess Doc.
  0234 212                         Dialnet
O 0234 212 080 105
I 0234 212 080 110      EPSONUK    Epson (UK)
A 0234 212 300 120      DIALNET    IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 12011    DIALNET    LRS-DIALOG 2   Dialog via London
Ar0234 212 300 12013    DIALMRC    LRS-Dialmail   (Reverse Charging)
A 0234 212 300 120*D@   DIALNET    IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 2920                GeoNet GEO2
B 0234 212 301 161                 OPTEL
  0234 212 301 186                 GEOSYSTEMS
  0234 212 301 187                 CAP GROUP LTD.
  0234 212 301 18722    CAP        CAP Industry Ltd.
  0234 212 301 281                 ONE TO ONE COMMS
O 0234 212 302 02192    PSSCLK     PSS Clock
B 0234 212 399 12013    DIALMAL    Dialmail via London
A 0234 212 900 115      STL        STL : ACER (BSD UNIX 4.2)
  0234 213 000 11
  0234 213 000 151      COMPUTAS   Computas Ltd
  0234 213 000 1511                COMPUTAS LTD.
D 0234 213 900 10150   ALVEY      Alvey Mail and FTP.
  0234 214 200 162      GLAXO      Galaxo Industries
  0234 214 400 12                  CONTROL DATA LTD.
  0234 215 000 11600    C3
  0234 215 710 104                 Consultans Ltd
  0234 216 700 127      PFIZER     Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12701    PFIZER1    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12702    PFIZER2    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12703    PFIZER3    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12704    PFIZER4    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 216 700 12706    PFIZER6    Pfizer, SANDWICH
  0234 218 801 00300               British Telecom Hotline
  0234 219                         PSS-Network
  0234 219 200 001                 Network Monitoring Centre (NFS)
  0234 219 200 002                 Network Monitoring Centre (NFS)
  0234 219 200 100                 University of London Computing Centre
  0234 219 200 10069    JANETGW    PSS/JANET Gateway (ULCC)
B 0234 219 200 101                 Finsbury Data Service
  0234 219 200 1082                BING COMPUTER SERVICES (EUROPE) LTD.
A 0234 219 200 118      ADPUK      ADP NETWORK SERVICES LTD. (=AUTONET?)
  0234 219 200 118                 atomic energy research establishment
  0234 219 200 13370    QTLON      Quantime
A 0234 219 200 146      CEGB       CEGB, Park Street, London
B 0234 219 200 14869    ULCC       Univ. London Computer Centre (=JANET2?)
B 0234 219 200 14918    UCLMVAX    UCL Microvax ARPA Gateway
B 0234 219 200 14970
  0234 219 200 154                 UNILEVER COMPUTER SERVICES LTD.
A 0234 219 200 171      LEXIS      LEXIS
A 0234 219 200 190      INFOLINE   PERGAMON INFOLINE LTD. (NFS)
A 0234 219 200 203      IPSH       SHARP, I. P. ASSOCIATES LTD.
A 0234 219 200 220                 BRITISH LIBRARY ON-LINE SYSTEM
A 0234 219 200 222      BLAISE     British Library Information System
  0234 219 200 297                 RLFE & NOLAN COMPUTER SERVICES PLC
B 0234 219 200 300      UCL        University College London - Computer
  0234 219 200 300      UCLFTP     UCL (FTP)
A 0234 219 200 300      UCLMAIL    UCL (JNT Mail)
  0234 219 200 304                 University Computing Company (GB) Ltd.
B 0234 219 200 333      EUCLID     University College London  Computer Centre
  0234 219 200 394      CISI       CISI (=SIANET?;=Computer Services, London?)
  0234 219 200 871                 Instrument Rentals (UK) Ltd.
B 0234 219 201 002      POOLE
  0234 219 201 004      BGOLD81    Telecom BT-GOLD System 81
  0234 219 201 00472    BGOLD72    Telecom BT-GOLD System 72
  0234 219 201 00474    BGOLD74    Telecom BT-GOLD System 74
  0234 219 201 00479    BTGOLD     Telecom BT-GOLD System 79
  0234 219 201 00481    BTGOLDA    Telecom BT-GOLD System 81
  0234 219 201 00482    BTGOLD82   Telecom BT-GOLD System 82
  0234 219 201 00484    BGOLD84    Telecom Gold System 84
  0234 219 201 005      PSSMAIL    PSS TELE-MAIL service
B 0234 219 201 00513    DIANENQ    Euronet DIANE Enquiry Service
                                   (=Echo,Rutherford?)
B 0234 219 201 00513    EUROINFO   Euronet Diane Information Service
                                   (=Echo,Rutherford?)
A 0234 219 201 00515    BTDOC      BT Online Documentation Service
A 0234 219 201 00515    HOSTESS    Hostess system (BT)
  0234 219 201 00530    BAYNARD    BT Protocol Study Centre (NFS)
  0234 219 201 00615    PSSDOC     PSS documentation service/X25 technical
                                   info on line
  0234 219 201 00620    BTBILL     BT Online Billing
  0234 219 201 0100513
  0234 219 201 01013    HOSTESS    Hostess system (BT) (=PSS Switchstream 1 ?)
T 0234 219 201 01030    TSTB       British Telecom
  0234 219 201 025      PRESTEL    BT Prestel Service
  0234 219 201 02517
  0234 219 201 07800
  0234 219 201 15600    ESA1       ESA-IRS via London
  0234 219 201 18       ADPUK      ADP Network Services Ltd
  0234 219 210 050                 BT Mailbox facility (NFS)
  0234 219 511 31       GEC        GEC Computers Borehamwood
  0234 219 511 311      GECB       GEC Computers Ltd. Borehamwood
  0234 219 513 11       GECB       GEC Computers Ltd. Borehamwood
  0234 219 709 111                 Modular Computer Services Ltd. (MODCOMP)
? 0234 219 709 111      NPL1       National Physical Laboratory
  0234 219 709 210      NPL2       National Physical Laboratory, Protocol Std
                                   Group
B 0234 219 806 160      QMC        Queen Mary College London
X 0234 220 200 1070                island-Adventure-Game
X 0234 220 200 10700               island-Adventure-Game
  0234 220 641 141      ESSX       Essex, University of, Computing Service
                                   (2653,2653,Mist)
A 0234 220 641 1411                MUD (Adventure Game), <guest>, <mist> or
                                   <2653,2653>
B 0234 221 222 122      MIDB       MIDNET Gateway at Birmingham (=MIDBHM)
  0234 221 222 223      BIRP       Prime R & D at Birmingham
  0234 221 222 225                 Freight Comp. Services
  0234 222 236 163      CARDF      Cardiff, University College
  0234 222 236 16300    CARDIFF    Univ. Coll. Cardiff Multics
  0234 222 236 236      UWIST      University of Wales
  0234 222 300 16102    ACORN      Acorn Computers
  0234 222 339 399      CAMBRID    Cambridge University (Phoenix)
  0234 222 530 303      SWURCC     South-West Universities
  0234 222 530 30388    SWURCC     South-West Universities Network
  0234 222 530 30398    SWCFTP     SWURCC (FTP)
A 0234 222 715 151      KENT       University of Kent
X 0234 222 715 11                  ? (---,Guest,Friend (call PIP))
  0234 223 440          TI         Texas Instruments Ltd
  0234 223 440 144      BED5       Prime R & D at Bedford (NFS)
  0234 223 440 345      TI         Texas Instruments Ltd
  0234 223 500 10998    HLH        High Level Hardware Ltd.
B 0234 223 519 111      AERE       Atomic Energy Research Establishment at
                                   Harwell
T 0234 223 519 11198    ADA        ADA UK Database
  0234 223 519 119169              JANET
  0234 223 519 191      DLVAFTP    Daresbury SRS VAX (FTP)
A 0234 223 519 191      JANET      Gateway to JANET at Rutherford
  0234 223 519 191      OUCSFTP    OUCS VAX (FTP) - Experimental
  0234 223 519 191      REVSFTP    ROE Starlink VAX (FTP)
  0234 223 519 191      RLDAFTP    Rutherford DCS 11/70 (FTP)
  0234 223 519 191      RLGBFTP    RL GEC (FTP)
  0234 223 519 191      RLIBFTP    RL IBM 370 CMS (FTP)
  0234 223 519 191      RLPCFTP    L Prime C (FTP)
  0234 223 519 191      SERC       Gateway to SERCNET at Rutherford
  0234 223 519 191      SERCENQ    SERCNET Acc & P/word Fac.
  0234 223 519 191      SYPEFTP    Surrey Prime 550 (FTP)
  0234 223 519 191      UEAFTP     East Anglia via SERC (FTP)
  0234 223 519 191      ZUVSFTP    UCL Starlink VAX (FTP)
A 0234 223 519 19169    SERCNET    R/ford XXX SERCnet g/way
                                   (=DARESBURY,=JANET?)
? 0234 223 519 19169,.10404000     Lancaster Uni
B 0234 223 519 19169,.36           Oxford2
? 0234 223 519 19169,49000001
B 0234 223 519 19169,.50200014     Oxford
B 0234 223 519 19169,.CPVC         Omega VAX
A 0234 223 519 19169,.CPVD         Merlin VAX
B 0234 225 621 126      DECSS      DEC Software Support VAX (=BEANO?)
  0234 227 200 110                 GEAC 8000 ITI
  0234 227 200 112      HPLB       HPLB (Hewlett Packard Labs, Bristol)
  0234 227 230 230      BRST       University of Bristol
  0234 227 230 23000    BRISTOL    University of Bristol
  0234 227 230 231                 DLLON Comp. & Manag. Services Ltd.
  0234 227 230 301                 GAC Computers Ltd.
  0234 227 230 333      AVON       Avon Universities Computer Centre
  0234 227 230 33300    AUCC       Avon Universities Computer Centre
  0234 227 230 33398    AUCCFTP    AUCC (FTP)
B 0234 227 900 102      BLAISE     British Library Information System
  0234 227 900 10400    ESTELLE    STC Estelle
  0234 227 900 14302    ITT        ITT Harlow (=ALCATEL?)
  0234 231 300 101                 PRIME Office, Edinburgh
  0234 231 300 102                 Forestry Commission FTP
  0234 231 300 105      LATTLOG    Lattice Logic LTD
  0234 231 300 107
B 0234 231 354 354      ERCC       Edinburgh Regional Computer Centre
  0234 231 354 35419    BUSHFTP    RCO 2988 (FTP)
B 0234 231 354 35422    ERCC       ERCC - 2980, 2972 (EMAS) (=RCONET?)
  0234 232 500 124      EXIS       EXIS
I 0234 233 458 158      STAND      St. Andrews University VAX
B 0234 233 458 15898    STANFTP    St. Andrews Univ. (FTP)
  0234 234 417 117                 ICL at Bracknell
  0234 227 230 333                 ?
B 0234 239 232 323      EXETER1    Exeter University
  0234 239 232 32304    EXTR       University of Exeter
  0234 241 200 107
  0234 241 260 106      SCRSX      University of Strathcylde PDP-11/44 (RSX)
A 0234 241 260 10604               ? (,5020015,Birch/Bryan)
  0234 241 260 260      GLSG       University of Glasgow (NFS)
B 0234 241 260 26004               Glasgow
  0234 246 200 10243               ICL West Gorton 'B' Service
  0234 246 200 10248               ICL West Gorton 'X' Service
  0234 246 200 10277               ICL West Gorton Perq
  0234 246 240 240      ICLL       ICL at Letchworth (=Kidsgrove?) (NFS)
  0234 247 300 103                 MTIER Management Systems Ltd.
  0234 247 300 10300               Bridge, Switch
  0234 247 300 10340               Bridge, (VAX/VMS)
  0234 247 300 10345               Bridge, (MUX(VT100))
  0234 247 300 10346               Bridge
  0234 247 302 022      MHGA       LDC at Martlesham
  0234 248 300 106                 DWENT-SDC Search Service
  0234 248 321 321                 DWENT-SDC Search Service
B 0234 251 248 248      LIVE       University of Liverpool
  0234 252 724 241      BSL        BL Systems Ltd.
  0234 253 265 165      LEEDS      University of Leeds (NFS)
  0234 253 300 124      CAMTEC     Camtec, Leicester
  0234 253 300 12406    CAMTEC     Camtec, Leicester (hard copy printer)
  0234 258 200 106      ARC        Agricultural Research Council (GEC -
                                   Switch)
  0234 258 200 106      EMALFTP    East Malling (FTP)
  0234 258 200 106      RESFTP     RES (Rothampstead) - FTP
  0234 258 200 10604    AGRIFTP    AGRINET (CPSE) FTP
  0234 258 200 10604    AGRINET    AGRINET Gateway
  0234 258 200 10604    EASTMAL    East Malling
  0234 258 240 242      GECD       GEC Computers Ltd at Dunstable
  0234 258 240 24200    MRCA       GEC - Marconi Research Centre
B 0234 260 227 227      MIDN       MIDNET Gateway at Nottingham (University
                                   Leicester?) (=MIDNOT?)
B 0234 261 456 8383                Microlink
B 0234 261 600 119                 Manchester
  0234 261 600 133                 IBM - SALE (also FTP)
B 0234 261 600 152      UMDAFL     University of Manchester Dataflow VAX
  0234 261 643 143      UMRCC      University of Manchester Regional Computer
                                   Centre
  0234 261 643 14398    UMRFTP     UMRCC (FTP)
  0234 261 643 210      SALF       Salford University
  0234 261 643 21090    SALFORD    Salford -> GANNET
  0234 261 643 21090   NRS        NRS
B 0234 261 643 343      FERRANTI   Feranti Computer Systems
  0234 261 643 365                 ICLBRA
  0234 261 643 36543               ICL West Gorton 'B' Service
  0234 261 643 36548               ICL West Gorton 'X' Service
  0234 261 643 36577               ICL West Gorton Perq (also FTP)
  0234 262 500 484                 Software Sciences Ltd.
B 0234 262 800 151                 CDM/EH (=Maidenhead?)
  0234 262 800 43300
B 0234 263 259 159      NUMAC      University of Newcastle
  0234 264 200 136                 Primenet
B 0234 270 500 115                 MAXXIM
B 0234 270 500 142                 Farenham
T 0234 270 500 15                  Uni Brighton (GUEST,WELCOME)
  0234 270 712 217      HATF       Hatfield Polytechnic
  0234 273 417 171      DEC-RDG    Digital Equipment Ltd Reading
  0234 273 417 217      MODC       Modcomp
  0234 273 417 317      DECR       DEC at Reading
  0234 274 200 103                 SHEFFIELD, University of, Dept.of
                                   Electronic & Elec...
  0234 274 200 103*DCODUCODUS      Codus
  0234 274 253 385                 DVY Computing Ltd.
  0234 274 317 31
  0234 275 300 102                 GIS Ltd.
  0234 275 312 212      BOC        British Oxygen (=The World Reporter??)
  0234 275 312 212      DATASOLVE  as above
  0234 275 312 212      EUROLEX    British Oxygen Company
  0234 275 317 173                 Lynx Computers Ltd.
  0234 275 317 177                 TELEFILE Computer Services Ltd.
  0234 275 317 177      GSI        GSI (NFS)
  0234 278 228 282                 ICL Letchworth
  0234 278 228 288                 ICL Letchworth
  0234 284 400 108                 Culham, (VAX)
  0234 284 400 123      ALVEY      Alvey Electronic Mail
B 0234 289 500 109                 UXB
  0234 290 468 168      YORK       York University PSS Gateway
B 0234 290 468 168      YORKFTP    York University (FTP)
  0234 290 468 168                 Gateway To DEC-10 At York
  0234 290 468 16804    YORKTS     York TS29 Port
  0234 290 524 242      RSRE       Radio, Space Research Establishment
  0234 290 524 24203    RSREDL     RSRE
  0234 290 524 24204    RSRESNK    RSRE
  0234 290 524 24250   RSREA      Radio, Space Research Establishment for
                                   ALVEY mail
  0234 290 840 111      POLIS      SCION
  0234 290 840 111      SCICON     SCICON, South England
  0234 292 549 149      DL         SERC at Daresbury Laboratory
  0234 293 212 212                 DATASOLVE LTD.
  0234 293 212 212      BOC        British Oxygen Company (NFS)
D 0234 293 765          ARTTEL     British Library, Boston Spa
  0234 293 765 265                 British Library Lending Divi.
  0234 299 212 221      NOLTON     Nolton Communications Ltd. (NFS)
  0234 3                           Euronet
  0234 307 813          EUROINFO   Euronet Diane Information Service
  0234 8                TELEX      UK Telex network
  0234 892 992 0        DECTELX
I 0235 200 143 00165
  0238                  DK         Denmark
  0238 2                           Datapak
A 0238 241 592 400                 Valby I/S Datacentralen
A 0238 241 745 600      RECKU      Univac in Copenhagen University
  0238 241 745 60000               Recku Univac (Enter @@ENQ)
  0238 241 745 60002    UDIKU
A 0238 242 126 400                 Lyngby DTB; I/S Datacentralen
I 0238 389 3                       Euronet Aarhus
  0240                  S          Sweden
I 0240 181 559 76       LIUIDA S   Linkvping LiUIDA Teletex
  0240 2                           Datapak
A 0240 200 002 05                  Uppsala STUNS VAX/UNIX KULING
I 0240 200 044 4        ENEA       ENEA
A 0240 200 100 110                 Stockholm QZ/DEC-10
A 0240 200 100 120                 Stockholm QZ/CD Cyber 730
O 0240 200 100 203                 Uppsala, UU, Teknikum, NORD 100/500
A 0240 200 100 205                 Uppsala, UU, Stuns, VAX 750
A 0240 200 100 206                 Uppsala, UDAC/DECnet RTR18A
O 0240 200 100 207                 Uppsala, UDAC, Cyber 835
A 0240 200 100 228                 Uppsala, UDAC/UPNET - Terminalnaet
A 0240 200 100 232                 Uppsala, UDAC, IBM/GUTS (BASF 7/68 ?)
O 0240 200 100 28                  Uppsala Upnet
? 0240 200 100 30                  Umeaa VAX-750 Skogsh. Umeaa Univ
A 0240 200 100 303                 Umeaa, UMDAC/BIOVAX
A 0240 200 100 304                 Umeaa, Skogshoegskolan, VAX 750
A 0240 200 100 305                 Umeaa, UMDAC/DECnet RTR09A, (Vax 11/750)
A 0240 200 100 30520               Umeaa, UMDAC/BASUN
A 0240 200 100 30540               Umeaa, UMDAC/UTB1 (Vax 11/780)
A 0240 200 100 30550               Umeaa, UMDAC/UTB2 (Vax 11/750)
A 0240 200 100 30570               Umeaa, UMDAC/OSTVAX (Vax 11/780, Hoegsk i
                                   Oe-sund)
A 0240 200 100 307                 Umeaa, UMDAC/Cyber 850
D 0240 200 100 312                 Luleaa, Tekn hoegsk, NORD 100
D 0240 200 100 313                 Luleaa, Tekn hoegsk, NORD 100
A 0240 200 100 328                 Umeaa, UMDAC/NUNET - Terminalnaet
D 0240 200 100 33                  Umeaa VAX-11/780
A 0240 200 100 403                 Linkoeping, ULi/LIUIDA, uVAX-I
D 0240 200 100 404                 Linkoeping, ULi/PDP 11/23 BULL
A 0240 200 100 405                 Linkoeping, LIDAC, VAX 11/780 VIKTOR
A 0240 200 100 407                 Linkoeping, LIDAC/DECnet RTR13A, uVAX-II
D 0240 200 100 432                 Linkoeping, LIDAC/TEXAS - Terminalnaet
A 0240 200 100 7                   Primenet
A 0240 200 101 903                 Stockholm, SU, Psykologi, Prime 750
A 0240 200 101 904                 Stockholm, QZ IBM (Amdahl)
A 0240 200 101 905                 Stockholm, QZ, NFRVAX
A 0240 200 101 907                 Stockholm, QZ/DECnet RTR08A
A 0240 200 101 914                 Stockholm, SU, Fysik, Vax 780
D 0240 200 101 926                 Stockholm, KTH/KTHNET - Terminalnaet
A 0240 200 101 928                 Stockholm, QZ/QZNET - Terminalnaet
O 0240 200 102 06                  Uppsala UDAC uVAX-II RTR18A
O 0240 200 102 07                  Uppsala CD Cyber 835
A 0240 200 102 7                   Stockholm DEC-10/Janus
A 0240 200 102 71                  Stockholm DEC-10/Janus
A 0240 200 201 603                 Goeteborg, CTH, Infobeh, VAX 750, Unix
D 0240 200 201 604                 Goeteborg, GU, Pedagogiska inst, Prime 550
A 0240 200 201 605                 Goeteborg, GU, Statistiska inst, Prime 550
D 0240 200 201 606                 Goeteborg, CTH, Tillaempad Elektronik, VAX
                                   750
A 0240 200 201 607                 Goeteborg, Tillaempad Elektronik/DECnet
                                   RTR31A (RTR18A ?)
A 0240 200 201 628                 Goeteborg, GD/GUCNET - Terminalnaet
D 0240 200 201 632                 Goeteborg Upnod
A 0240 200 205 4                   SCB
A 0240 200 278 0                   Oerebro, Hoegskolan, Prime
A 0240 200 292 6                   Karlstad, Hoegskolan, VAX 11/780
D 0240 200 310 204                 Lund, Fysikum, NORD 500, Lucas
O 0240 200 310 206                 Lund, Maxlab, NORD 100
A 0240 200 310 207                 Lund, LDC/DECnet RTR46A, uVAX-II
A 0240 200 310 20720               Lund, LDC/GEMINI, Vax 8350
A 0240 200 310 228                 Lund, LDC/LUNET - Terminalnaet
  0240 201 001 30                  Stockholm QZ/Amdahl
  0240 201 002 03                  Uppsala Teknikum Nord 100/500
  0240 5                SWEDEN     Swedish data network (Telepak)
I 0240 500 025 3        QZXB       QZ by yet another route
I 0240 500 025 7                   Stockholm, DEC, VAX
I 0240 501 50                      Scannet, Goteborg
I 0240 501 51                      Scannet, Helsingfors
I 0240 501 52                      Stockholm KTH/TTDS
I 0240 501 531 0        QZCOM      QZ-COM - Stockholm University DEC-10
I 0240 501 532 0        QZCB       QZ Cyber
I 0240 501 533 0        QZIB       QZ Amdahl
I 0240 501 54           UPPS       Uppsala network, Sweden
I 0240 501 550 3                   Gottenburg, Sweden
I 0240 501 582 8        LUND       Lund University
I 0240 501 60                      Helsinki CP9500 HYLK B7800
I 0240 502 00                      Scannet, Stockholm
I 0240 502 01                      Denmark, Copenhagen Scannet
I 0240 502 02                      Tandem Computers
I 0240 502 032 8        QZXA       QZ Sweden via reverse PAD (=UPNET?)
I 0240 502 032 832                 Oden, Sweden
I 0240 502 033 2        QZDA       QZ DEC-10 Sweden
I 0240 502 04                      Prime Computers
I 0240 502 05                      Vaesteraas PAD ASEA Multics
I 0240 502 52                      KEMIDATA
I 0240 502 53           QZXB       QZ by yet another route
  0240 515 330                     Amdahl
  0242                  N          Norway
  0242 2                NORWAY     Norwegian data network (Datapak/Norpak)
  0242 192 010 1013                PSS DOC
X 0242 211 000 00107    OSLO       DEC-1099 DEC-net/PSI at Oslo University
D 0242 211 000 001*D02             Oslo univ BRU-nett UNINETT
D 0242 211 000 001*D03  OSLO       DEC-10 at Oslo University
D 0242 211 000 00100               Oslo univ DEC-1099 UNINETT
D 0242 211 000 002                 Oslo Scannet NSI Nord-100
D 0242 211 000 01018    DATAPIN    DATAPAK Info - Norway
B 0242 211 000 074                 Oslo VAX
T 0242 223 000 00151    RBK        Cyber 170 at IFE (Energy Research Centre)
T 0242 223 000 001*D00  RBK        Cyber 170 at IFE, Kjeller RBK UNINETT
D 0242 223 000 002                 Kjeller FFI UNINETT
D 0242 245 000 00101    BERGEN     Univac at Bergen University (UNINETT)
D 0242 245 000 001*D00  BERGEN     Univac at Bergen University
A 0242 245 013 4                   BBB Mailbox (Bergen By Byte)
  0242 253 000 001*D11             Trondheim UNINETT RUNIT UNIVAC
T 0242 253 000 00101    RNI        Univac at Trondheim University
X 0242 253 000 00103               Trondheim RUNIT UNINETT VAX-780 (=PUNIT
                                   (EANNET) ?)
T 0242 253 000 00104               Trondheim NLHT UNINETT VAX-750
  0242 265 000 001*D00             Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, Cyber 171
  0242 253 000 001*D11  RUNIT      Univac at Trondheim University
  0242 265 000 001*D81             Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, NORD-10
  0242 265 000 001*D82             Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, NORD-100
  0242 265 000 001*D83             Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, NORD-500
  0242 265 000 00101    TROMSOE    Cyber 170 at Tromsoe University (UNINETT)
  0242 265 000 001*D81  TROMSO     ELAN at Tromsoe University
X 0242 265 000 106                 PORTACOM (PORTACOM)
  0244                  SF         Finland
  0244 2                           Datapak (Finpak)
A 0244 202 006                     Economics HP 3000
A 0244 202 007                     University of Helsinki, B7800 (=CANDE ?)
A 0244 202 008                     VTKK (Staten DC) IBM 360
A 0244 202 012                     U o Helsinki Mopo Mikko3
A 0244 203 008          HELVA      High Energy Physics Vax 11/750
A 0244 203 017                     U of Technology DEC-20
D 0244 231 006                     Technical University of Tampere VAX
A 0244 253 001                     Tech U of Lappeenranta VAX/VMS
A 0244 261 001                     U of Vaasa VAX/VMS
A 0244 273 002                     University of Joensuu VAX
D 0248 321 321                     DWENT-SDC Search Service
  0262                  D          Germany
  0262 3                           Euronet
X 0262 307 4                       INFAS
  0262 4                GERMANY    German data network (Datex-P)
I 0262 428 462 10706
I 0262 428 479 11065
D 0262 432 210 43002               Apple
Ar0262 432 210 93001               Quick-Com
Y 0262 442 010 49132
O 0262 442 110 40325               OKI
Y 0262 442 110 49130               PAD Frankfurt
Y 0262 442 110 49133
Y 0262 442 110 49230
I 0262 442 151 40327               KIS (info)
I 0262 442 210 49331
A 0262 442 210 90371               elma-mailbox (~pim)
Y 0262 442 210 99632
O 0262 442 310 40312               Bibliothek  Chemie
I 0262 442 310 90306               Chemie
I 0262 442 410 40341    RMI        RMI Mailbox Aachen
I 0262 442 433 40307               CMES
O 0262 442 461 40343
Y 0262 443 000 49234
A 0262 443 000 90314               ?
Y 0262 443 000 99131
I 0262 444 000 90314               CCC Hamburg (Clinch), Hackerbox (1 line...)
Y 0262 444 000 90330               Allgemeine Bank der Niederlande
O 0262 444 000 90342               Batig Beteiligungen GmbH
A 0262 444 000 90374               Master Control System (MCS) Hamburg
Y 0262 444 000 99132
Y 0262 444 441 40317               Osnabrueck, Driverstr.24, 2848 Vechta
I 0262 445 110 30317               Metereologie
I 0262 445 110 90323               Bibliothek
I 0262 446 154 40371               DECATES - Oberramstadt
Y 0262 446 210 49330
Y 0262 446 810 49131
Y 0262 446 810 49132
O 0262 446 900 30331               IBD Online Frankfurt a.M.
I 0262 446 900 40318               Chemie
Y 0262 446 900 49231
Y 0262 446 900 49232
I 0262 446 900 90286               RZ
Y 0262 446 900 99133
O 0262 447 071 10303               Organische Chem.
Y 0262 447 110 49134
I 0262 447 114 9236                Emery
I 0262 447 127 90344
Y 0262 447 310 40313               Online-Literaturdok.
A 0262 447 531 40310               Chemie
I 0262 448 136                     Luma Uni
O 0262 448 136 90323               Genesys EDV-Systeme
Y 0262 448 210 49630
A 0262 448 900 30368               Phoenix
Y 0262 448 900 49130
A 0262 448 900 90313               Max Planck Institut
Y 0262 448 900 90341               LMU Bibliothek
Y 0262 448 900 99632
I 0262 449 310 90312               Apel Hans-Joerg
I 0262 452 000 21721               ???
I 0262 450 000 90184
I 0262 451 104 2301
O 0262 452 010 40116               AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 452 010 40179               RZ Uni Essen
I 0262 452 020 40120               Apotheke Dr.Schiemes
I 0262 452 080 40381               DVO Datenverarbeitung
I 0262 452 090 832                 ?
I 0262 452 101 30030               3M Mailbox
I 0262 452 101 40030               3M Mailbox
I 0262 452 110 40001               RZU Duesseldorf (ND100)
I 0262 452 110 40005               CIERR 1402
I 0262 452 110 40016               ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
I 0262 452 110 40018               ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
Ar0262 452 110 40026               Primenet Stadt Duesseldorf,
I 0262 452 110 40063               ADAC
I 0262 452 110 40080               Uni Duesseldorf
Dr0262 452 110 40099
D 0262 452 110 40105               RZU Duesseldorf (Siemens 7.570)
D 0262 452 110 40123               Data General
Ar0262 452 110 40130
Dr0262 452 110 40132
A 0262 452 110 40134               MCKDU VM/SP
I 0262 452 110 40211               Applid-Data-Research
I 0262 452 110 40325               OKI-GmbH
I 0262 452 110 90371               Software-Express
I 0262 452 210 0
Yr0262 452 210 40002               DIMDI Fep 1 Koeln
Ar0262 452 210 40004               Primenet (MicroVMS V4.5)
A 0262 452 210 40006               DIMDI Fep 2 Koeln  (Medical docs)
I 0262 452 210 40015               Kaufhof AG
I 0262 452 210 40027               ADAC
Ar0262 452 210 40035               Primenet
A 0262 452 210 40104               DIMDI1  (German Med. Inst., Koeln)
Yr0262 452 210 40119
O 0262 452 210 40136               AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 452 210 40202               Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 40203               Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 90265               RZ Uni Koeln
I 0262 452 210 90304               Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 90305               Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 90349               Kaufhof AG (RZ 2)
D 0262 452 210 90510               Geophysik und Meteorologie
Ir0262 452 210 93001               ?
A 0262 452 241 24104               VAX
A 0262 452 241 24105               GMD2
A 0262 452 241 24134               GMDZI
A 0262 452 280 40082               GMD (TSO)
A 0262 452 280 40187    BNVA       Bonn VAX (PI)
Ar0262 452 280 40191               Infas GmbH (VM)
D 0262 452 280 90020               Amtsgericht
A 0262 452 310 40003    EMX1       EMEX-Mailbox (Guest)
I 0262 452 310 40017               Primenet
O 0262 452 310 40103               AEG-Telefunken
A 0262 452 310 42100               Informatik
A 0262 452 310 42144    UNIDO      University of Dortmund
I 0262 452 310 40017               Primenet
I 0262 452 310 45100               Uni Dortmund (Siemens 7.760)
A 0262 452 310 9304                Dortmund
D 0262 452 340 40140               Primenet = RZU Bochum (CDL 855) ??
A 0262 452 340 40194    RUB        Cyber 205 (=855?), Ruhr University - Bochum
                                   (RUB)
D 0262 452 410 40149               Aachener + Muenchener Versicherung
I 0262 452 410 90014               ???
I 0262 452 410 90528               rmi-aachen
A 0262 452 410 90832               RMI Datentechnik Aachen
I 0262 452 433 40307               OPTEL (Ruehlemann-Box)
I 0262 452 461 90509               Kfz Juelich
A 0262 452 710 40240               Uni Siegen, FB Physik (VAX 11/750)
D 0262 452 931 40196               Handwerkskammer (HWK) Arnsberg
I 0262 453 000 0414                GFC-AG
D 0262 453 000 20104               Vax
D 0262 453 000 217      HMI        HMI in Berlin
A 0262 453 000 21711               Siemens
A 0262 453 000 21712               Siemens
A 0262 453 000 21713               Hahn-Meitner-Institut Berlin
D 0262 453 000 21714               ???
D 0262 453 000 40013               Uni Berlin
Y 0262 453 000 40014               GFC AG
Ar0262 453 000 40023    BERLIN     Tech. Univ. Berlin (Computer Science)
I 0262 453 000 40027               ADAC
I 0262 453 000 40112               ABC Barkredit Bank
I 0262 453 000 40166               David Verlag
I 0262 453 000 40509               COM-Box Berlin
A 0262 453 000 20205               CN01
A 0262 453 000 43109               netmbx, Berlin
A 0262 453 000 90055               COM.BOX, Berlin
A 0262 453 000 90864               ? (GUEST)
I 0262 453 002 17       HMI        Hans Mietner Institute in Berlin
I 0262 453 004 0023                Uni Berlin
I 0262 453 210 40017               tymnet-gateway
I 0262 454 000 30029
A 0262 454 000 30035               (immediately drops the line)
A 0262 454 000 30041               COM-PLETE (?) (command prefix is '*')
A 0262 454 000 30046               (immediately drops the line)
O 0262 454 000 30071
A 0262 454 000 30090               (cierr 1402)
A 0262 454 000 30104               ? ("INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX")
A 0262 454 000 30105
A 0262 454 000 30110               Host
A 0262 454 000 30113               (cierr 1402)
A 0262 454 000 30138               ? (no reaction)
D 0262 454 000 30150
D 0262 454 000 30158
A 0262 454 000 30175               ? ("INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX")
D 0262 454 000 30187               E2000 Hamburg VAX
O 0262 454 000 30201               Hasylab VAX (user/user)
A 0262 454 000 30202               HERA Magnet Measurement VAX 750 (=Krista
                                   Cryogenics Control ?)
A 0262 454 000 30215               ? ("INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX")
D 0262 454 000 30259
D 0262 454 000 30261
A 0262 454 000 30296               DFH2001I
A 0262 454 000 30502
I 0262 454 000 30519
A 0262 454 000 30566               DFH2001I
O 0262 454 000 30578               Primenet 20.0.4 DREHH
I 0262 454 000 40014               Hahn Egon RZ !! Code: EBCDIC !!
I 0262 454 000 40015               ???
Y 0262 454 000 40042               ???
D 0262 454 000 40044               Primenet MUF
I 0262 454 000 40053               SCHERAX
Y 0262 454 000 40078               ???
A 0262 454 000 40082               ? (no reaction)
I 0262 454 000 40103               Airbus
I 0262 454 000 40109               ???
I 0262 454 000 40111               BADGER
D 0262 454 000 40198               Argus IPP-Vax
I 0262 454 000 43100               ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
A 0262 454 000 50233               Altos Hamburg (althh) (Gast)
I 0262 454 000 8001     DYVA       MARK J VAX at DESY
I 0262 454 000 90047               AEG-Telefunken
A 0262 454 000 90092               Data-General
A 0262 454 000 90184               Uni Hamburg (VAX) (=UKE?)
I 0262 454 000 90194               Verbraucherbank AG
O 0262 454 000 90241               ???
I 0262 454 000 90258               Desy ( Vax )
I 0262 454 000 90558               Philips VAX
D 0262 454 000 90560    EMBLHH     EMBL VAX at Hamburg (Eur.Molecular
                                   Biol.Lab.)
I 0262 454 000 905602              ???
A 0262 454 000 90582               Desy V.24 Switch
A 0262 454 000 91110               Deutsche Mailbox 1
A 0262 454 000 91120               Deutsche Mailbox 2
A 0262 454 000 92210               DESYNET
A 0262 454 000 9306     DYVA       MARK J VAX at DESY
D 0262 454 103 90161               Astra Chemicals GmbH
  0262 454 106 40206               RCA
A 0262 454 210 40064               COMTES
O 0262 454 210 40108               AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 454 210 40145               AEG-Telefunken
Y 0262 454 210 40244               AEG-Telefunken
O 0262 454 210 42001               Bremen
I 0262 454 210 90302               Computerland VAX
O 0262 454 298 43070               Infex 2
I 0262 454 310 40545               Kiel IMF
A 0262 454 410 30033               Uni Oldenburg
I 0262 454 421 40045               ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
I 0262 454 488 40147               Essmann Getraenke GmbH
I 0262 455 110 40081               Airbus
I 0262 455 110 40171               Alli-Frischdienst
A 0262 455 110 42330               Uni Hannover (VM/370)
A 0262 455 110 43020               Nachrichtentechnik (VAX)
I 0262 455 110 701                 Uni Hannover
A 0262 455 110 90192               ???
A 0262 455 110 90835               CosmoNet (GAST)
A 0262 455 110 92200               RZ
D 0262 455 151 40212               AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 455 152 90154               Oldenburger Volksbank
I 0262 455 210 40562               Uni Bielefeld (CGK/TR440)
I 0262 455 251 90192               Paderborn
D 0262 455 251 90193               Paderborn
A 0262 455 251 93020               Uni Paderborn (4.3 BSD UNIX)
D 0262 455 362 90057               IUM
I 0262 455 410 40086               Alli-Frischdienst
I 0262 455 410 40162               RZ
I 0262 455 410 40560               Bibliothek
I 0262 455 421 043050              ORION
A 0262 455 510 32804               Uni Goettingen (choose VAX or IBM)
I 0262 455 521 90172               Spar & Darlehenskassen
I 0262 455 818 104                 Anders Frido GmbH
I 0262 455 910 40094               Essmann Getraenke GmbH
I 0262 455 931 40095               Ruhr AG
I 0262 456 061 40097               Polydress Plastic GmbH
I 0262 456 102 4301                DEC Frankfurt
I 0262 456 102 90145               Nadler-Werke GmbH
I 0262 456 103 40332               Amann KG
I 0262 456 104 0250                Tymnet
A 0262 456 106 40254               Alfa Service Partner (Primenet)
I 0262 456 106 90119               Alfa Service Partner
I 0262 456 110 40009               IBM  Centre for Info and Doc, Germany
I 0262 456 110 40037               Control Data (Test.-Serv.C4,ZZA201,CDC)
I 0262 456 110 40076               Autonet
I 0262 456 110 40105               Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 40106               Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 40107               CN01
I 0262 456 110 40187               WAX Bank FRA
I 0262 456 110 40240               City-Bank FFM (Uni Bochum ??)
I 0262 456 110 40245               ??
I 0262 456 110 40250               Tymnet (Id=Information)
I 0262 456 110 40303               American Express
I 0262 456 110 40305               American Express
I 0262 456 110 40311               AMC
I 0262 456 110 40365               AMP
I 0262 456 110 90211               Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 90212               Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 90322               American Express
I 0262 456 110 90347               American Express
I 0262 456 121 40207               ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
I 0262 456 121 40217               BKA
I 0262 456 121 40225               BKA
I 0262 456 121 90580               BKA
I 0262 456 131 40138               Uni Mainz RZ
I 0262 456 131 40545               RZ
Y 0262 456 131 90031               Allg.Kreditversicherung
Y 0262 456 151 40282               ???
A 0262 456 151 40516               Uni Darmstadt (Siemens 7.xxx)
A 0262 456 151 40547               GSI Darmstadt (EMMA-VAX 8600)
A 0262 456 151 42807               GMD Darmstadt (CADMUS 9240)
I 0262 456 172 90070               A-Kredit
I 0262 456 193 40082               Apotheken Marketing
D 0262 456 196 40095               Data General Schwalbach
A 0262 456 196 40107               Int.Doc.Chem.
A 0262 456 210 40000               Telebox der DBP (ID INF100,Telebox)
A 0262 456 210 40014               ACF/VTAM
A 0262 456 210 40025               Oeva
A 0262 456 210 40026               HOST
D 0262 456 210 40027               BASF/FER.VAX 8600
I 0262 456 210 40097               Nadler-Werke GmbH
I 0262 456 210 40217               Primenet
I 0262 456 210 40324               Abacus
D 0262 456 210 40508               VCON0.BASF.A6
A 0262 456 210 40516               CN01
A 0262 456 210 40532
A 0262 456 210 40580               DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25
A 0262 456 210 40581               DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25
A 0262 456 210 40582
A 0262 456 210 90000               Telebox der DBP
I 0262 456 221 3002     EMBL       European Microbiology Lab (or European
                                   Molecular Biological Lab.) (=ALKOR?)
D 0262 456 221 40201               DKFZ (Heidelberg)
I 0262 456 221 40244               Franny (=Max Planck VAX=MPI?)
I 0262 456 310 40252
I 0262 456 310 421
D 0262 456 310 424
I 0262 456 310 4302
I 0262 456 340 40136               Nadler-Werke GmbH
A 0262 456 410 30021               HRZ-Giessen
I 0262 456 410 40142               Aachener + Muenchener Versicherung
A 0262 456 410 90040               HRZ Giessen (CDCNET-X.25)
I 0262 456 410 90828               Ernaehrungswissenschaften
I 0262 456 441 90335               Leerwe GmbH
I 0262 456 615 142804              GMD, Darmstadt
A 0262 456 673 13330               Geonet 1 (ex IMCA)
A 0262 456 673 13340               Geonet 3
I 0262 456 673 30070               IMCA-Mailbox, Solmser Str. 16, D-6419
                                   Haunetal-Staerklos
I 0262 456 721 40305               Alfa Metalcraft Corp.
I 0262 456 810 40010               Teleprint Saarbrueckener Zeitung
I 0262 456 810 40071               Nadler-Werke GmbH
I 0262 456 810 40076    SAARBRU    Univ of Saarbruecken (Saarland RZ)
A 0262 456 900 10174               Beilstein Gmelin RZ (COMDOS ?)
O 0262 456 900 10552               FIZ-Technik
O 0262 456 900 30040               Nixdorf Computer
A 0262 456 900 40076               Autonet
D 0262 456 900 40106               Nixdorf
I 0262 456 900 40505               AEG-Telefunken
  0262 456 900 40506               AEG-Telefunken
A 0262 456 900 90125
I 0262 456 900 90506               Nixdorf
I 0262 456 900 9308                SYNTAX
I 0262 457 010 40025               ?
A 0262 457 071 40266               Zentrum fuer Datenverarbeitung
  0262 457 071 40529               Zentrale Verw.
  0262 457 071 90182               ADW-Wirtschaftsberatung
D 0262 457 071 90249               Bibliothek
D 0262 457 110 10023               Hohenheim Bibliothek
D 0262 457 110 211                 Rechenzentrum
Dr0262 457 110 40028
Dr0262 457 110 40035               Primenet !! No CTRL-P clr !!
B 0262 457 110 40124               Stahl EDV-Service
  0262 457 110 40129               Allg.Rentenanstalt
  0262 457 110 40147               MAHU Verlag
D 0262 457 110 90059               Bibliothek
  0262 457 110 90103               Data General
  0262 457 110 90246               Hohenheim DokumentationsSt.
D 0262 457 110 90316               RMI-Net
  0262 457 110 90557               Stahl EDV-Service
A 0262 457 110 90593               Unix, Informatik (ifistg)
  0262 457 141 90098               Aigner Buchhandlung
X 0262 457 210 40002               V750
Br0262 457 210 40025               Badenia
  0262 457 210 40031               IITB-Datenverarbeitung
D 0262 457 210 40135               Fraunhofer Institut
C 0262 457 210 40189               Uni Karlsruhe, RZ (until 10-APR-88)
X 0262 457 210 40248               Uni Karlsruhe, LINK (=NETONE?)
A 0262 457 210 42100               Uni Karlsruhe, IRAV2 (VAX 8200)
A 0262 457 210 42140               Uni Karlsruhe, RZ (since 11-APR-88)
D 0262 457 210 4303                Telematik
A 0262 457 247 40001               INKA  FIZ-Chemie 2 (German Centre for
                                   Tech.?)
A 0262 457 247 40141               INKA  FIZ-Chemie 1
A 0262 457 247 40211    CASGER     STN Internat. Karlsruhe
D 0262 457 310 90269               RZ Bereich OE
  0262 457 310 921                 RZ
  0262 457 351 40032               AFD-Arbeitsgruppe F.DV
A 0262 457 531 90008               Informationswissenschaften
D 0262 457 531 90094               RZ
  0262 457 552 90320               Alno-Moebel
D 0262 457 610 300                 Uni Freiburg, 9600bps
D 0262 457 610 370                 Uni Freiburg, Sperry Univac
D 0262 457 610 40079               Albert Ludwig, Uni-Bibliothek
  0262 457 610 40166               AEG-Telefunken
  0262 457 610 40306               Alpha-Buch GmbH
B 0262 457 610 420                 Uni Freiburg, 4800bps
B 0262 457 610 480                 Uni Freiburg, Sperry Univac
X 0262 457 610 520                 Uni Freiburg, Uni Bibliothek
  0262 457 641 40265               Anders Ernst
  0262 457 721 40071               Kienzle Computer
  0262 457 721 40072               Kienzle Computer
  0262 457 721 40171               Kienzle Computer
  0262 457 721 90004               Kienzle Computer
  0262 457 721 90226               Kienzle Computer
  0262 457 810 40222               Dietrich Georg GmbH
B 0262 458 151 40114               Kejo GmbH (Josef Keller)
D 0262 458 210 40114               Bibliothek
  0262 458 210 40120               NCR
  0262 458 510 30236               Passau RZ
D 0262 458 710 40171               Transfer Data Test GmbH
  0310 600 021 0                   Procter and Gamble
  0310 600 022 6                   Anistics
  0310 600 022 6                   Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
  0310 600 023 2                   Scientific Timesharing
  0310 600 024 2                   Timesharing Resources
  0310 600 025 2                   Computer Science Corporation
  0310 600 025 5                   Timesharing Associates
  0310 600 027 6                   Management Decision Systems Inc
  0310 600 028 8                   SRI
  0310 600 028 8                   SRI San Francisco (UNIX)
  0310 600 028 8                   Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
  0310 600 030 3                   Scientific Timesharing
  0310 600 030 7                   Infomedia Corporation
  0310 600 032 3                   TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
  0310 600 040 1                   TMCS Public Network
  0310 600 043 2                   Interactive Market Systems
  0310 600 046 6                   Bibliographic Retrieval Services
B 0310 600 058 1                   BRS
  0310 600 063 3                   Public TYMNET/TRWNET Interlink
  0310 600 079 3                   J&J Host
B 0310 600 105 3
  0310 600 133 0                   MULTICS, HVN 862-3642
  0310 600 140 0                   TMCS Public Network
B 0310 600 150 9                   Orbit (SDC)
B 0310 600 157 878                 BIX
D 0310 600 165 9                   BYTE Information Exchange (GUEST,GUEST)
A 0310 600 166 3                   People Link
  0310 600 181 9                   TMCS Public Network
  0310 600 182 8        FRX        Faifax Outdial Host (Tymnet)
  0310 600 186 4                   SUNGARDS Central Computer Facility Networks
  0310 600 189 2                   Primenet (certain hours)
B 0310 600 195 2                   VAX
B 0310 600 197 6                   Outdial NY
A 0310 600 197 7
  0310 600 209 5                   COMODEX Online System
  0310 600 209 8                   D & B
  0310 600 209 9                   D & B
  0310 600 210 0                   D & B
  0310 600 210 9                   TYMNET/15B (inter-link)
B 0310 600 220 7,OUT               Outdial
  0310 600 228 6                   Primenet TFGI
  0310 600 229 9                   CONSILIUM
  0310 600 232 901*D    MFE        Magnetic Fusion Energy Centre, Lawrence
                                   Livermore
B 0310 600 236 1                   Denver Oil&Gas
  0310 600 241                     Bank Of America
  0310 600 245 3                   Primenet
B 0310 600 254 5        SEISMO     Centre for Seismic Studies
B 0310 600 255                     Outdial NY
A 0310 600 262 3                   VAX/VMS (GUEST ???)
B 0310 600 262 3003                VTINET
B 0310 600 262 460                 SUMEX
B 0310 600 263 5                   QUOTRON Wall Street (Boerse n.y.)
B 0310 600 266 400      SLAC       SLAC on Tymnet
B 0310 600 267 7                   The New York Times
  0310 600 269 4                   PVM3101,SPDS/MTAM, MLCM,VM/SP,STRATUS-1,
                                   STRATUS-2
  0310 600 279 0                   VM/370
  0310 600 286 4                   RCA Semicustom
B 0310 600 302 70000               VTI NETONE
  0310 600 307 9                   VM/370
  0310 600 309 2                   TYMNET/Protected Access Service Sys.
                                   Inter-link
  0310 600 316 8                   VM/370
  0310 600 321 4                   VM/370
  0310 600 322 0                   VM/370
  0310 600 322 1                   VM/370
  0310 600 357 2                   NORTH AMERICA DATA CENTRE
  0310 600 360 4                   VM/370
  0310 600 404 1                   RCA GLOBCOM'S PACKET SWITCHING SERICE
A 0310 600 412 9                   ?
A 0310 600 413 1                   ?
  0310 600 413 7                   TSO, VM/370
  0310 600 416 300                 Oakridge, Tennessee
  0310 600 417 4                   VM/370
  0310 600 420 6                   MAINSTREAMS
  0310 600 423 500                 Oakridge, Tennessee
B 0310 600 430 5                   BIOVAX
  0310 600 434 1                   (Host) 2 - VM/370, T - VM/370,1,3,4,A,C,E,Z
A 0310 600 436 5                   Toxnet (NLM=National Lib. of Medicine's)
B 0310 600 455 5                   VAX
  0310 600 459 97
  0310 600 474 3                   TYMNET Info Service
X 0310 600 502 0                   Outdial Fairfax
  0310 600 522 9                   Uni.of Pencilvania School of Arts and
                                   Science
  0310 600 526 7                   CHANEL 01
X 0310 600 531 7                   Outdial St.Louis
B 0310 600 532 0                   DEC Soft. Serv.
  0310 600 556 9                   STRATUS/32
  0310 600 557 1                   STRATUS/32
  0310 600 560 3                   (Host) systems 1,2,3,4,5,C (5=Outdial)
B 0310 600 562 200      FNAL       Fermilab
B 0310 600 562 226                 Fermilab 2
B 0310 600 578 78                  BIX
B 0310 600 584 401                 Washington Post
B 0310 600 61           DIALOG1    Lockheed Info Systems
  0310 600 61*DSDDIPSSL ORBIT2     SDC Search Service
  0310 600 628 1                   EDCS
  0310 600 628 3                   EDCS
  0310 600 643 2                   EASYLINK
  0310 600 643 4                   EASYLINK
  0310 600 672 2                   International Network
  0310 600 68                      Stanford SUMEX-AIM. Tenex op syst.
  0310 600 683 2                   A&A DATANET (Systems 1,8,0,14)
X 0310 600 701 7                   Outdial NY
  0310 600 759 6                   (Host)  A - VM/370, B - VM/370
? 0310 600 787                     Dallas
  0310 601 79                      Berkley Univ.
  0310 602 88                      Stanford Research Institute
B 0310 611 467                     Cas Online Sys.
  0310 614 67                      Ohio CAS (Chemical Abstracts Service)
  0310 617 001 38                  Multics
  0310 647 911 065                 BIX Lexington Data Service
  0310 690 006 1*D      DIALOG4    Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0310 690 080 3*D      DIALOG3    Lockheed DIALOG service
  0310 690 762 6                   Emery ADO
  0311 0                TELENET    USA - Telenet
B 0311 002 130 0039                ECLD
  0311 020 100 02000               Insco Systems
  0311 020 100 022                 New Jersey Outdial 2400 bps (Area 201)
  0311 020 100 02300               American Information Services
  0311 020 100 02400               The Information Bank
  0311 020 100 02500               New Jersey Institute of Technology
  0311 020 100 02800               Olcott International Company
  0311 020 100 03700               Informatics Inc
  0311 020 100 169      MOUTON
  0311 020 100 301                 New Jersey Outdial 1200 bps (Area 201)
  0311 020 101 59200               Scientific Process & Research Inc
  0311 020 200 02100               Scientific Timesharing
  0311 020 200 02200               Scientific Timesharing
X 0311 020 200 066                 Air Force
T 0311 020 200 099      ICIB       Information Council Incorporated B system
  0311 020 200 1        TELEMAIL   US Telemail facility
X 0311 020 200 10900    CIS        Chemical Information Systems
A 0311 020 200 115                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 202)
A 0311 020 200 116                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 202)
  0311 020 200 117                 Distr. of Columbia Outdial 2400 bps (Area
                                   202)
B 0311 020 200 141      TELEMAIL   US Telemail facility (GT-Net)
  0311 020 200 14175    TELEENQ    Telenet Enquiry Service
  0311 020 200 14175    TELEMAIL1  US Telemail facility
  0311 020 200 14275    TELENET    US Telenet
  0311 020 201 19500               Gallaude College Computer Centre
  0311 020 300 06400               NCSS Bureau
  0311 020 300 130                 Connecticut Outdial 1200 bps (Area 203)
  0311 020 301 78900               Yale University Computer Centre
  0311 020 400 02900    WATERLO    University of Waterloo
  0311 020 600 019                 Washington Outdial 1200 bps (Area 206)
  0311 021 200 02000               Bowne Timesharing
  0311 021 200 02500               Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
  0311 021 200 02800               Burroughs Corp (NYC data centre)
  0311 021 200 141      JPLM1      Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 1, USA
  0311 021 200 142      JPLM2      Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 2, USA
  0311 021 200 14200               GT-Net Telemail
A 0311 021 200 315                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 212)
A 0311 021 200 316                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 412                 Outdial 2400 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 41200               New York City Outdial (Area 212)
  0311 021 201 39200               Memorial Dose Distribution Computation
                                   Service
  0311 021 201 40600               MAV Systems (300 bps)
  0311 021 201 57800               IP Sharp Associates
  0311 021 201 58000               SDL International (1200 bps)
  0311 021 201 58500               SDL International (300 bps)
  0311 021 201 58800               DSL Systems Inc
  0311 021 201 59500               SDL International (1200 bps)
  0311 021 201 62000               Telestat System Inc
  0311 021 201 62700               Telestat Systems Inc
  0311 021 300 02200               Interactive Systems Corporation
  0311 021 300 02700               Mellonics Information Centre
  0311 021 300 029                 TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
B 0311 021 300 03300    ORBIT      Orbit
  0311 021 300 03300*D  ORBIT      SDC Search Service (300 bps)
  0311 021 300 04400               SDC Search Service (1200 bps)
B 0311 021 300 039      USCAL2     Univ. of Southern California
  0311 021 300 04114    IHW        IHW
  0311 021 300 04700               University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 048      USCAL1     University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 170                 LRS Dialog 2
T 0311 021 300 17000    DIALOG5    Lockheed Info Systems
  0311 021 300 17000*D  DIALOG2    Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 021 300 219      CALTECH    Caltech VAX 11/780
  0311 021 300 21908    CALTECH    Caltech VAX 11/780
  0311 021 300 21909    CALTECH2   Caltech VAX 11/780
  0311 021 300 412                 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 213)
A 0311 021 300 413                 Outdial CA
  0311 021 300 668                 Adainfo
  0311 021 301 353      UCLA       UCLA, USA
  0311 021 301 40300               Marshall & Swift Publication
  0311 021 400 117                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 214)
A 0311 021 400 118                 Texas Outdial 1200 bps (Area 214)
  0311 021 500 022                 Pennsylvania Outdial 2400 bps (Area 215)
  0311 021 500 112                 Pennsylvania Outdial 1200 bps (Area 215)
A 0311 021 600 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 216)
A 0311 021 600 021                 Ohio Outdial 1200 bps (Area 216)
  0311 021 700 021                 University of Illinois - Urbana
  0311 030 100 02000    NLM        National Library of Medicine
A 0311 030 100 02400               The Source
B 0311 030 100 038                 The Source (ID BSC131 SR3811)
B 0311 030 100 243                 ITT Dialcom
  0311 030 100 364                 Primesoft
A 0311 030 100 38                  The Source
B 0311 030 100 633                 Toxnet (NLM)
  0311 030 101 26500               Informatics Inc
  0311 030 300 02000               Computer Sharing Services
  0311 030 300 021                 Colorado Outdial 2400 bps (Area 303)
  0311 030 300 02300               Broker Services Inc
  0311 030 300 115                 Colorado Outdial 1200 bps (Area 303)
  0311 030 301 13100               EDI Computer Services
  0311 030 301 13200               EDI Computer Services
  0311 030 301 13300               Energy Enterprises
  0311 030 500 121                 Florida Outdial 1200 bps (Area 305)
  0311 030 501 16300               Florida Computer Inc
D 0311 030 508 793                 Miami Outdial (Area 305) ?
  0311 031 200 02200               National Computer Network of Chicago
  0311 031 200 024                 Illinois Outdial 2400 bps (Area 217 ?)
  0311 031 200 03100               Continental Bank
  0311 031 200 03200               Continental Bank
  0311 031 200 04900               American Hospital Supply Corporation
  0311 031 200 411                 Illinois Outdial 1200 bps (Area 217 ?)
  0311 031 201 07300               Commodity Information Services
  0311 031 268 801      ADPUSA     ADP Network Services Ltd.
  0311 031 300 024                 Michigan Outdial 2400 bps (Area 313)
  0311 031 300 04000               ADP Network Services
  0311 031 300 06200               Merit International (MIT)
  0311 031 300 216                 Michigan Outdial 1200 bps (Area 313)
  0311 031 301 39800               Merit Computer
  0311 031 400 07200               Environmental DataNetwork Inc.
  0311 031 401 06500               McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
  0311 031 401 06600               McDonnel Douglas Automation (110 bps)
  0311 031 401 06700               McDonnel Douglas Automation (1200 bps)
  0311 031 401 61000               McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
  0311 031 500 02000               Bibliographic Retrieval Services
A 0311 040 100 612                 Modemcity
A 0311 040 400 114                 Georgia Outdial 1200 bps (Area 404)
A 0311 040 800 021                 California Outdial 1200 bps? (Area 408)
  0311 040 800 245                 Bridge
B 0311 040 800 246                 SCF
  0311 041 201 4600                On-Line Systems Inc
  0311 041 400 02000               A.O. Smith Data Systems Divisions
  0311 041 400 021                 Wisconsin Outdial 1200 bps (Area 414)
B 0311 041 500 020                 LRS-Dialog 2
A 0311 041 500 02000    DIALOG     Lockheed Information Systems
  0311 041 500 02000*D  DIALOG     Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 041 500 048                 LRS Dialog 2
  0311 041 500 04800    DIALOG2    Lockheed Information Systems 2
  0311 041 500 04800*D  DIALOG1    Lockheed DIALOG service
  0311 041 500 117                 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
I 0311 041 500 210                 Outdial USA
A 0311 041 500 215                 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 217                 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 220                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
  0311 041 500 48000               Lockheed Information Systems (?)
B 0311 041 500 607                 BIONET
B 0311 041 500 609                 INTELLIGENETICS
  0311 041 501 23600               Hydrocomp Inc (300 bps)
  0311 041 501 23700               Hydrocomp Inc (1200 bps)
  0311 041 501 26800               ITEL Corp (300 bps)
  0311 041 501 26900               ITEL Corp (1200 bps)
  0311 041 501 59700               Stanford Library Centre for Inform
                                   Processing
  0311 041 501 59700               Standard Centre for Information Processing
O 0311 050 006 1                   Nuclear Research
A 0311 050 300 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 503)
A 0311 050 300 021                 Oregon Outdial 1200 bps (Area 503)
B 0311 050 500 060                 ICN (=LASL)
  0310 600 021 0                   Procter and Gamble
  0310 600 022 6                   Anistics
  0310 600 022 6                   Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
  0310 600 023 2                   Scientific Timesharing
  0310 600 024 2                   Timesharing Resources
  0310 600 025 2                   Computer Science Corporation
  0310 600 025 5                   Timesharing Associates
  0310 600 027 6                   Management Decision Systems Inc
  0310 600 028 8                   SRI
  0310 600 028 8                   SRI San Francisco (UNIX)
  0310 600 028 8                   Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
  0310 600 030 3                   Scientific Timesharing
  0310 600 030 7                   Infomedia Corporation
  0310 600 032 3                   TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
  0310 600 040 1                   TMCS Public Network
  0310 600 043 2                   Interactive Market Systems
  0310 600 046 6                   Bibliographic Retrieval Services
B 0310 600 058 1                   BRS
  0310 600 063 3                   Public TYMNET/TRWNET Interlink
  0310 600 079 3                   J&J Host
B 0310 600 105 3
  0310 600 133 0                   MULTICS, HVN 862-3642
  0310 600 140 0                   TMCS Public Network
B 0310 600 150 9                   Orbit (SDC)
B 0310 600 157 878                 BIX
D 0310 600 165 9                   BYTE Information Exchange (GUEST,GUEST)
A 0310 600 166 3                   People Link
  0310 600 181 9                   TMCS Public Network
  0310 600 182 8        FRX        Faifax Outdial Host (Tymnet)
  0310 600 186 4                   SUNGARDS Central Computer Facility Networks
  0310 600 189 2                   Primenet (certain hours)
B 0310 600 195 2                   VAX
B 0310 600 197 6                   Outdial NY
A 0310 600 197 7
  0310 600 209 5                   COMODEX Online System
  0310 600 209 8                   D & B
  0310 600 209 9                   D & B
  0310 600 210 0                   D & B
  0310 600 210 9                   TYMNET/15B (inter-link)
B 0310 600 220 7,OUT               Outdial
  0310 600 228 6                   Primenet TFGI
  0310 600 229 9                   CONSILIUM
  0310 600 232 901*D    MFE        Magnetic Fusion Energy Centre, Lawrence
                                   Livermore
B 0310 600 236 1                   Denver Oil&Gas
  0310 600 241                     Bank Of America
  0310 600 245 3                   Primenet
B 0310 600 254 5        SEISMO     Centre for Seismic Studies
B 0310 600 255                     Outdial NY
A 0310 600 262 3                   VAX/VMS (GUEST ???)
B 0310 600 262 3003                VTINET
B 0310 600 262 460                 SUMEX
B 0310 600 263 5                   QUOTRON Wall Street (Boerse n.y.)
B 0310 600 266 400      SLAC       SLAC on Tymnet
B 0310 600 267 7                   The New York Times
  0310 600 269 4                   PVM3101,SPDS/MTAM, MLCM,VM/SP,STRATUS-1,
                                   STRATUS-2
  0310 600 279 0                   VM/370
  0310 600 286 4                   RCA Semicustom
B 0310 600 302 70000               VTI NETONE
  0310 600 307 9                   VM/370
  0310 600 309 2                   TYMNET/Protected Access Service Sys.
                                   Inter-link
  0310 600 316 8                   VM/370
  0310 600 321 4                   VM/370
  0310 600 322 0                   VM/370
  0310 600 322 1                   VM/370
  0310 600 357 2                   NORTH AMERICA DATA CENTRE
  0310 600 360 4                   VM/370
  0310 600 404 1                   RCA GLOBCOM'S PACKET SWITCHING SERICE
A 0310 600 412 9                   ?
A 0310 600 413 1                   ?
  0310 600 413 7                   TSO, VM/370
  0310 600 416 300                 Oakridge, Tennessee
  0310 600 417 4                   VM/370
  0310 600 420 6                   MAINSTREAMS
  0310 600 423 500                 Oakridge, Tennessee
B 0310 600 430 5                   BIOVAX
  0310 600 434 1                   (Host) 2 - VM/370, T - VM/370,1,3,4,A,C,E,Z
A 0310 600 436 5                   Toxnet (NLM=National Lib. of Medicine's)
B 0310 600 455 5                   VAX
  0310 600 459 97
  0310 600 474 3                   TYMNET Info Service
X 0310 600 502 0                   Outdial Fairfax
  0310 600 522 9                   Uni.of Pencilvania School of Arts and
                                   Science
  0310 600 526 7                   CHANEL 01
X 0310 600 531 7                   Outdial St.Louis
B 0310 600 532 0                   DEC Soft. Serv.
  0310 600 556 9                   STRATUS/32
  0310 600 557 1                   STRATUS/32
  0310 600 560 3                   (Host) systems 1,2,3,4,5,C (5=Outdial)
B 0310 600 562 200      FNAL       Fermilab
B 0310 600 562 226                 Fermilab 2
B 0310 600 578 78                  BIX
B 0310 600 584 401                 Washington Post
B 0310 600 61           DIALOG1    Lockheed Info Systems
  0310 600 61*DSDDIPSSL ORBIT2     SDC Search Service
  0310 600 628 1                   EDCS
  0310 600 628 3                   EDCS
  0310 600 643 2                   EASYLINK
  0310 600 643 4                   EASYLINK
  0310 600 672 2                   International Network
  0310 600 68                      Stanford SUMEX-AIM. Tenex op syst.
  0310 600 683 2                   A&A DATANET (Systems 1,8,0,14)
X 0310 600 701 7                   Outdial NY
  0310 600 759 6                   (Host)  A - VM/370, B - VM/370
? 0310 600 787                     Dallas
  0310 601 79                      Berkley Univ.
  0310 602 88                      Stanford Research Institute
B 0310 611 467                     Cas Online Sys.
  0310 614 67                      Ohio CAS (Chemical Abstracts Service)
  0310 617 001 38                  Multics
  0310 647 911 065                 BIX Lexington Data Service
  0310 690 006 1*D      DIALOG4    Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0310 690 080 3*D      DIALOG3    Lockheed DIALOG service
  0310 690 762 6                   Emery ADO
  0311 0                TELENET    USA - Telenet
B 0311 002 130 0039                ECLD
  0311 020 100 02000               Insco Systems
  0311 020 100 022                 New Jersey Outdial 2400 bps (Area 201)
  0311 020 100 02300               American Information Services
  0311 020 100 02400               The Information Bank
  0311 020 100 02500               New Jersey Institute of Technology
  0311 020 100 02800               Olcott International Company
  0311 020 100 03700               Informatics Inc
  0311 020 100 169      MOUTON
  0311 020 100 301                 New Jersey Outdial 1200 bps (Area 201)
  0311 020 101 59200               Scientific Process & Research Inc
  0311 020 200 02100               Scientific Timesharing
  0311 020 200 02200               Scientific Timesharing
X 0311 020 200 066                 Air Force
T 0311 020 200 099      ICIB       Information Council Incorporated B system
  0311 020 200 1        TELEMAIL   US Telemail facility
X 0311 020 200 10900    CIS        Chemical Information Systems
A 0311 020 200 115                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 202)
A 0311 020 200 116                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 202)
  0311 020 200 117                 Distr. of Columbia Outdial 2400 bps (Area
                                   202)
B 0311 020 200 141      TELEMAIL   US Telemail facility (GT-Net)
  0311 020 200 14175    TELEENQ    Telenet Enquiry Service
  0311 020 200 14175    TELEMAIL1  US Telemail facility
  0311 020 200 14275    TELENET    US Telenet
  0311 020 201 19500               Gallaude College Computer Centre
  0311 020 300 06400               NCSS Bureau
  0311 020 300 130                 Connecticut Outdial 1200 bps (Area 203)
  0311 020 301 78900               Yale University Computer Centre
  0311 020 400 02900    WATERLO    University of Waterloo
  0311 020 600 019                 Washington Outdial 1200 bps (Area 206)
  0311 021 200 02000               Bowne Timesharing
  0311 021 200 02500               Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
  0311 021 200 02800               Burroughs Corp (NYC data centre)
  0311 021 200 141      JPLM1      Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 1, USA
  0311 021 200 142      JPLM2      Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 2, USA
  0311 021 200 14200               GT-Net Telemail
A 0311 021 200 315                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 212)
A 0311 021 200 316                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 412                 Outdial 2400 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 41200               New York City Outdial (Area 212)
  0311 021 201 39200               Memorial Dose Distribution Computation
                                   Service
  0311 021 201 40600               MAV Systems (300 bps)
  0311 021 201 57800               IP Sharp Associates
  0311 021 201 58000               SDL International (1200 bps)
  0311 021 201 58500               SDL International (300 bps)
  0311 021 201 58800               DSL Systems Inc
  0311 021 201 59500               SDL International (1200 bps)
  0311 021 201 62000               Telestat System Inc
  0311 021 201 62700               Telestat Systems Inc
  0311 021 300 02200               Interactive Systems Corporation
  0311 021 300 02700               Mellonics Information Centre
  0311 021 300 029                 TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
B 0311 021 300 03300    ORBIT      Orbit
  0311 021 300 03300*D  ORBIT      SDC Search Service (300 bps)
  0311 021 300 04400               SDC Search Service (1200 bps)
B 0311 021 300 039      USCAL2     Univ. of Southern California
  0311 021 300 04114    IHW        IHW
  0311 021 300 04700               University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 048      USCAL1     University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 170                 LRS Dialog 2
T 0311 021 300 17000    DIALOG5    Lockheed Info Systems
  0311 021 300 17000*D  DIALOG2    Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 021 300 219      CALTECH    Caltech VAX 11/780
  0311 021 300 21908    CALTECH    Caltech VAX 11/780
  0311 021 300 21909    CALTECH2   Caltech VAX 11/780
  0311 021 300 412                 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 213)
A 0311 021 300 413                 Outdial CA
  0311 021 300 668                 Adainfo
  0311 021 301 353      UCLA       UCLA, USA
  0311 021 301 40300               Marshall & Swift Publication
  0311 021 400 117                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 214)
A 0311 021 400 118                 Texas Outdial 1200 bps (Area 214)
  0311 021 500 022                 Pennsylvania Outdial 2400 bps (Area 215)
  0311 021 500 112                 Pennsylvania Outdial 1200 bps (Area 215)
A 0311 021 600 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 216)
A 0311 021 600 021                 Ohio Outdial 1200 bps (Area 216)
  0311 021 700 021                 University of Illinois - Urbana
  0311 030 100 02000    NLM        National Library of Medicine
A 0311 030 100 02400               The Source
B 0311 030 100 038                 The Source (ID BSC131 SR3811)
B 0311 030 100 243                 ITT Dialcom
  0311 030 100 364                 Primesoft
A 0311 030 100 38                  The Source
B 0311 030 100 633                 Toxnet (NLM)
  0311 030 101 26500               Informatics Inc
  0311 030 300 02000               Computer Sharing Services
  0311 030 300 021                 Colorado Outdial 2400 bps (Area 303)
  0311 030 300 02300               Broker Services Inc
  0311 030 300 115                 Colorado Outdial 1200 bps (Area 303)
  0311 030 301 13100               EDI Computer Services
  0311 030 301 13200               EDI Computer Services
  0311 030 301 13300               Energy Enterprises
  0311 030 500 121                 Florida Outdial 1200 bps (Area 305)
  0311 030 501 16300               Florida Computer Inc
D 0311 030 508 793                 Miami Outdial (Area 305) ?
  0311 031 200 02200               National Computer Network of Chicago
  0311 031 200 024                 Illinois Outdial 2400 bps (Area 217 ?)
  0311 031 200 03100               Continental Bank
  0311 031 200 03200               Continental Bank
  0311 031 200 04900               American Hospital Supply Corporation
  0311 031 200 411                 Illinois Outdial 1200 bps (Area 217 ?)
  0311 031 201 07300               Commodity Information Services
  0311 031 268 801      ADPUSA     ADP Network Services Ltd.
  0311 031 300 024                 Michigan Outdial 2400 bps (Area 313)
  0311 031 300 04000               ADP Network Services
  0311 031 300 06200               Merit International (MIT)
  0311 031 300 216                 Michigan Outdial 1200 bps (Area 313)
  0311 031 301 39800               Merit Computer
  0311 031 400 07200               Environmental DataNetwork Inc.
  0311 031 401 06500               McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
  0311 031 401 06600               McDonnel Douglas Automation (110 bps)
  0311 031 401 06700               McDonnel Douglas Automation (1200 bps)
  0311 031 401 61000               McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
  0311 031 500 02000               Bibliographic Retrieval Services
A 0311 040 100 612                 Modemcity
A 0311 040 400 114                 Georgia Outdial 1200 bps (Area 404)
A 0311 040 800 021                 California Outdial 1200 bps? (Area 408)
  0311 040 800 245                 Bridge
B 0311 040 800 246                 SCF
  0311 041 201 4600                On-Line Systems Inc
  0311 041 400 02000               A.O. Smith Data Systems Divisions
  0311 041 400 021                 Wisconsin Outdial 1200 bps (Area 414)
B 0311 041 500 020                 LRS-Dialog 2
A 0311 041 500 02000    DIALOG     Lockheed Information Systems
  0311 041 500 02000*D  DIALOG     Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 041 500 048                 LRS Dialog 2
  0311 041 500 04800    DIALOG2    Lockheed Information Systems 2
  0311 041 500 04800*D  DIALOG1    Lockheed DIALOG service
  0311 041 500 117                 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
I 0311 041 500 210                 Outdial USA
A 0311 041 500 215                 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 217                 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 220                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
  0311 041 500 48000               Lockheed Information Systems (?)
B 0311 041 500 607                 BIONET
B 0311 041 500 609                 INTELLIGENETICS
  0311 041 501 23600               Hydrocomp Inc (300 bps)
  0311 041 501 23700               Hydrocomp Inc (1200 bps)
  0311 041 501 26800               ITEL Corp (300 bps)
  0311 041 501 26900               ITEL Corp (1200 bps)
  0311 041 501 59700               Stanford Library Centre for Inform
                                   Processing
  0311 041 501 59700               Standard Centre for Information Processing
O 0311 050 006 1                   Nuclear Research
A 0311 050 300 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 503)
A 0311 050 300 021                 Oregon Outdial 1200 bps (Area 503)
B 0311 050 500 060                 ICN (=LASL)
B 0311 051 300 03000               Mead Data Central
  0311 051 501 39600               State University of New York
  0311 051 600 02200               Timesharing Resources
D 0311 060 200 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 602)
D 0311 060 200 021                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 602)
B 0311 060 200 150                 Phoenix
  0311 060 201 60900               Timesharing Associates
B 0311 060 300 020                 Dartmouth College
  0311 060 300 02000    DARTMTH    Dartmouth College, USA
  0311 060 300 05000               Corporate Timesharing
  0311 060 301 54700               Raytheon Company Scientific Computer
                                   Service
X 0311 060 700 02000    CORNELL0   Cornell University (134.5 bps)
T 0311 060 700 02100    CORNELL1   Cornell University (300 bps)
T 0311 060 700 02200    CORNELL2   Cornell University (1200 bps)
  0311 060 700 02300    CORNELL3   Cornell University (1200 bps)
  0311 060 700 03600               TIPO Computer
  0311 060 702 00       CORNELL2   Cornell University
  0311 060 702 00       CORNELL2   Cornell University
  0311 060 800 02500               University of Wisconsin
  0311 060 801 6630                University of Wisconsin
  0311 060 900 4200                Dow-Jones
  0311 061 200 02500               Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork
  0311 061 200 02700               Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork
  0311 061 200 121                 Minnesota Outdial 1200 bps (Area 612)
  0311 061 201 06500               Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
                                   300 bps
  0311 061 201 06500               Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork
  0311 061 201 06600               Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
                                   110 bps
  0311 061 201 06700               Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
                                   300 bps
  0311 061 201 06900               Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
                                   134 bps
B 0311 061 400 021                 CAS online
D 0311 061 400 02124    CASUSA     STN International
  0311 061 700 02000               Bolt Beranek & Newman
  0311 061 700 02300               Computer Corporation    of America
  0311 061 700 02400               AVCO Computer Services
  0311 061 700 03600               Data Resources Inc
  0311 061 700 03800               BBN-RCC
  0311 061 700 03800               Bolt Beranek & Newman
  0311 061 700 06700               Management Decision Systems Inc
  0311 061 700 07000               Interactive Science Corp
  0311 061 700 07600               Interactive Science Corp
  0311 061 700 08000               III Systems Inc
B 0311 061 700 08401               LCG
  0311 061 700 12000               Cullinane Corp
  0311 061 700 13700               Masachusetts Institute of Technology
  0311 061 700 13800               Masachusetts Institute of Technology
  0311 061 700 13900               Masachusetts Institute of Technology
  0311 061 700 14000               Masachusetts Institute of Technology
B 0311 061 700 270                 Waltham
B 0311 061 700 609                 Package
B 0311 061 700 613                 BBN10
B 0311 061 700 614                 BBNVAX
  0311 061 701 01600               Data Resources Inc (300 bps)
  0311 061 701 01900               Data Resources Inc (300 bps)
  0311 061 701 16100               First Data Division/ADP Inc
  0311 061 701 16200               First Data Division/ADP Inc
  0311 061 701 25800               Data Resources Inc (134.5 bps)
  0311 061 701 26900               Interactive Management Systems
  0311 061 701 27500               Masachusetts Institute of Technology
  0311 061 701 39000               Masachusetts Institute of Technology
  0311 061 701 40300               Masachusetts Institute of Technology
  0311 061 703 088                 Delphi
  0311 061 900 050                 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 619)
  0311 070 300 02000               Litton Computer Services
  0311 070 300 02100               American Management Systems
  0311 070 300 056                 PRC Computer Centre Inc
  0311 070 300 117                 Virginia Outdial 2400 bps (Area 703)
B 0311 070 300 50000               NIH-EPA (CIS)
  0311 070 305 05200               Digital Broadcasting Corporation
  0311 071 300 024                 Texas Outdial 2400 bps (Area 713)
  0311 071 300 114                 Texas Outdial 1200 bps (Area 713)
  0311 071 301 08300               Corporate Services Inc
  0311 071 301 56500               Rice University
  0311 071 400 02000    SCIAPP     Science Applications Inc.
  0311 071 401 13700               Engineering Supervision Co
  0311 071 700 02000               Brodart Inc
A 0311 080 100 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 801)
A 0311 080 100 021                 Utah Outdial 1200 bps (Area 801)
B 0311 080 100 054                 ES
  0311 080 101 13700               Environmentech Information Systems
  0311 080 400 02000               Multiple Access Computer Group
X 0311 080 800 01046    UKIRTUK    Infra Red Telescope in Hawaii
X 0311 080 800 040      UKIRT      UK Infra Red Telescope in Hawaii
A 0311 081 300 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 813)
A 0311 081 300 021                 Florida Outdial 1200 bps (Area 813)
D 0311 081 305 518                 Tampa Outdial (Area 813) ?
  0311 081 800 021                 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 818)
D 0311 090 900 80000   JPLM3      Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 2, USA
  0311 090 900 8100                Telemail
  0311 091 400 02200               Electronic Tabulating Corporation
  0311 091 600 050                 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 916)
A 0311 091 900 020                 Outdial 300 bps (Area 919)
A 0311 091 900 021                 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 919)
  0311 3                RCA        USA - RCA (RCAG)
  0311 9                           USA - TRT
  0312 4                           USA - FTCC
  0312 5                           USA - Uninet
  0312 521 210 1        DIALOG6    Lockheed Info Systems
D 0312 561 703 080                 UNINET
B 0312 561 703 088                 Delphi
  0312 6                AUTONET    USA - Autonet
  0312 688 01           AUTONET    AUTONET Information
  0312 7                           USA - Telenet
  0313 2                COMPU      USA - Compuserve
  0313 6                           USA - Geisco
  0334                             Mexico
  0334 0                           Telepac
  0340                  FA         French Antilles (Martinique (Curacau?))
  0340 0                           Dompac/NTI
  0342                  BDS        Barbados
  0342 235 191 9169
  0350                             Bermuda
  0350 3                           PSDS
  0425                  IL         Israel
  0425 1                           Isranet
B 0425 130 000 215                 Israelbox
  0426                  BRN        Bahrain
  0426 3                           BTC
  0431                  DXB        United Arab Emirates - Dubai
  0440                  J          Japan
  0440 1                           DDX-P
B 0440 129 431 04                  KEK VAX
B 0440 129 431 21                  Tsukuba Uni
  0440 8                VENUSP     Venus-P (Japanese data network)
I 0440 820 023                     KDD ?
B 0440 820 060 01       KDD        KDD Test Host, TOKYO
  0442
B 0442 110 403 25                  OKI
B 0442 433 403 07                  CMES
  0450                             South Korea
  0450 1                           Dacom/DNS
  0454                  HK         Hong Kong
  0454 2                           Intelpak
  0454 5                           Datapak
A 0454 550 010 4        HKDATA     Hong Kong DATAPAK Info
A 0454 550 043 1                   DATAFAX
  0487                             Taiwan
  0487 2                           Pacnet
  0487 7                           Udas
  0505                  AUS        Australia
  0505 2                           Austpac
  0505 228 621 000                 Anglo/Australian Observatory
  0505 228 621 001                 CSIRO Radio-Physics
  0505 228 621 001                 FTP for Epping
  0505 233 422 000      MELBUNI    Melbourne Univ. Australia
A 0505 273 720 000      UQ         Univ. of Queensland Australia
A 0505 273 720 000      UQXA       University of Queensland ANF-10 gateway
D 0505 273 722 0000                Uni Queensland
  0505 282 620 000                 FTP For Austek
A 0505 282 620 000                 VAX in Sidney, Australia
  0505 3                           Midas
  0505 321 000 1                   Network test
  0505 321 000 3                   MIDAS FOX Test
  0510                             Indonesia
  0510 1                           PSDS (1986)
  0525                  SGP        Singapore
  0525 2                           Telepac
A 0525 211 668 8        TELEPAC    Telepac Info
  0530                  NZ         New Zealand
  0530 1                           P.S.S. (Pacnet)
  0530 171 000 004      WAIKATO    Univ of Waikato New Zealand
B 0530 197 000 016                 ASMAIL
  0547                             Fr.Polyn.
  0547 0                           Tompac
  0612                             Ivory Coast
  0612 2                           Sytranpac
  0647                             Reunion
  0647 0                           Dompac/NIT
  0655                  ZA         South Africe
  0655 0                           Saponet
D 0655 011 101 207                 UNI-NET
  0714                             Panama
  0714 1                           Intelpac
  0722                             Argentinia
  0722 2                           Arpac
I 0722 221 110 0171
  0724                  BR         Brazil
  0724 0                           Interdata
  0724 1                           Renpac
D 0724 782 450 8                   Nuclear Research Institute
  0730                             Chile
  0730 0                           Entel
  0732                             Colombia
  0732 0
  0742                             French Guiana
  0742 0                           Dompac/NTI
  0900                             USA ?
  0900 0                           Dialnet

==============================================================================
|
| Local addresses on KOMETH (0228 479 110 86):
|
|   11  KOMETH-Informations
|  120  Modems 1200 bps (predefined numbers, some with a PW)
|  124  Modems 2400 bps (     "        "   ,  "   "    a PW)
|  130  Modems 300 bps  (     "        "   ,  "   "    a PW)
|  1D0  RZ-VAX (EZRZ1)
|  300  ETZ-VAX (CUMULI)
|  520  ETHICS, Library database
|  D11  PSI-Informations
| C000  Time
| C025  X25 Gateway (RZU, with password)
| C011  NUZ-Informations
| C100  RZU, VM/SP, full-screen
|
| There are two information systems on the RZ-VAX:
|
|  MAC-BBS  BBS with Mac-specific informations. Access for validated users
|           only (that means that you have to type in your name, address and
|           whether you're a student at the ETH or not and then wait a few
|           days).
|           (Username=MAC)
|  VisInfo  Informations server of the VIS (Verein der InformatikStudenten)
|           Contains some boards with mail from several networks and from
|           local sources.  Has a CHAT (closed during prime time hours). Free
|           access.
|           (Username=VISINFO)
|
===============================================================================
|
| Local addresses at CERN (0228 468 114 0510):
|
|   17  Lyon (own network)
|   23  PAD
|   31  VXOMEG
|   41  Wisconsin/Madison
|   42  CERNLINE 193
|   45  DECserver
|   51  ALEPH
|   56  MERLIN VAX
|   61  (Prompt )
|   72  Wylbur / VM
|  100  Wylbur / VM
|  101  VM/370 CERNVM
|  102  VM/370 CERNVMB
|  103  VM/370 CERNVM
|  110  VXLDB1 VAX 8650 VMS 4.6
|  111  Information
|  112  VXSB
|  115  VXLDB1
|  120  Service CAD_CAM (VAX 8650+VAX785)/SYSTEME=VMS 4.6
|  121  CAD_CAM
|  122  VXCERN
|  123  VXCERN
|  124  BSD
|  125  CERNVM
|  127  PAD
|  130  L3 test beam VXC3
|  137  ALEPH-TPC
|  140  VXEPEL
|  141  DECserver 200 ("user friendly")
|  142  CERNADD
|  146  VXEPEL
|  147  Uni Genf TEC VAXTEC
|  151  CCVAX / DECserver 200
|  152  Uni Genf WA70
|  154  ALEPH 750 Fastbus VAX
|  161  MCR
|  162  MCR
|  166  VXWA80
|  167  cernvax
|  170  VXINFN
|  175  ALEPH
|  176  MCR with HELP
|  X29  X25 Gateway
|
===============================================================================
|
| Addresses on Merit (0228 468 114 0583):
|
|  The principal host computers on Merit are:
|
|   Name        System/machine       Organization           Location
|   ----        -----------------    -------------------    -------------
|   MSUnet-IBM  VM/CMS IBM 3090-180  Michigan State Univ    East Lansing
|    OU         Multics Honeywell    Oakland Univ           Rochester
|    UB         MTS IBM 3090-400     Univ of Michigan       Ann Arbor
|    UM         MTS IBM 3090-400     Univ of Michigan       Ann Arbor
|    WM         DECsystem-10         Western Michigan Univ  Kalamazoo
|    WU         MTS Amdahl 470V/8    Wayne State Univ       Detroit
|
|  If you have a question about the use of the Merit Network, call
|  [phone] and ask for a user consultant.
|
|  Other host computers and services available on the Merit network:
|
|  Autonet             CMU-Cyber           CMU-IBM          Datapac
|  DIALOUT-AA          DIAL1200-AA         DIAL2400-AA      DIAL300-AA
|  EMU-VAX             IGW                 ITI              MAGNET
|  MSU-CLSI            MSU-CLVAX1          MSU-EGRNET       MSU-IBM
|  MSU                 MTU                 MTUS5            OU-SecsNet
|  RPI                 RUAC                Survey           Telenet
|  UM-Annex            UM-CIC              UM-CLINFO        UM-dippy
|  UM-DSC              UM-EnginHarris      UM-MMVAX         UM-Public-Service
|  UM-QuickSlides      UM-RAVAX            UM-zippy         UMD-LIB
|  UMLIB               UMLIB-300           WAYNEST1         WAYNEST2
|  WMU-CAE             WMU-Kanga           WMU-Pooh         WMU-Puff
|  WMU-Tigger          WMU-Winnie          WSU-CSVAX        WSU-ET
|  WSUNET              ZOOnet-KCollege     ZOOnet-KVCC      ZOOnet-Nazareth
|
|  Some of the other computers and services which can be accessed via Telenet,
|  Autonet, and Datapac:
|
|  ABA/NET             ACP                 ADPNS-261        ADPNS-3
|  ADPNS-446           ADPNS-9             Alberta          ARTFL
|  Automail-23         Automail-297        Boeing           British-Columbia
|  BRS                 Cal-Berkeley        Calgary          Caltech-HEP
|  Carnegie-DEC-20     Carnegie-MICOM      Carnegie-11/45   CompuServe
|  Comshare            Cornell             Dalhousie        DatapacInfo
|  Dialcom             Dialog              Dow-Jones        Guelph
|  Guelph-Cosy         Illinois            Illinois-Cyber   LEXIS
|  Manitoba            Maryland-Unix       McGill           MGH
|  Minnesota-Cyber     Minnesota-VAX       MIT-Multics      MIT-VM
|  Montreal            Natl-Lib-Med        NCAR-Telenet     New-Brunswick
|  Newsnet             NJIT-EIES           NLM              NLM-MCS
|  Notre-Dame          NRC                 NYTimes          OAG
|  Queens              Rice                SDC              SFU
|______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 5 of 12


                                    COSMOS

                   COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS

                                   Part Two

                                by King Arthur


     This article will present solutions to the computer security problems
presented in my previous file.  The following are simple but often neglected
items which if properly treated can immensely increase your company's computer
security.  These points apply not merely in regards to COSMOS, but to all
computers in all companies.


A) Dial-Up Security:

     When securing a computer system, regardless of its type, it's important to
remember this: the only way someone can remotely access your system is if there
is a dial-up line leading to that system.  If your system has a dial-up, make
sure that you have taken every possible precaution to secure that line.  "The
one piece of advice I would give is:  Be careful with dial-up lines," says
Bellcore's Ed Pinnes.

     Dave Imparato, Manager of Database Management at New York Telephone, says,
"We have devices that sit in front of our computers that you have to gain
access to.  In order to even get to COSMOS, there are three or four levels of
security you have to go through, and that's before you even get to the system."

Rules for protection of Dial-Up lines:

1.  Have as few dial-up lines as possible.  Private lines or direct connections
    are often a viable replacement for dial-up lines.

2.  If you must have phone lines going to your computer, use external hardware,
    if possible.  For instance, the Datakit Virtual Circuit Switch (VCS) will
    require a user to specify an "access password" and a system destination to
    specify which system you are calling.  The VCS would then connect you to
    the requested system which would prompt you for a login and password.
    Using hardware similar to this serves a double purpose:

         A) It is harder for someone to get into your computer, due to
            additional passwords;

         B) Employees need only dial a single number to access a number of
            systems.

    Another good type of hardware is a callback modem.  A callback modem will
    prompt users for a login and password.  If these are correct, the modem
    will automatically callback to a predetermined number.  At that point you
    would login to the computer.  The advantage of callback is that unless a
    call is placed from a certain phone, there is no way to connect.
    Unfortunately, this is not always efficient for systems with large numbers
    of users.

    Lastly, and the most effective means of access, is to have a system which
    does not identify itself.  A caller has to enter a secret password, which
    doesn't display on the screen.  If a caller doesn't type the correct
    password, the system will hang up, without ever telling the caller what has
    happened.

3.  If you ever detect "hackers" calling a certain number, it is advisable to
    change that number.  Phone numbers should be unlisted.  According to a
    hacker, he once got the number to an AT&T computer by asking directory
    assistance for the number of AT&T at 976 Main Street.

4.  If dial-up lines aren't used on nights or weekends, they should be
    disabled.  Computer hackers usually conduct their "business" on nights or
    weekends.  The COSMOS system has the ability to restrict access by time of
    day.


B) Password Security:

     Using the analogy between a computer and a file cabinet, you can compare a
password to the lock on your file cabinet.  By having accounts with no
passwords you are, in effect, leaving your file cabinet wide open.  A system's
users will often want passwords that are easy to remember.  This is not an
advisable idea, especially for a database system with many users.  The first
passwords tried by hackers are the obvious.  For instance if MF01 is known to
be the user name for the frame room, a hacker might try MF01, FRAME, MDF, or
MAINFRAME as passwords.  If it's known to a hacker that the supervisor at the
MDF is Peter Pinkerton,  PETE or PINKERTON would not be very good passwords.

Rules for password selection:

1.  Passwords should be chosen by system administrators or the like.  Users
    will often choose passwords which provide no security.  They should not be
    within the reach of everybody in the computer room, but instead should be
    sent via company mail to the proper departments.

2.  Passwords should be changed frequently, but on an irregular basis -- every
    four to seven weeks is advisable.  Department supervisors should be
    notified of password changes via mail, a week in advance.  This would
    ensure that all employees are aware of the change at the proper time.  One
    thing you don't want is mass confusion, where everybody is trying to figure
    out why they can't access their computers.

3.  System administrators' passwords should be changed twice as often because
    they can allow access to all system resources.  If possible, system
    administrator accounts should be restricted from logging in on a dial-up
    line.

4.  A password should NEVER be the same as the account name.  Make sure that
    ALL system defaults are changed.

5.  Your best bet is to make passwords a random series of letters and  numbers.
    For example 3CB06W1, Q9IF0L4, or F4W21D0.  All passwords need not be the
    same length or format.  Imparato says, "We built a program in a PC that
    generates different security passwords for different systems and makes sure
    there's no duplication."

6.  It's important to change passwords whenever an employee leaves the company
    or even changes departments.  Imparato says, "When managers leave our
    organization, we make sure we change those passwords which are necessary to
    operate the system."

7.  The Unix operating system has a built-in "password aging" feature, which
    requires a mandatory change of passwords after a period of time.  If you
    run any Unix-based systems, it's important to activate password aging.

8.  When you feel you have experienced a problem, change ALL passwords,  not
    just those passwords involved with the incident.


C) Site security:

     There have been a number of articles written by hackers and published in
2600 Magazine dealing with garbage picking or what hackers call "trashing".
It's important to keep track of what you throw out.  In many companies,
proprietary operations manuals are thrown out.  COSMOS itself is not a
user-friendly system.  In other words, without previous exposure to the system
it would be very difficult to operate.  Bellcore's Beverly Cruse says, "COSMOS
is used in so many places around the country, I wouldn't be surprised if they
found books... in the garbage, especially after divestiture.  One interesting
thing about a COSMOS article written by hackers, is that there was a lot of
obsolete information, so it shows that wherever the information came from... it
was old."

Rules for site security:

1.  Although it may seem evident, employees should be required to show proper
    identification when entering terminal rooms or computer facilities.  It's
    doubtful that a hacker would ever attempt to infiltrate any office, but
    hackers aren't the only people you have to worry about.

2.  Urge employees to memorize login sequences.  It's a bad idea for passwords
    to be scribbled on bits of paper taped to terminals.  Eventually, one of
    those scraps may fall into the wrong hands.

3.  Garbage should be protected as much as possible.  If you use a private
    pick-up, keep garbage in loading docks, basements, or fenced-off areas. If
    you put your garbage out for public sanitation department pick-up, it's a
    good idea to shred sensitive materials.

4.  Before throwing out old manuals or books, see if another department could
    make use of them.  The more employees familiar with the system, the less of
    a chance that there will be a security problem.

5.  Printing terminals should be inspected to make sure that passwords are not
    readable.  If passwords are found to echo, check to see if the duplex is
    correct.  Some operating systems allow you to configure dial-ups for
    printer use.


D) Employee Security:

     When a hacker impersonates an employee, unless he is not successful there
is a great chance the incident will go unreported.  Even if the hacker doesn't
sound like he knows what he's talking about, employees will often excuse the
call as an unintelligent or uninformed person.  It's unpleasant to have to
worry about every call with an unfamiliar voice on the other end of the phone,
but it is necessary.

Rules for employee security:

1.  When making an inter-departmental call, always identify yourself with:
    1) Your name; 2) Your title; and 3) Your department and location.

2.  Be suspicious of callers who sound like children, or those who ask you
    questions that are out of the ordinary.  Whenever someone seems suspicious,
    get their supervisor's name and a callback number.  Don't discuss anything
    sensitive until you can verify their identity.  Don't ever discuss
    passwords over the phone.

3.  When there is a security problem with a system, send notices to all users
    instructing them not to discuss the system over the phone, especially if
    they do not already know the person to whom they are talking.

4.  Remind all dial-up users of systems, before hanging up.

5.  If security-minded posters are put up around the workplace, employees are
    bound to take more care in their work and in conversations on the phone.

6.  If managers distribute this and other computer security articles to
    department supervisors employee security will be increased.


E) General Security:

     Bellcore recently sent a package to all system administrators of COSMOS
systems.  The package detailed security procedures  which applied to COSMOS and
Unix-based systems.  If you are a recipient of this package, you should re-read
it thoroughly to ensure that your systems are secure.  Cruse says, "Last
year... I had a call from someone within an operating company with a COSMOS
security problem.  All we really did was give them documentation which reminded
them of existing security features...  There is built-in security in the COSNIX
operating system...  We really didn't give them anything new at the time.  The
features were already there; we gave them the recommendation that they
implement all of them."

     If you feel you may not be using available security features to the
fullest, contact the vendors of your computer systems and request documentation
on security.  Find out if there are security features that you may not be
currently taking advantage of.  There are also third party software companies
that sell security packages for various operating systems and computers.

     Computer security is a very delicate subject.  Many people try to pretend
that there is no such thing as computer crime.  Since the problem exists, the
best thing to do is to study the problems and figure out the best possible
solutions.  If more people were to write or report about computer security, it
would be easier for everyone else to protect themselves.  I would like to see
Bellcore publish security guidelines, available to the entire
telecommunications industry.  Keep in mind, a chain is only as strong as its
weakest link.
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 6 of 12

                 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<*>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
                 <<<                                       >>>
                 <<<       Looking Around In DECNET        >>>
                 <<<                                       >>>
                 <<<    by Deep Thought of West Germany    >>>
                 <<<                                       >>>
                 <<<             June 1, 1989              >>>
                 <<<                                       >>>
                 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<*>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>


Disclaimer:  I take no responsibility for any use or abuse of the information
             contained in this article, nor for any damage caused by the use of
             methods described.  DECNET, VAX, and VMS are possibly registered
             trademarks of Digital Equipment Corporation.


There comes a time when every somewhat intelligent programmer asks:  Is hacking
difficult?  Now, being in a university network, why don't just give it a try?
Since one is an official student and somewhat authorized to use the computing
facilities, testing the modern means of communication should cause no trouble.

Well, you start searching on those nodes, you have official access for
interesting programs and procedures.  And you find:  Netdcl, just one program
of many, that obviously enables one to run commands on remote nodes without
having an account on these nodes.  A really interesting thing, as nearly
everything is allowed that a normal user can do.

The dear reader may start to think:  Wasn't there always the shouting about VMS
being the MOST SECURE computer system, making it UNPENETRABLE to hackers?  Ok,
cool down, this feature can be disabled and so, you think, if someone has super
secret data on his VAX, he will stop any use or abuse of this feature.

2nd Act -- Somewhere one has heard about some mystery things called system
calls.  Since one always wanted to know about how to react on keystrokes on a
VAX (really being not trivial!) you start reading the manuals more precisely to
find out how to do it in Pascal.

Randomly on browsing thru the pages you discover functions which deliver
information about Userids.  This comes in handy, as a friend engaged in
university politics wants to distribute a leaflet by email to all registered
users.  In fact, it's completely unproblematic to gain a list of all users.  An
example program, although written in Assembler, is even contained in the
manuals.  Enjoy a list of 1000 Userids complete with information about network
access rights.  The Pascal program is contained in Appendix B (later in this
file).

Sorry, passwords are not stored in this list.  Even the Sysop can't access
them, so that's no great loss.  Guess what passwords many accounts have?  Sure,
just try the username.  It's really amazing how ignorant users can be.  Of
course this is a problem of group-accounts, that many users have access to and
must know the password.  Nevertheless, the hole is there.

The real hacker, once he has logged in on such an account surely finds ways to
gain system privilege.  This requires in-depth knowledge of the Kernel of VMS
and is another story I won't deal with.


What is DECNET?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DECNET is the means, by which computers from Digital Equipment Corporation
(DEC) can be connected to each other.  Each computer in this network has an
address which is normally given by x.y where x is the area number (an integer)
and y is the node number in this area which ranges from 1 to 1023.  To access
DECNET nodes, one specifies just one number, which can be computed from x and y
by the following formula:

   nodenumber = x * 1024 + y

Often nodes, especially local nodes (having the same area number as your
current node) have names assigned to them so they can be memorized more easily.


Interesting DECNET Commands
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To get a (first) list of available DECNET nodes, try the command

   $ SHOW NET

The $ (as in the following examples) is the default prompt of VMS and should
not be entered.  This Command will give you a list of (hopefully) reachable
nodes.  All lines of the output contain the network address in the form x.y and
normally a name which this node is known by.

Your current node is mentioned in the first line in "VAX/VMS network status for
local node X.Y Name".  In most cases you will then just see local nodes listed
and a line saying "The next hop to the nearest area router is node XX.YY".
This node contains more information about the DECNET than the node you are
currently on.  If you have an account on the specified node, log on there and
try again.  If not, well, play with the local nodes listed and look at the
command NCP shown later.

Now, what can you do with those nodes that were mentioned in the output?
First command is

    $ SET HOST <node>

Where <node> is either a nodename or a nodenumber (see above).  Thus, if SDIVAX
was listed in the SHOW NET list as 42.13, then you may try both SET HOST SDIVAX
or SET HOST 43021 (42*1024+13 = 43021).  Probably you'll get that ugly
Username: prompt.  You're on your own then.

Second thing you can do with DECNET is email.  On VMS the MAIL program can send
mail to other users.  If you and your friend both have accounts on the same
DECNET, you can send him mail if you know his nodename or nodenumber by
specifying SDIVAX::FREDDY or 43021::FREDDY.

Then there is PHONE.  This is a utility to talk to another (or several) user(s)
on a DECNET.  If you want to call Freddy, just type PHONE SDIVAX::FREDDY.  If
he is logged in, his terminal will ring and if he answers his phone (with PHONE
ANSWER) you may chat with him.  PHONE has another nice feature built in:  You
may ask for a list of active users on a remote name by %DIR SDIVAX.  See the
online help on PHONE for further details.

The next really mighty DECNET facility is remote file access.  Valid filenames
in VMS consist of the components node, disk, directory and filename.  An
example for a valid filename is SDIVAX::DISK$2:[NASA.SECRET]SDI.DOC where some
components may be omitted and default values are used instead.

File names including the node specification may be used in nearly all VMS
commands examples being DIR, TYPE and COPY.  Access to the specified file is
granted, if the protection of the file allows access by world, or if the owner
of the file is the user DECNET.  This pseudo userid is available on every VAX
and has the password DECNET.  Access to that account is limited to network
processing so you can't just log in with Username=DECNET, password=DECNET.  By
default a special directory owned by the User DECNET exists on each node.  This
directory can be accessed by just specifying the nodename without any disk or
directory information, as in

    $ DIR SDIVAX::

If users played too much with this feature, the directory may be protected or
otherwise disabled.

The last feature described here is the remote command processing facility.  If
you try to open a file with the specification

    $ SDIVAX::"task=foo.com"

Instead of opening the DCL procedure, foo.com will be executed.  To make use of
this feature easily, programs have been written to interactively communicate
with a remote host.  The command procedure NETDCL.COM does this task and is
contained in the Appendix A (seen later in this file.  Look at this
DCL-Procedure to learn more about DECNET features.


The Key To Universal Knowledge
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There is a pearl under the programs on a VAX.  It's called NCP and will give
readily information about the whole DECNET.  You start this program either by
MCR NCP or by doing a SET DEF SYS$SYSTEM and RUN NCP.  Use the on-line Help
provided in NCP (which means Network Control Program) to learn more.

    NCP> SHOW KNOWN NODES

Provides a list of all nodes known on your current node, including the names
you may use as node specifications.  But there is more:  You may connect to
another node's database and get a list of nodes which are known at the remote
node with

    NCP> SET EXEC SDIVAX

And then again the SHOW KNOWN NODES command.  This feature should provide you
with a nearly infinite list of node names and node numbers.


Conclusion
~~~~~~~~~~
There are many nice features available under DECNET.  Probably I don't know
all, but I hope this article showed you the mighty tools available on VMS to
make network life easier.


WARNING:  The author has had bad experiences with some node administrators,
          who didn't like their machines being contacted over DECNET.  Yes,
          that's the drawback, each DECNET activity is written to a protocol
          file that is printed and deleted every month.  So you should be
          careful in using DECNET.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

APPENDIX A:

The Procedure NETDCL.COM, sometimes called TELL.COM, NET.COM
-----------------------
$ IF f$mode() .EQS. "NETWORK" THEN GOTO network
$ IF p1 .EQS. "" THEN READ/PROMPT="_Node: " sys$command p1
$ nodespec = p1 - "::"
$ nodename = f$extract(0,f$locate("""",nodespec),nodespec)
$! include the following line for "hard cases"
$! nodespec = nodespec+"""decnet decnet"""
$ ON WARNING THEN CONTINUE
$ CLOSE/ERR=open_server dcl_server
$open_server:
$ OPEN/READ/WRITE dcl_server 'nodespec'::"TASK=NETDCL"/ERROR=open_failure
$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO exit
$flush_output:
$ READ dcl_server record
$ IF record .EQS. "SEND_ME_A_COMMAND" -
  THEN GOTO send_command
$ WRITE sys$output record
$ GOTO flush_output
$send_command:
$ IF p2 .NES. "" THEN GOTO single_command
$ READ sys$command record /PROMPT="''nodename'> " /END=exit
$ record  := 'record
$ IF record .EQS. "EXIT" THEN GOTO exit
$ WRITE dcl_server record
$ GOTO flush_output
$single_command:
$ command := 'p2' 'p3' 'p4' 'p5' 'p6' 'p7' 'p8'
$ WRITE dcl_server command
$single_flush:
$ READ dcl_server record
$ IF record .EQS. "SEND_ME_A_COMMAND"-
$ THEN GOTO exit
$ WRITE sys$output record
$ GOTO single_flush
$open_failure:
$ ON WARNING THEN EXIT
$ COPY/LOG Netdcl.Com 'nodespec'::
$ WAIT 0:0:1
$ OPEN/READ/WRITE dcl_server 'nodespec'::"TASK=NETDCL"
$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO exit
$ GOTO flush_output
$exit:
$ CLOSE dcl_server
$ EXIT
$network:
$ OPEN/READ/WRITE dcl_link sys$net
$ SET NOON
$ dcl_verify = 'f$verify(0)'
$ DEFINE sys$output dcl_link:
$server_loop:
$ WRITE dcl_link "SEND_ME_A_COMMAND"
$ READ dcl_link dcl_string /END_OF_FILE=server_exit /ERROR=server_exit
$ 'dcl_string'
$  GOTO server_loop
$server_exit:
$ IF dcl_verify THEN set verify
$ CLOSE dcl_link
$ DEASSIGN sys$output
$ EXIT
-----------------------

APPENDIX B

ALLUSER.PAS - Show all registered users
-----------------------
{
* alluser.pas - get names of all users
* by Deep, 1989
* This program is freely redistributable as long no modifications are made
* DISCLAIMER: I take no responsibility for any use or abuse of this
*             program.  It is given for informational purpose only.
*
* program history:
* 04-May-89   started
* 02-Jun-89   clean up of code
}
[inherit ('sys$library:starlet.pen')]
program alluser(input,output);

  type $word      = [word] 0..65535;
       $byte      = [byte] 0..255;
       $quadword  = record
                      lo,hi : unsigned;
                    end;
       $uquad  = record
                      lo,hi : unsigned;
                    end;
var
  id: unsigned;
  status, status2: integer;
  length: $WORD;
  attrib,context,context2,context3: unsigned;
  ident, ident2: unsigned;
  name: varying [512] of char;
  holder: $uquad;

begin

writeln('Alluser - use at your own risk!');
status := SS$_NORMAL;
{ id = -1 selects next identifier }
id := -1;
context := 0;
while (status <> SS$_NOSUCHID) do
   begin
   { find next identifier }
   status := $idtoasc(id,name.length,name.body,ident,attrib,context);
   if (status <> SS$_NOSUCHID) then begin
      write(pad(name,' ',16));
      if (ident div (65536*32768) > 0) then
         { it's a rights-list, so print the hex-value of the identifier }
         begin
         writeln(oct(ident,12));
         context2 := 0;
         context3 := 0;
         { find all holders of this right }
         repeat
            holder := zero;
            status2 := $find_holder(ident,holder,attrib,context2);
            if (holder.lo <> 0) then begin
                ident2 := ident;
                { get UIC and username }
                status := $idtoasc(holder.lo,name.length,name.body,ident2
                    ,attrib,context3);
                write('                ',pad(name,' ',16));
                writeln('[',oct(holder.lo div 65536,3),','
                    ,oct(holder.lo mod 65536,3),']');
               end;
         until (holder.lo = 0);
         end
      else
         { it's a UIC, so translate to [grp,user] }
         begin
         writeln('[',oct(ident div 65536,3),',',oct(ident mod 65536,3),']');
         end;
      end;
   end;
end.
-----------------------

This article has been brought to you by Deep Thought of West Germany.  If you
liked this article, grant me access if I once drop in your BBS!
_______________________________________________________________________________


Received: (from C483307@UMCVMB for TK0JUT1@UCLAMAIL via NJE)
         (C483307-9202;     114 LINES); Tue, 27 Jun 89 15:54:16 CDT
Date:    Tue, 27 Jun 89 15:54 CDT
To:      TK0JUT1
From:    C483307@UMCVMB

Comment: converted from NETDATA format at NIU
                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 7 of 12

               <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>
               <:>                                          <:>
               <:>          The Making Of A Hacker          <:>
               <:>                                          <:>
               <:>        by Framstag of West Germany       <:>
               <:>                                          <:>
               <:>                June 2, 1989              <:>
               <:>                                          <:>
               <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>


Prologue For None VMS Users
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     DECnet is the network for DEC machines, in most cases you can say VAXes.
DECnet allows you to do:   - e-mail
                           - file transfer
                           - remote login
                           - remote command
                           - remote job entry
                           - PHONE
     PHONE is an interactive communication between users and is equal to TALK
on UNIX or a "deluxe"-CHAT on VM/CMS.

     BELWUE, the university network of the state Baden-Wuerttemberg in
West Germany contains (besides other networks) a DECnet with about 400 VAXes.
On every VAX there is standard-account called DECNET with pw:= DECNET, which is
not reachable via remote login.  This account is provided for several
DECnet-Utilities and as a pseudo-guest-account.  The DECNET-account has very
restricted privileges:  You cannot edit a file or make another remote login.

    The HELP-menu is equipped by the system and is similar to the MAN command
on UNIX.

    More information on DECnet can be found in "Looking Around In DECnet" by
Deep Thought in this very issue of Phrack Inc.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

     Here, at the University of Ulm, we have an *incredibly* ignorant computer
center staff, with an even bigger lack of system-literature (besides the 80 kg
of VAX/VMS-manuals).  The active may search for information by himself, which
is over the level of "run," "FORTRAN," or "logout."  My good luck that I have
other accounts in the BELWUE-DECnet, where more information is offered for the
users.  I am a regular student in Ulm and all my accounts are completely legal
and corresponding to the German laws.  I don't call myself a "hacker," I feel
more like a "user" (...it's more a defining-problem).

     In the HELP-menu in a host in Tuebingen I found the file netdcl.com and
the corresponding explanation, which sends commands to the DECNET-Account of
other VAXes and executes them there (remote command).  The explanation in the
HELP-menu was idiot-proof -- therefore for me, too :-)

     With the command "$ mcr ncp show known nodes" you can obtain a list of all
netwide active VAXes, as is generally known, and so I pinged all these VAXes to
look for more information for a knowledge-thirsty user.  With "help", "dir" and
other similar commands I look around on those DECnet accounts, always watching
for topics related to the BELWUE-network.  It's a pity, that 2/3 of all VAXes
have locked the DECNET-Account for NETDCL.COM.  Their system managers are
probably afraid of unauthorized access, but I cannot imagine how there could be
such an unauthorized access, because you cannot log on this account -- no
chance for trojan horses, etc.

     Some system managers called me back after I visited their VAX to chat with
me about the network and asked me if they could help me in any way. One sysop
from Stuttgart even sent me a version of NETDCL.COM for the ULTRIX operation
system.

     Then, after a month, the  H O R R O R  came over me in shape of a the
following mail:

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
From:   TUEBINGEN::SYSTEM       31-MAY-1989 15:31:11.38
To:     FRAMSTAG
CC:
Subj:   don't make any crap, or you'll be kicked out!

From:   ITTGPX::SYSTEM       29-MAY-1989 16:46
To:     TUEBINGEN::SYSTEM
Subj:   System-breaking-in 01-May-1989

To the system manager of the Computer TUEBINGEN,

On May 1st 1989 we had a System-breaking-in in our DECNET-account, which
started from your machine.  By help of our accounting we ascertained your user
FRAMSTAG to have emulated an interactive log-on on our backbone-node and on
every machine of our VAX-cluster with the "trojan horse" NETDCL.COM.  Give us
this user's name and address and dear up the occurrence completely.  We point
out that the user is punishable.  In case of repetition we would be forced to
take corresponding measures.  We will check whether our system got injured.  If
not, this time we will disregard any measure.  Inform us via DECnet about your
investigation results -- we are attainable by the nodenumber 1084::system

Dipl.-Ing. Michael Hager
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

     My system manager threatened me with the deleting of my account, if I
would not immediately enlighten the affair.  *Gulp*!
     I was conscious about my innocence, but how to tell it to the others?  I
explained, step by step, everything to my system manager.  He then understood
after a while, but the criminal procedure still hovered over me... so, I took
quickly to my keyboard, to compose file of explanations and to send it to that
angry system manager in Stuttgart (node 1084 is an institute there).  But no
way out:  He had run out of disk quota and my explanation-mail sailed into the
nirwana:

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
$ mail explanation
  To:   1084::system
%MAIL-E, error sending to user SYSTEM at 1084
%MAIL-E-OPENOUT, error opening SYS$SYSROOT:[SYSMGR]MAIL$00040092594FD194.MAI;
as output
-RMS-E-CRE, ACP file create failed
-SYSTEM-F-EXDISKQUOTA, disk quota exceeded
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

     Also the attempt of a connection with the PHONE-facilty failed:  In his
borderless hacker-paranoia, he cut off his PHONE... and nowhere is a list with
the REAL-addresses of the virtual DECnet-addresses available (to prevent
hacking).  Now I stood there with the brand "DANGEROUS HACKER!" and I had no
chance to vindicate myself.  I poured out my troubles to an acquaintance of
mine, who is a sysop in the computer-center in Freiburg.  He asked other sysops
and managers thru the whole BELWUE-network until someone gave him a telephone
number after a few days -- and that was the right one!

     I phoned to this Hager and told him what I had done with his
DECnet-account and also what NOT.  I wanted to know which crime I had
committed.  He promptly cancelled all of his reproaches, but he did not excuse
his defamous incriminations.  I entreated him to inform my system manager in
Tuebingen that I have done nothing illegal and to stop him from erasing my
account.  This happens already to a fellow student of mine (in this case, Hager
was also guilty).  He promised me that he would officially cancel his
reproaches.

     After over a week this doesn't happen (I'm allowed to use my account
further on).  In return for it, I received a new mail from Hager on another
account of mine:

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
From:   1084::HAGER         1-JUN-1989 12:51
To:     50180::STUD_11
Subj:   System-breaking-in

On June 1st 1989 you have committed a system-breaking-in on at least one of our
VAXes.  We were able to register this occurrence.  We would be forced to take
further measure if you did not dear up the occurrence completely until June
6th.

Of course the expenses involved would be imposed on you.  Hence enlightenment
must be in your own interest.

We are attainable via DECnet-mail with the address 1084::HAGER or via following
address:

Institut fuer Technische Thermodynamik und Thermische Verfahrenstechnik
Dipl.-Ing. M. Hager    Tel.: [phone]
Dipl.-Ing. M. Mrzyglod Tel.: [phone]
Pfaffenwaldring 9/10-1
7000 Stuttgart-80

 M. Hager
 M. Mrzyglod
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

This was the reaction of my attempt: "$ PHONE 1084::SYSTEM".  I have not
answered to this mail.  I AM SICK OF IT!


                                   Framstag
                          ([e-mail])

         With Special Thanks For Translation Assistance To Schrulli B.
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 8 of 12

        <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
        <><><><>                                              <><><><>
        <><><>             Sending Fake Mail In Unix            <><><>
        <><>                                                      <><>
        <>                     by Dark OverLord                     <>
        <><>                                                      <><>
        <><><>                   May 26, 1989                   <><><>
        <><><><>                                              <><><><>
        <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>


Here is a shell script that can be use to send fakemail from any Unix system.
Have fun and stay out of trouble.


-Dark Overlord

        -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=  Cut here -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
! /bin/sh
#Mfakemail - A shell script to send fakemail.
#M##M#Met up the path.
PATH=/usr/ucb:/bin:$HOME/Bin
#Marse the command line
case $ in
0)echo "USAGE: user@host [ from@somewhere ] [ mailer_host ]" >& 2
exit 1
;;
1)mailto=$1
from="person@campus"
mailerhost=localhost
;;
2)mailto=$1
from=$2
mailerhost=localhost
;;
3)mailto=$1
from=$2
mailerhost=$3
;;
*)echo "USAGE: user@host [ from@somewhere ] [ mailer_host" >& 2
exit 1
;;
esac
#Mreate a header for sendmail
cat <<E!O!F!> /tmp/cli$$
helo $mailerhost
mail from:$from<$from>
rcpt to: $mailto <$mailto>
data
From: $from
To: $mailto
Subject:
Status: RO


E!O!F!
#Mdit the mailer
vi /tmp/cli$$
#M
dd a ending for the mailer
cat <<E!O!F!>> /tmp/cli$$
.
quit
E!O!F!
#Monnect to the remote host's sendmail daemon
telnet $mailerhost smtp < /tmp/cli$$
#Mlean up time
/bin/rm -f /tmp/cli$$
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 9 of 12


                   +======================================+

                         The Postal Inspection Service

                 (C) UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (U.S. MAIL)

                               Brought to you by

                                   Vendetta

                                 May 10, 1989

                   +======================================+


Protecting The U.S. Mails
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The protection of the U.S. Mail and the mail system is the responsibility of
the Postal Inspection Service.  As the law enforcement and audit arm of the
U.S. Postal Service, the Inspection Service is a highly specialized,
professional organization performing investigative, law enforcement, and audit
functions essential to a stable and sound postal system.

As our country's oldest federal law enforcement agency, the Inspection Service
has jurisdiction in all criminal matters infringing on the integrity and
security of the mail, and the safety of all postal valuables, property, and
personnel.

Since the beginning of a postal system in this country, criminal and
administrative problems of the Postal Service have been interwoven.  By
detecting and investigating crimes against the mail and postal revenue,
establishing safe and efficient postal systems, protecting all postal
properties, assuring that the postal system is not criminally misused to the
detriment of the public, the Inspection Service plays an integral part in
maintaining effective operations in the Postal Service.

The agency's activities make a vital contribution to the protection of the
nation's economy.  Security and enforcement functions of the Inspection Service
provide assurance to American business for the safe exchange of funds and
securities through the U.S. Mail, and to postal customers of the sanctity of
the seal in transmitting correspondence and messages to all parts of the world.
Audits ensure stability to financial operations, help control costs, and
promote increased efficiency in our Postal Service.


Postal Inspectors
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Postal Inspectors are the fact finding and investigative agents of the U.S.
Postal Service.  Today nearly two-thirds of their time is spent in
investigating and solving postal related crimes.  Possessing statutory power of
arrest, they apprehend violators of the law and work closely with U.S.
Attorneys in prosecuting cases in court.  Their work also includes crime
prevention, the audit of postal operations, investigation of accidents and a
wide variety of other service and audit matters.

The work of a Postal Inspector requires total dedication and a willingness to
work long hours.  Investigations of postal crimes which often entail interstate
or international coordination, and the responsibility to restore mail service
following catastrophes such as floods, fire, and airplane wrecks, are
time-consuming and can be hazardous.

There are approximately 1,900 Postal Inspectors stationed in the United States
and Puerto Rico.  All trainees undergo an eleven-week basic training course
involving use of firearms, defensive tactics, legal matters, search and
seizure, arrest techniques, court procedures, postal operations, audit
functions, and a detailed study of the federal laws in which the Inspection
Service has jurisdiction.  Classes are conducted at the Inspection Service
training center in Potomac, Maryland.

Refresher courses keep Inspectors informed of current court decisions, laws,
and legal procedures.  Additional specialized courses are continually held to
equip the Service with expertly trained personnel.

All applicants for the position of Postal Inspector must successfully complete
the following steps; entry examination; a comprehensive background
investigation including ma medical examination; the candidate assessment center
review; and all phases of the basic training course.


Inspection Service Activity
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         Criminal investigations and postal crime prevention represent
             the greatest portion of Inspection Service activity.

Postal Inspectors investigate violations of all postal laws and other related
criminal violations.  Crimes within the purview of postal investigations
include mail fraud, the illegal transmission of controlled substances through
the U.S. Mail, the mailing of child pornography, thefts of mails or postal
valuables, assaults on postal employees, bombs sent through the mails or
directed against postal properties, and the mailing of matter containing
poison, unauthorized concealable firearms, and harmful or prohibited articles.

Five crime laboratories located throughout the country assist Inspectors in
analyzing evidentiary material needed for identifying and tracing criminal
suspects and in providing expert testimony for cases brought to trial.

The objectives of postal crime prevention are to anticipate, identify, and
analyze those areas of greatest crime risk potentially affecting employees,
funds, property, and postal customers.  Postal Inspectors then take action to
remove or reduce that risk and maintain the integrity of the Postal Service.

                "The Postal Inspection Service is responsible
                for the internal audit of the Postal Service."

Postal Inspectors provide management with independent audits and investigations
of all postal activities as a part of the Postal Service's internal control
system.

Audits of installations and systems protect the assets of the Service, improve
its financial management system, assist in the resolution of customer
complaints, investigate matters of Congressional interests, and identify
specific improvements for better customer service and more economical
operations.

Financial audits provide an independent check on the adequacy and effectiveness
of control systems; verify the existence of assets and ensure the proper
safeguards are maintained.  Operations audits are conducted to assist postal
management in the operation of an efficient, and reliable Postal Service.


Security Force
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Postal Police Officers provide protection to mail, postal valuables, postal
employees, facilities, and vehicles of the Postal Service.  As part of the law
enforcement team, they assist Postal Inspectors in the enforcement of certain
postal laws and regulations on postal premises and provide mobile response
unites in emergency situations involving the Postal Service.

Equipped with portable radios and alerted by closed circuit television they
provide perimeter security to major postal facilities and other buildings
operated by the Postal Service.  Their presence in postal installations
throughout the country is a deterrent to postal crimes and an aid to employee
morale.

Postal Police Officers also are used to escort high value mail while in transit
between postal units and at airports.

Experience in military or civil law enforcement, industrial security, or
similar occupations is an asset for positions in the Security Force.  All
appointees undergo a four-week training course conducted at the Inspection
Service's training center.


Coordination With Other Agencies
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Inspection Service extends full cooperation to all local and federal
investigative and prosecutive authorities in law enforcement matters to ensure
greater protection to the public.  Postal Inspectors participate in the
Department of Justice national strike force teams aimed at curtailing
widespread criminal acts of an organized nature.  Postal Inspectors also work
closely with the External Auditors in providing support to the certification of
the Postal Service's financial statements.


Conviction Rate
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Inspection Service maintains a consistently high conviction rate each year
of approximately 98% of cases brought to trial, a rate not exceeded by any
other federal law enforcement agency.


Jurisdiction, Postal Laws, and Protection
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Inspection Service exercises investigative jurisdiction over approximately
85 postal-related statues.  These can be grouped in two categories:  Criminal
acts against the mails, postal facilities, or postal personnel; and criminal
misuse of the postal system.


MAIL FRAUD

All criminal activity involving use of the U.S. Mail with intent to defraud
comes under the jurisdiction of the Postal Inspection Service.  The Mail Fraud
Law is the oldest consumer protection law in the United States and is one of
the most effective prosecutive tool in fighting white collar and organized
crime.  Millions of dollars are lost each year through mail fraud which cheats
not only the poor and the elderly, but businessmen and the consumer as well.
Prevalent schemes include insurance, banking, false billings; land and
advance-fee selling swindles; franchise schemes; work-at-home and fraudulent
diploma schemes; charity schemes; promotions of fake health cures, beauty
devices, fast-working diets, and sex stimulants; chain letters, lotteries, and
solicitations for the sale of advertising specialty items.

While Postal Inspectors have no statutory authority to act as intermediaries in
the settlement of unsatisfactory financial or property transactions conducted
through the mails, their investigations frequently result in the discontinuance
of fraudulent or borderline operations.  Administrative mail-stop orders may be
issued to prevent continuing public loss while sufficient evidence is being
developed for criminal prosecutive action in the courts, or in cases where
false representations, but not necessarily fraudulent intent, can be proven.
The Inspection Service has a leading role in consumer protection through the
implementation of educational programs designed to prevent mail fraud schemes
from developing, and through its efforts to resolve complaints relating to
consumer/vendor misunderstandings or poor business practices.


ORGANIZED CRIME

Investigations by Postal Inspectors in organized crime matters most frequently
relate to cases involving theft and fencing of large amounts of stamp stock and
securities by organized post office burglary rings; insurance and investment
frauds; and planned bankruptcies and schemes aimed at looting company assets.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 specifically includes violation of the
Mail Fraud Statue as "racketeering activity."  Postal Inspectors are assigned
to the Justice Department Organized Crime Strike Forces which operate at various
points throughout the country.


MAIL THEFT/BURGLARY/ROBBERY

Investigation of mail theft offenses are a large part of the Inspection
Service's responsibilities and most commonly involve stolen checks, food
coupons, or other negotiable securities.  Primary attention is directed at
major gangs, sophisticated fencing operations, large scale thefts, and the
implementation of preventive programs.

Burglaries of post offices range from vandalism to high level burglary rings
and fencing operations involving organized crime activity.

Armed robberies endanger the lives of postal employees and the public and,
therefore, are priority investigations.  The targets of these crimes usually
are postal facilities, vehicles transporting mail, and individual employees,
primarily letter carriers.


DRUGS

Illegal trafficking in drugs, narcotics, and other controlled substances
through the mail is investigated in conjunction with other federal and state
law enforcement agencies.


PORNOGRAPHY

The Inspection Service investigates violations of the Postal Obscenity Statue
enacted in 1865 which prohibits the sending of obscene materials through the
U.S. Mail.  This includes the investigation of child pornography offenses
involving the sexual abuse of exploitation of children based on laws passed in
1977 and 1984.


BOMBS

Investigations of incidents of threats involving bombs and incendiary devices
sent through the mails or directed at postal properties or functions are within
the jurisdiction of the Inspection Service.


EXTORTION

The Inspection Service has investigative responsibility in incidents involving
use of the mails to extort money or property by threat of injury to person's
reputation or by accusing a person of a crime.


OTHER PROHIBITED MAILINGS

The mailing of poisons or other harmful matter prohibited by law is
investigated by Postal Inspectors.


Assistance From The Public
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In most cases, the Inspection Service must rely on the watchfulness and
alertness of mail recipients to inform them of possible criminal or harmful
activity involving the use of the mails.  Any suspected violations of postal
laws or misuse of the mails should be reported to the local Postmaster for
referral to a Postal Inspector.  Prompt action on the part of postal customers
and Postal Inspectors is essential in the interest of crime prevention and
detection.
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 10 of 12

            PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN        P h r a c k   W o r l d   N e w s        PWN
            PWN        ~~~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~        PWN
            PWN               Issue XXVII/Part 1                PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN                  June 20, 1989                  PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN          Created, Written, and Edited           PWN
            PWN               by Knight Lightning               PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN


                 Welcome to Issue XXVII of Phrack World News!

This issue features articles on SouthernNet's hacker scam, the Florida
probation sex incident, bulletin boards in Argentina, fax attacks, computer
security, other hacking occurrences, as well as more articles and new
information about Kevin David Mitnick (aka Condor), Robert Tappan Morris, Karl
Koch (Hagbard Celine, one of Clifford Stoll's "Wily Hackers"), TRW and Social
Security Administration, the National Crime Information (NCIC) "Super
Database," and many other fun stories.

Because of our temporary exile from Bitnet, this will be the last regular issue
of Phrack World News until next Fall.  Next issue expect to see the full
write-up on the details and fun events of SummerCon '89.  It is only two days
away as of this writing (it kinda begins on Thursday evening for some of us)
and it looks to be the best SummerCon ever!

A very special thanks goes to Delta Master, Hatchet Molly, and The Mad Hacker
who all assisted with this issue's PWN by submitting articles.  Hatchet Molly
will be serving as a collection agent for Phrack Inc. during the summer.  Be
sure to forward any news articles to him that seem relevant to PWN and he will
get them to me (eventually).  He can be reached on the wide area networks at;

                                (Hatchet Molly)

                              [e-mail]
                      [e-mail]

One other thing to mention here is a special hello to one of our government
readers... Peter Edmond Yee of NASA's Ames Research Center.  He had recently
remarked that he "had access to Phrack!"  I wonder if he thought that Phrack
Inc. was top secret or hard to get?  Still if he wanted it that badly, Taran
King and I thought, "Why not make it easier on him and just send it to his
network address?"  We did :-)))

:Knight Lightning


        "The Real Future Is Behind You... And It's Only The Beginning!"
_______________________________________________________________________________

Mitnick Plea Bargain Rejected By Judge As Too Lenient            April 25, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Excerpts from Kim Murphy (Los Angeles Times)

             "Mr. Mitnick, you have been engaging in this conduct
             for too long, and no one has actually punished you.
             This is the last time you are going to do this."

Reportedly U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer unexpectedly rejected the plea
bargain of Kevin Mitnick, the hacker once called "as dangerous with a keyboard
as a bank robber with a gun."  Pfaelzer declared that Mitnick deserves more
time behind bars.

As reported in recent issues of Phrack World News, "Mitnick pleaded guilty to
one count of computer fraud and one count of possessing unauthorized
long-distance telephone codes... Mitnick faces one year in prison.  Under a
plea agreement with the government, he must also submit to three years'
supervision by probation officers after his release from prison."

On April 24, 1989 Judge Pfaelzer said, "Mr. Mitnick, you have been engaging in
this conduct for too long, and no one has actually punished you.  This is the
last time you are going to do this."  She said a confidential pre-sentence
report recommended that she exceed even the 18-month maximum prison term called
for under mandatory new federal sentencing guidelines.  The judge's action
voids Mitnick's guilty plea.

Both prosecuting and defense attorneys were surprised.  Mitnick's attorney said
he did not know whether his client would agree to a guilty plea carrying a
longer prison term.  This could make it harder to bring charges against
Mitnick's alleged associates.  If Mitnick is brought to trial, testimony from
at least one of his associates would be required to convict him, and they would
not appear as witnesses without receiving immunity from prosecution.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Computer Hacker Working On Another Plea Bargain                     May 6, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Excerpts from the Los Angeles Herald Examiner

Attorneys said yesterday they are negotiating a second plea bargain for
computer hacker Kevin Mitnick, whose first offer to plead guilty was scuttled
by a judge because it called for too little time in prison.

Mitnick, 25, of Panorama City, California offered in March to serve one year in
prison and to plead guilty to computer fraud and possessing unauthorized
long-distance telephone codes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mitnick Update                                                     May 10, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Excerpts taken from the Los Angeles Times

When last we heard about Kevin Mitnick, the hacker once called "as dangerous
with a keyboard as a bank robber with a gun," the judge, Judge Mariana
Pfaelzer, had rejected a plea bargain as too lenient, saying Mitnick deserved
more than the agreed one year of jail time [see above articles].

According to more recent information, Mitnick has now reached a new agreement,
with no agreed-upon prison sentence.  He pleaded guilty to stealing a DEC
security program and illegal possession of 16 long-distance telephone codes
belonging to MCI Telecommunications Corp.  The two charges carry a maximum of
15 years and a $500,000 fine.  The government agreed to lift telephone
restrictions placed on Mitnick since he was jailed in December, 1988.

At DEC's request, Mitnick will help the firm identify and fix holes in its
security software to protect itself from other hackers.  He will also cooperate
in the government's probe of Leonard DiCicco, a fellow hacker.  (DiCicco is the
"friend" who turned Mitnick in.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Kenneth Siani Speaks Out About Kevin Mitnick                       May 23, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Kevin Mitnick, the hacker "so dangerous that he can't even be allowed to use a
phone."  "He could ruin your life with his keyboard."  "Armed with a keyboard
and considered dangerous."

These are some of the things that have been said about this person.  All of
this media hype would be fine if it just sold newspapers.  But it has done much
more then just sell a few papers. It has influenced those that will ultimately
decide his fate.  I myself do not know the man, but I have talked to others
that do.  Including one of the persons that investigated Mitnick.  From all I
have heard about him, I think he is a slime ball!  But even a slime ball should
not be railroaded into a prison sentence that others of equal or greater guilt
have avoided.

I personally feel the man is just a criminal, like the guy that robs a 7/11, no
better but certainly not any worse.  Unfortunately he is thought of as some
kind of a "SUPER HACKER."  The head of Los Angeles Police Dept's Computer Crime
Unit is quoted as saying, "Mitnick is several levels above what you would
characterize as a computer hacker."

No disrespect intended, but a statement like this from the head of a computer
crime unit indicates his ignorance on the ability of hackers and phone phreaks.
Sure he did things like access and perhaps even altered Police Department
criminal records, credit records at TRW Corp, and Pacific Telephone,
disconnecting phones of people he didn't like etc.  But what is not understood
by most people outside of the hack/phreak world is that these things are VERY
EASY TO DO AND ARE DONE ALL THE TIME.  In the hack/phreak community such
manipulation of computer and phone systems is all to easy.  I see nothing
special about his ability to do this.  The only thing special about Kevin
Mitnick is that he is not a "novice" hacker like most of the thirteen year old
kids that get busted for hacking/phreaking.  It has been a number of years
since an "advanced" hacker has been arrested.  Not since the days of the Inner
Circle gang have law enforcement authorities had to deal with a hacker working
at this level of ability.  As a general rule, advanced hackers do not get
caught because of there activity but rather it is almost always others that
turn them in.  It is therefore easy to understand why his abilities are
perceived as being extraordinary when in fact they are not.

Because of all the media hype this case has received I'm afraid that:

1.) He will not be treated fairly. He will be judged as a much greater threat
    to society then others that have committed similar crimes.

2.) He will become some kind of folk hero.  A Jesse James with a keyboard.
    This will only cause other to follow in his footsteps.

I'm not defending him or the things he has done in any sense.  All I'm saying
is let's be fair.  Judge the man by the facts, not the headlines.

Disclaimer:  The views expressed here are my own.

  Kenneth Siani, Sr. Security Specialist, Information Systems Div., NYMA Inc.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
If you are looking for other articles about Kevin David Mitnick aka Condor
please refer to;

"Pacific Bell Means Business"                   (10/06/88) PWN XXI. . .Part 1
"Dangerous Hacker Is Captured"                  (No Date ) PWN XXII . .Part 1
"Ex-Computer Whiz Kid Held On New Fraud Counts" (12/16/88) PWN XXII . .Part 1
"Dangerous Keyboard Artist"                     (12/20/88) PWN XXII . .Part 1
"Armed With A Keyboard And Considered Dangerous"(12/28/88) PWN XXIII. .Part 1
"Dark Side Hacker Seen As Electronic Terrorist" (01/08/89) PWN XXIII. .Part 1
"Mitnick Plea Bargains"                         (03/16/89) PWN XXV. . .Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________________

Computer Intrusion Network in Detroit                              May 25, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from the San Jose Mercury News (Knight-Ridder News Service)

DETROIT -- Secret Service agents smashed what they described as a costly,
sophisticated computer intrusion network on Wednesday, May 24, and were
surprised to discover it made up largely of teen-agers.

The computer systems of more than 20 companies including the Michigan
Department of Treasury, Home Box Office cable television services, [and RCA]
were infiltrated, according to agents serving search warrants across the
country.

Federal officials said the infiltrations by the network represented fraud of
$200,000 to $1.5 million in appropriated goods, telephone and computer time.

Agents expected to arrest some adults when they swept down on eight people who
allegedly ran the network in several states.  Instead, they found only one
adult, in Chicago.  The rest were teen-agers as young as 14:  Two in Columbus,
Ohio; two in Boston, Massachusetts; two in Sterling Heights, Michigan [The
Outsider and The Untouchable]; and one in Atlanta, Georgia.  Agents expected to
make another arrest in Los Angeles.

Officials said at least 55 other people nationwide made use of the network's
information.

In Sterling Heights, Secret Service agents pulled two eighth-grader boys, both
14, out of school and questioned them in the presence of their parents, who
apparently were unaware of their activities.  James Huse, special agent in
charge of the U.S. Secret Service office in Detroit, said the youths admitted
involvement in the scheme.

He said the eight-graders, because they are juveniles, cannot be charged under
federal law and will be dealt with by local juvenile authorities.

Authorities believe the mastermind is Lynn Doucett, 35, of Chicago.  She was
arrested Wednesday, May 24, and is cooperating with authorities, Huse said.

Doucett, who was convicted in Canada of telecommunications fraud, supports
herself and two children through her computer intrusion activities, which
include using stolen or counterfeit credit cards for cash advances or money
orders, according to an affidavit filed in U.S. District Court.

If convicted, she faces up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

               Special Thanks to Jedi For Additional Information
_______________________________________________________________________________

HR 1504 -- Beeper Abuse Prevention Act                             May 22, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                 "Pagers Don't Commit Crimes, Congressmen Do."

The fools in congress assembled are at it again.  Three years in jail for
selling a pager to a minor?  If you didn't believe when Abbie Hoffman said that
the drug hysteria was just an excuse for more control of the citizens, think
again.

In USA Today was a "face-off" on the issues.  According to this article,
Representative Kweisi Mfume (D-Md) says the following:

     "The drug business is using the  latest technology to promote its
     deadly trade.  One such advance, the paging device, or beeper, is
     now appearing in classrooms and schoolyards.  I have introduced the
     Beeper Abuse Prevention Act to curtail the use of beepers by young
     people who deal drugs.  It would require the Federal Communications
     Commission to prescribe regulations that would restrict the
     possession and use of paging devices by persons under age 21.

     Law officers say dealers and suppliers send coded messages via
     beeper to youths in school.  The codes translate into messages like
     "meet me at our regular place after class to pick up the drugs."
     Drug traffickers are even using 800 numbers now available with
     regional paging services.  A supplier could actually conduct a
     transaction in Baltimore from Miami, for example.

     My bill, H.R. 1504, would require any person selling or renting
     paging devices to verify the identification and age of every
     customer; encourage parents and businesses to take more
     responsibility in their children's or employees' activities; make
     it unlawful for a person to knowingly and willfully rent, sell or
     use paging devices in violation of rules prescrived by the FCC
     (there are provisions for stiff fines and up to three-year prison
     terms for adults who illegally provide beepers to youths); and
     require parents or businesses who allow the use of beepers to state
     that intention with and affidavit at the time of purchase."

He goes on to say that he recognizes that there are legitimate uses of beepers,
but we can no longer stand by and watch drugs flow into our neighborhoods.  The
opposite side is taken by Lynn Scarlett, from Santa Monica, CA.  She asks what
beepers have to do with the drug trade, and regulating their use will not put a
dent it it.  She also says that there is little evidence that gun control keeps
guns out of the hands of gangsters, and it will take a good dose of wizardry to
keep beepers away from bad guys.  She finishes with:

     "The logic of the Beeper Abuse Prevention Act opens the door for
     laws to make us sign promises that we won't, we swear, use these
     things for illicit acts when we buy them.  De Tocqueville, that
     eminent observer of our nation, warned that our loss of freedom
     would sneak in through passage of quiet, seemingly innocuous and
     well-intended laws -- laws like H.R. 1504.
_______________________________________________________________________________

Computer Threat Research Association (UK)                        March 31, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
For those of you interested an umbrella organization has been established in
the United Kingdom to coordinate information on, and research into, all aspects
of computer security.  In the first instance one of the organization's primary
concerns will be combatting the threat posed by computer viruses by acting as a
clearing house for virus information and control software.

Below is a copy of an initial letter mailed to prospective members:

                   The Computer Threat Research Association

The computer threat research association, CoTra is a non-profit making
organization that exists to research, analyze, publicize and find solutions
for threats to the integrity and reliability of computer systems.

The issue that caused the formation of CoTra was the rise of the computer
virus.  This problem has since become surrounded by fear, uncertainty and
doubt.  To the average user, the computer virus and its implications are a
worry of an unknown scale.  To a few unfortunates whose systems have become
victims, it is a critical issue.

The key advantage of CoTra membership will be access to advice and information.
Advice will be provided through publications, an electronic conference (a
closed conference for CoTra's members has been created on the Compulink CIX
system) as well as other channels such as general postings direct to members
when a new virus is discovered.

CoTra membership will be available on a student, full or corporate member
basis.  All software that is held by CoTra that enhances system reliability,
such as virus detection and removal software, will be available to all members.
It is intended to establish discounts with suppliers of reliability tools and
services.  A library of virus sources and executables and other dangerous
research material will be made available to members who have a demonstrable
need.

A register of consultants who have specific skills in the systems reliability
field will be published by CoTra and reviews of reliability enhancing software
will be produced.

Your support of CoTra will ensure that you have the earliest and most accurate
information about potential threats to your computer systems.

CoTra, The Computer Threat Research Association,
c/o 144 Sheerstock, Haddenham, Bucks.  HP17 8EX
_______________________________________________________________________________

Strange Customs Service Clock Department                            May 1, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Written by Vanessa Jo Grimm (Goverment Computer News)(Page 6)

The U.S. attorney for Washington is reviewing an allegation that a Customs
Service official violated the Computer Security Act [PL 100-235 presumably] by
altering a computer's internal clock.

Treasury Department Inspector General Michael R. Hill referred the allegation
to the prosecutor after an investigation into year-end spending by Custom
officials at the close of Fiscal Year 1988.  The allegation involves an
official who may have authorized altering the date maintained by the computers
that the agency uses for procurement documents, according to Maurice S. Moody,
the Inspector General's audit director for Financial Management Service.

Moody recently told the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight the
computers are part of the agency's Automated Commercial System.  He declined to
provide Government Computer News with more details.

Allegedly the computer clock was rolled back during the first three days of
October of 1988 so that $41.8 million in procurement obligations would be dated
in September against fiscal year 1988 appropriations, Moody said.

An inspector general report issued in late February concluded Customs had not
violated any procurement laws.  The inspector general's investigation is
continuing, however.

"Doesn't $41.8 million worth of procurement on the last day of the fiscal year
bother anybody?" asked Rep. Richard T. Shulze (R-Pa).  The purchases did bother
the inspector general, Moody said, and this concern led to getting the United
State attorney attorney.  "This problem is endemic in the federal government,"
he said.  "Year-end spending is very common."

William F. Riley, Customs controller, said he knew about the rollback, but he
and Deputy Commissioner Michael H. Lane refused to say who authorized the
action...  Subcommittee members continued to press Riley and Lane.  "Is the
person still at Customs?" asked subcommittee chairman J. J. Pickle (D-Texas).
He is working full time and in the position he was at the time," Lane answered.

Rep. Beryl F. Anthony, Jr. (D-Ark) asked how Riley became aware of the
rollback.  "He (the official who authorized the rollback) told me that it was
going to be done," Riley said.

Rep. Pickle suggested that a high ranking official would have to authorize such
an action, but Counsel advised Lane not to reply.  He did say neither he nor
Commissioner von Raab had made the decision.

The balance of the article deals with the actions of Linda Gibbs, who became
aware of the incident and reported it to the inspector general after being
unable to stop the action.  Gibbs also alleged that the action was intended to
use available year-end money to cover cost overrun on a contract with Northrop
Corp.  She also alleged that she had been reassigned and given no new duties.
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 11 of 12

            PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN        P h r a c k   W o r l d   N e w s        PWN
            PWN        ~~~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~        PWN
            PWN               Issue XXVII/Part 2                PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN                  June 20, 1989                  PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN          Created, Written, and Edited           PWN
            PWN               by Knight Lightning               PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN


Robert T. Morris Suspended From Cornell                            May 25, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from the New York Times

Cornell University has suspended the graduate student identified by school
officials as the author of "the Internet worm."

In a May 16th letter to Robert Tappan Moris, age 23, the dean of the Cornell
University Graduate School said a university panel had found him guilty of
violating the school's Code of Academic Integrity.

He will be suspended until the beginning of the fall semester of 1990, and then
could reapply.

No criminal charges have been filed against Morris.  A federal grand jury this
year forwarded its recommendations to the Justice Department, which has not
taken any action.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Justice Department Wary in Computer Case                           May 28, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Matthew Spina (Syracuse Herald-American)

              "Is Washington Fearful Of Losing A Landmark Trial?"

Some computer experts theorize that the Justice Department, afraid of bungling
what could become a landmark computer case, still doesn't know how to treat the
Cornell student whose computer worm slithered nationwide in November, 1988.

A further concern in Washington:  A trial in the case might embarrass the
Department of Defense if its scientists are asked to detail how their computers
were among the thousands crippled by the worm.

For several months, the decision on how to charge 23-year-old Robert T. Morris,
Jr. had been before Mark Richard, a deputy assistant attorney general.  Within
the last few weeks, Richard made a decision that now is being reviewed by an
assistant attorney general, according to a computer professional who has been
talking with the Justice Department.

"I thought we would have heard something from Washington by now," said Andrew
Baxtoer, the assistant U.S. attorney who in November and December presented the
case to a grand jury in Syracuse.

The grand jury's report was sent on the the Justice Department, which refuses
to comment publicly on the matter because Morris has not been indicted.

"Within the next two weeks I assume that a decision will be made," said one
official.

"If they decide to begin an expensive trial, they have to make sure they win so
as not to damage future attempts to prosecute under that law," said Eugene H.
Spafford, an assistant professor at Purdue University whose analysis of the
worm has helped federal investigators.  "If they decide not to prosecute, and
the total thing that happens is he gets suspended (from Cornell), I will be
outraged."

So far, Cornell has taken the only disciplinary measure against Morris,
suspending him for the 1989-90 academic year.  But the graduate student left
the computer science department early in November, the day after the worm
spread out of a computer in Upson Hall.

Morris, a computer science graduate student, has been called the author of a
rogue computer program, called a worm, that was spread from a Cornell
University computer.  The program was designed to reproduce and infect any
computer linked to the Internet, a network shared by colleges, research centers
and military institutions.

However, experts say an error caused the program to replicate out of control,
sending thousands of copies into thousands of computers.

If Morris is to be charged with a felony, prosecutors would then have to show
he intended to destroy or extract information.

Proving that would be difficult since the program neither destroyed nor removed
information from any computer.

To convict Morris on most lesser charges, prosecutors would have to show he
intended to harm computers.

Prosecutors also could use a misdemeanor charge requiring them to prove only
that Morris gained access to a federal government computer. The worm did reach
computers at the Army Ballistics Research Laboratory and NASA's Langley
Research Center, among others.

Some computer experts wonder, though, if Defense Department officials will be
reluctant to testify publicly about how their computers were penetrated -- even
those computers holding non-classified information. In February, at a computer
convention in San Diego, Defense Department computer experts detailed some
security improvements made to the network since November, but then refused to
release copies of their presentation to people at the seminar.

The FBI -- which enforces the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 -- and some
people in the computer industry are pushing for a vigorous prosecution to
display a strong case against computer hacking.  Others in the industry,
including some of Morris' friends from Harvard University and Cornell, urge
leniency because he was trying to demonstrate security flaws with computers.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Other articles about Robert Tappan Morris, Jr. and the Internet Worm are;

"Computer Network Disrupted By 'Virus'"            (11/03/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"Virus Attack"                                     (11/06/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"The Computer Jam:  How It Came About"             (11/08/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"US Is Moving To Restrict {...} Virus"             (11/11/88) PWN XXII/Part 2 *
"FBI Studies Possible Charges In Virus"            (11/12/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"Big Guns Take Aim At Virus"                       (11/21/88) PWN XXII/Part 3
"Congressman Plan Hearings On Virus"               (11/27/88) PWN XXII/Part 3
"Pentagon Severs Military {...} Virus"             (11/30/88) PWN XXII/Part 3 *
"Networks Of Computers At Risk From Invaders"      (12/03/88) PWN XXII/Part 4 *
"Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1988"           (12/05/88) PWN XXII/Part 4 *
"Breaking Into Computers {...}, Pure and Simple"   (12/04/88) PWN XXIV/Part 1 *
"Cornell Panel Concludes Morris {...} Virus"       (04/06/89) PWN XXVI/Part 1

* - Indicates that the article was not directly related to Robert Morris, but
    did discuss him as well as the Internet Worm incident.
_______________________________________________________________________________

SouthernNet's Anti-Hacker Psychological Con Game                     April 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
WARNING!  Your call is being intercepted!

Error:  Setting may not be changed by callers.


                  Welcome to:  S o u t h e r n N e t   I n c.


You have reached the SouthernNet Fraud Department, the authorization code you
are attempting to use is not valid.  Hacking and illegal use of codes are
violations of state and federal laws.

We are currently conducting an investigaion for code abuse in your area and we
are coordinating the investigation with law enforcement authorities. Persons
identified hacking or abusing codes will be prosecuted to the full extent of
the law.

I'll see you soon,

Hacker Tracker
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Hold for additional information:

Hacker Tracker is unavailable right now; however, you may avoid possible arrest
and/or prosecution by calling Hacker Tracker in person.

You may contact Mr. Tracker between the hours of 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM Eastern
Standard Time, Monday - Friday, simply by dialing the access number you have
just used and code number 101010 or 011010 if the access  you have used
requires a seven digit code.  Just hold the line for 10 seconds and your call
will automatically be routed to Mr. Tracker at no charge to you.

This is *NOT* a trick and it will be the intention of SouthernNet Inc. to
settle this matter without involving law enforcement authorities if you
cooperate with our fraud department 100%.

It will certainly be to your advantage to contact Mr. Tracker as this will
reflect your own decision to assist and avoid prosecution by our company!!!

I'll be expecting your call.

Hacker Tracker

Hold a sec... Engaging Auto Page for Hacker Tracker...

      50 seconds till disconnect
      40 seconds till disconnect
      30 seconds till disconnect
      20 seconds till disconnect
      10 seconds till disconnect
       5 seconds till disconnect

NO CARRIER


 [Do you think anyone believed this and actually called "Hacker Tracker?" -KL]
_______________________________________________________________________________

What's Happening:  Computer Security Up                            June 4, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from Gannett Westchester Newspapers

                   [Comments in brackets from Delta-Master]

High-tech companies are spending 64% more [than they previously spent] on
computer security, according to a recent survey conducted by the National
Center for Computer Crime Data in Los Angeles.  The group surveyed 3,500 law
enforcement agencies and computer security experts about computer crime.  The
prosecution rate is also up -- 6.4% in 1988 from only 2.4% during 1987.

Contrary to popular image, computer hackers aren't always young boys.  The
study found that 32% of those arrested for computer crimes were female, while
only 14% were under 21.  The study said 45% of hackers were 25 to 30 years old.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Comments from Delta-Master
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I do not know about you people, but the public's confusion about hackers starts
to bother me when they make errors.  Seriously, I know of only a few hackers
over the age of 21.  The fact that the newspapers also equate the thug-like
computer criminals with the mastermind-criminal type hacker (you guys) is also
pretty annoying, wouldn't you agree?  One key phrase you must note: "32% OF
THOSE ARRESTED."  Oh well, such are the mistakes of newspapers.
_______________________________________________________________________________

Public Service Commission Bans Operator Companies                April 24, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Jerri Stroud (St. Louis Post-Dispatch)

The Missouri Public Service Commission voted 4-1 last week to ban providers of
so-called alternative operator services in Missouri because allowing the
companies to operate is "not in the public interest."

Alternative operator services companies contract with hotels, motels colleges,
hospitals, airports, restaurants and other facilities to provide operator
assistance to customers using pay telephones or house phones.  Consumer groups
have complained about price-gouging by the companies nationwide.

Mark Wheatley, a lawyer for the Office of Public Council, praised the
commission's decision.

The Office of Public Council has received numerous complaints about excessive
rates and surcharges by alternative operator services companies, said Wheatley.
Some alternative operator services companies also have accepted other
companies' credit cards without authorization from the companies issuing the
cards, he said.

"We feel that it's an extremely important decision by the commission." said
Wheatley.  But he said he expects the companies affected by the ruling to
appeal.

Lawyers for the alternative operator services companies could not be reached
for comment.

In it's ruling, the commission said many consumers aren't aware of the rates
charged by the alternative operator services companies until they receive "a
bill for operator services at prices higher than those to which he is
accustomed."  Consumer groups say the rates often are twice or three times the
rates charged by better-known long-distance companies.

Even if an operator service company identifies itself when a consumer makes a
call, the commission said many consumers don't understand the significance of
the identification.

"If the end user is not educated as to the intricacies of using an alternative
operator services provider, he does not truly have a meaningful choice..." the
commission said.

The ruling only affects intrastate calls handled by alternative operator
services companies, but it may effectively prevent the companies from providing
interstate service as well.

The commission specifically denied tariff requests from International
Telecharge Inc. and American Operator Services Inc.  The commission also
directed three other companies -- Teleconnect Inc., Dial US, and Dial USA -- to
file new tariffs consistent with the ruling.

The ruling allows companies to operate who provide operator services in
connection with their business -- long-distance carriers and local telephone
companies, for example.  But the commission also placed limits on these
companies.

Under the ruling, operator services companies must:

     * Identify themselves to the caller as well as to the party being billed
       by the call (in the case of a collect or third-party call).

     * Quote rates to the caller or billed party on request, without charge.

     * Use calling card verification procedures acceptable to the companies
       issuing the cards.

     * Post in a prominent position the company's name, detailed complaint
       procedures and instruction on how to reach the local telephone company
       operator and other long-distance carriers.

     * Transfer emergency traffic to the local telephone company or American
       Telephone & Telegraph Co. until the alternative services provider can
       show that it can handle emergency calls adequately.
_______________________________________________________________________________

Fax Attack                                                         May 13, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from The Ann Arbor News

       "Governor's Attempt To Ban Unsolicited Advertisements Backfires!"

HARTFORD, Conn - The great fax attack of 1989 -- an all-out lobbying campaign
against a bill banning unsolicited facsimile advertising -- may have backfired
when the governor's fax machine was jammed for hours with unwanted messages.

Starting Thursday, May 11, and continuing Friday, May 12, Governor William A.
O'Neill's fax machine has been beeping constantly, spitting out unwanted
messages from angry businesses that advertise by fax.

The businesses oppose a bill now awaiting O'Neill's signature that would
prohibit them from marketing their products by fax without first obtaining the
permission of the recipient.  Violators would face a $200 fine.

Starting Thursday morning, dozens of Connecticut businesses faxed to O'Neill's
office a form letter arguing against the fax ban.  The stream of fax messages
was so constant (40 came in before 10 AM) that the governor's office turned off
the fax machine Thursday (May 11).

O'Neill's press secretary, Jon. L. Sandberg, said the governor still hasn't
decided whether he will sign the bill.  But aides to the governor said the
persistent lobbying campaign proved how annoying unwanted messages can be.  The
inconvenience was compounded because the governor's office was unable to use
its fax machine to receive information about spring flooding around the state.
_______________________________________________________________________________

NYNEX Announces Info-Look Gateway                                April 28, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Introducing a new service for accessing information and more... all through
your personal computer!

Starting in May 1989, New York Telephone's INFO-LOOK (tm) Gateway Service can
be your link to accessing a variety of information, products and services.

The INFO-LOOK Gateway simplifies on-line computer access to a variety of
information providers.  When you call the Gateway phone number through your
modem, you'll be able to scan a menu of information services.

The types of information services you may choose from include:  Entertainment,
business, health, food, news, weather, sports, travel, government, educational
and reference information.  The services, some interactive, are provided by
independent companies.

The INFO-LOOK Gateway is easy to use -- even if you're relatively new to using
a PC.

What you'll need to use the INFO-LOOK Gateway

1.  Virtually any type of personal computer.

2.  A modem (300, 1200, or 2400 Baud), and communications software.  This
    enables your computer to communicate with other computers via the telephone
    system.

3.  A New York Telephone Calling Card.  If you need a New York Telephone
    Calling Card, (it's FREE), call your service representative whose number
    appears on page one of your New York Telephone bill.

Charges for using the INFO-LOOK Gateway

There are ** no ** Gateway enrollment fees and ** no ** monthly subscription
charges.  In most cases, you will be charged (New York people only):

o  A local call to reach the INFO-LOOK Gateway.

o  While you're browsing the Gateway directory of services, or moving between
   services, you pay $.05 a minute.

o  Once you connect to a service, the charge is determined by the Service
   Provider.  Some services have a per-minute usage charge.  Some services are
   free.  The charges for each service are listed in the Gateway menu.

You'll find most charges itemized on your monthly New York Telephone bill.
Some Service Providers may decide to bill you separately and directly for use
of their services.

Call for more information:

To get your free INFO-LOOK Gateway information booklet call (toll- free)
1-800-338-2720, Ext. 20, any day from 9 a.m. to 11 p.m.

Note:  New York Telephone does not provide or control the services offered
       through the INFO-LOOK Gateway Service.  They are provided by independent
       companies, which are responsible for the content, character, and quality
       of their services.

The predictions run $5 billion now and another $5-10 billion by 1991.

       [INFO-LOOK is already operating in Bell South and Bell Atlantic.]
_______________________________________________________________________________

Pacific Bell Plans Access To Computers                             June 9, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from Santa Cruz Sentinel (Section B)

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) -- Pacific Bell said Thursday it hopes to compete with the
popularity of television by offering people easy access to computerized
libraries, bulletin boards and the use of electronic mail.

PacBell's California On-line -- which will be available to anybody with a
personal computer, telephone and calling card -- will be among the first in the
nation to use a graphic-based system that simplifies procedures so only a
rudimentary familiarity with computers is needed.

"It's going to offer our customers a supplement to their current leisure
activities... and among other things we've seen (in trials) a lot of people
who got away from the TV," said Roger P. Conrad, director of Videotex Gateway
Services.

"We feel this is a more productive way for people to spend their lives and we
think a lot of users are going to agree," he added.  Users will pay
"info-entrepreneurs" fees based on the time they use various services and will
be billed on their monthly telephone statements.  Unlike some on-line
information services, users do not have to subscribe ahead of time.

Conrad said the types of services are limited only by vendors' imaginations.
PacBell will make money by selling telecommunication line use to the companies.
_______________________________________________________________________________

Bulletin Boards Of Argentina                                       June 5, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Country Code = 54 (Argentina)
City Code  = 1    (Buenos Aires)

This list might be slightly incorrect due to the passage of time.  The last
update was on December 23, 1986.

Name                    Hours Of Operation       ======= Number=
----
Beta                    23:00 -  6:30     802-0288
C-Mania                 21:00 -  7:00     362-8843
CBM                     16:00 - 12:00      90-4988
Century 21              24 hours          632-7070
Cerebruss               24 hours           47-2717
Cerebruss Information   ?                  48-8300
                                           48-9886
Databank                ?                  44-9760
Drean Conection         ?                 953-2523
Los Pinos               13:00 - 19:00      21-0375
Magenta                 ?                 392-0124
Magenta                 ?                 392-0016
Maxes                   23:00 - 7:00      542-2695
Mendieta                22:00 - 8:00      654-6999
Pirates Cove            24:00 - 6:00      783-5023
Sanctuary               24:00 - 3:00      641-4608
Soft-work               22:30 - 9:00       88-2065
TCConection             19:00 - 12:00      22-4197
The Connection          24 Hours           82-5780
The Hacker              23:00 - 7:00      748-2005
Tiger                   ?                 784-2226
XCASA                   ?                 611-8136
BBS-IOM                 24 Hours          804-3602

Note:  The settings for all systems listed above are Even, 7, 1.

                              Contributed by Noli
_______________________________________________________________________________


                                ==Phrack Inc.==

                     Volume Three, Issue 27, File 12 of 12

            PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN        P h r a c k   W o r l d   N e w s        PWN
            PWN        ~~~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~        PWN
            PWN               Issue XXVII/Part 3                PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN                  June 20, 1989                  PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN          Created, Written, and Edited           PWN
            PWN               by Knight Lightning               PWN
            PWN                                                 PWN
            PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN


One of Cliff Stoll's "Wily Hackers" Is Dead (Suicide?)             June 5, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
According to West German publications, the "Wily Hacker" Karl Koch, of
Hannover, West Germany, died Friday, June 3, probably by suicide.  His body was
found burnt (with gasoline) to death, in a forest near Celle (a West German
town near Hannover where he committed his hacks, as had been observed by German
Post).

Koch was one of the 2 hackers who confessed their role in the KGB hack to the
public prosecutors, therewith bringing the case to public attention.  As German
newspapers report, he probably suffered from a psychic disease:  He thought he
was permanently observed by alien beings named Illimunates' which tried to kill
him.  Probably, he had internalized the role of "Captain Hagbard" (his
pseudonym in the hacking scene), taken from a U.S. book, who (like him)
suffered from supervision by the Illuminates. Police officials evidently think
that Koch committed suicide (though it is believed, that there are "some
circumstances" which may also support other theories; no precise information
about such moments are reported).

According to German police experts, Karl Koch's role in the KGB case as in
daily life can properly be understood when reading this unknown book.

                   Information Provided by Klaus Brunnstein
                            (University of Hamburg)

                                        [Illuminates... KGB... whatever... -KL]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Illuminatus!                                                      June 14, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~
The book in question is believed to be "Illuminatus!" by Harold Shea and Robert
Anton Wilson.  The book is a spoof on conspiracy theories, and suggests that
many and probably all human institutions are just fronts for a small group of
"enlightened ones," who are themselves a front for the Time dwarves from
Reticuli Zeta, or perhaps Atlantean Adepts, remnants of Crowley's Golden Dawn,
or even more likely the Lloigor of H.P. Lovecraft's Cthulhu Mythos.  A leading
character in this book is named Hagbard Celine.

"Illuminatus!" is a fun read if you like psychedelia and paranoia.  It also
seems to have influenced a lot of subsequent work, most notably Adams'
"Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy."  It is easy to see how an unbalanced mind,
taking it literally, could be completely absorbed.  In fact "Illuminatus!"
seems as if it was written with the intent of just this sort of programming,
referring to it as "Operation Mindfuck."

This is probably not a real danger for the vast majority of sane adults, but it
may, tragically, have been the case here.  Or perhaps, no disrespect intended,
Koch may in the course of various hacks really have discovered too much about
the Illuminati.  After all, they are supposed to be the secret power behind the
KGB :-)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

For more information on Clifford Stoll and the Wily Hackers of West Germany,
please see:

"Who Is Clifford Stoll?"        (No Date) Phrack World News issue XXII/Part 1
"A Message From Clifford Stoll" (1/10/89) Phrack World News issue XXIII/Part 2

And the following articles all found in Phrack World News issue XXV/Part 2:

       "German Hackers Break Into Los Alamos and NASA"         (3/2/89)
       "Computer Espionage:  Three 'Wily Hackers' Arrested"    (3/2/89)
       "Computer Spy Ring Sold Top Secrets To Russia"          (3/3/89)
       "KGB Computer Break-Ins Alleged In West Germany"        (3/3/89)
       "News From The KGB/Wily Hackers"                        (3/7/89)
_______________________________________________________________________________

Sex Put On Probation By Mystery Hacker                            June 13, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Ft. Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel

      "Yes, you sound very sexy, but I really need a probation officer."

DELRAY BEACH, Fla. -- Callers trying to dial a probation office in Delray
Beach, Fla on Monday, June 12, heard a smorgasbord of sex talk from a panting
woman named Tina instead.

Southern Bell telephone officials said a computer hacker reprogrammed their
equipment over the weekend, routing overflow calls intended for the local
probation office to a New York-based phone sex line.

"People are calling the Department of Corrections and getting some kind of sex
palace," said Thomas Salgluff, a spokesman for the Palm Beach County probation
office.

Southern Bell officials said it was the first time their switching equipment has
been reprogrammed by an outside computer intruder.  Southern Bell provides
local telephone service in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina.

"We're very alarmed," said Southern Bell spokesman Buck Passmore.  He said such
a feat would require someone with considerable computer knowledge.

The implications of such a computer breach are considerable.  Intercepting
corporate communications, uncovering unlisted phone numbers, and tampering with
billing information are all plausible consequences of computer security
breaches at the the phone company.

Hackers have invaded Southern Bell in the past, but they have never
reprogrammed a telephone link, Passmore said.

Security technicians from Southern Bell and AT&T are trying to trace the source
of the computer breach, Passmore said.
_______________________________________________________________________________

Hacking For A Competitive Edge                                     May 12, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from the Los Angeles Times

Two former Tampa, FLA TV news managers have been charged with illegally tapping
into phone lines and computers at another station to gain a news edge over
their competitors.  Former new director Terry Cole and assistant news director
Michael Shapiro at WTSP-TV have been charged with 17 counts of computer hacking
and conspiracy in the theft of information from WTVT-TV through computer phone
lines, authorities said.  Their arraignment was set for May 19.

If convicted, each could face a maximum prison sentence of 85 years.  The two
were fired from WTSP when the station learned of the alleged thefts.  The
break-ins began in November, 1988, but were not noticed until January 12, 1989,
when WTVT's morning news producer noticed that files were missing, authorities
said.

Computer experts determined that an intruder had rifled the files.  Authorities
said Shapiro knew WTVT's security system thoroughly because he had helped set
it up while working there as an assignment manager before being hired away from
WTVT in October.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

TV News Executives Fired After Hacking Charges From Rival
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tampa, Fla. -- A Florida television station fired two news executives in the
wake of reports that one of them allegedly penetrated a rival station's
computer system and stole sensitive information.

WTSP-TV (Channel 10), an ABC affiliate in St. Petersburg, announced that it had
fired Assistant News Director Michael Shapiro and News Director Terry Cole.

Shapiro was arrested on February 7th on felony charges for allegedly breaking
into a computer system at WTVT-TV (Channel 13) on at least six occasions in
January.  He was once employed by WTVT as an assistant manager and was
responsible for administering the station's computer systems.

Law enforcement officials seized from Shapiro's home a personal computer, 200
floppy disks and an operating manual and user guide for software used at the
rival station.

He has been charged with 14 felony counts under Florida Statute 815, which
covers computer-related crimes.  Each count carries a maximum sentence sentence
of 15 years and a $10,000 fine.

Vince Barresi, WSTP's vice-president and general manager, refused to comment on
the two firings.  However, in a prepared statement, he said that he told
viewers during an 11 PM newscast last Tuesday that the station acted to "avoid
any questions about the objective way we do our business in keeping the public
informed."

Cole, who hired Shapiro last September, has not been charged by Florida law
enforcement officials.  He was fired, according to one source, because as
director of the news room operations, he is held ultimately for the actions of
news staffers.  Shapiro and Cole were unavailable for comment.

[Another story that discussed this case was "Television Editor Charged In Raid
On Rival's Files" (February 8, 1989).  It appeared in Phrack World News Issue
XXIV/Part 2. -KL]
_______________________________________________________________________________

National Crime Information Center Leads To Repeat False Arrest     May 14, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by James Rainey (Los Angeles Times)

Mix ups with the databases at the NCIC have caused Roberto Perales Hernandez to
be jailed twice in the last three years as a suspect in a 1985 Chicago
residential burglary.  The authorities confused him with another Roberto
Hernandez due to a single entry in the FBI's National Crime Information Center
computer.

The two Roberto Hernandezes are the same height, about the same weight, have
brown hair, brown eyes, tattoos on their left arms, share the same birthday,
and report Social Security numbers which differ by only one digit!

The falsely imprisoned man has filed suit charging the Hawthorne, California
Police Department, Los Angeles County, and the state of California with false
imprisonment, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations
stemming from the most recent arrest last year.

He had previously received a $7,000 settlement from the county for holding him
12 days in 1986 before realizing he was the wrong man.  In the latest incident,
he was held for seven days then freed with no explanation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Another False Incarceration                                        May 18, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In his testimony on May 18, 1989 to the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of
Representatives, relating to the National Crime Information Center, David D.
Redell cited another case of false incarceration concerning Roberto Perales
Hernandez as well as various cases noted earlier -- such as that of Terry Dean
Rogan [see below]:

     "Only last week, a case in California demonstrated the potential
     benefit of easy access to stored images.  Joseph O. Robertson had
     been arrested, extradited, charged, and sent to a state mental
     facility for 17 months.  During that entire time, mug shots and
     fingerprints were already on file showing clearly that he was the
     wrong man, but no one had taken the trouble to check them."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
These articles show clear examples of the damage and problems caused by this
"super" database.  People like William Bayse (Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Director For Technical Services) and William Sessions (Director of the FBI)
either fail to realize this or perhaps they just do not care (as long as
something similar does not happen to them).

For those of you who are interested in looking into this further, the first
article about this NCIC database was; "'Big Brotherish' Data Base Assailed,"
(November 21, 1988).  It appeared in Phrack World News Issue XXII/Part 3.

Another incident similar to the cases mentioned above concerned Richard
Lawrence Sklar, a political science professor at the University of California
at Los Angeles.  He was mistaken by the computer for a fugitive wanted in a
real estate scam in Arizona.  Before the FBI figured out that they had the
incorrect person, Sklar, age 58, spent two days being strip searched, herded
from one holding pen to another, and handcuffed to gang members and other
violent offenders.  For more details on this case and the case concerning Terry
Dean Rogan, please refer to "FBI National Crime Information Center Data Bank,"
(February 13, 1989) which appeared in Phrack World News Issue XXIV/Part 2 (as
well as the Washington Post).
_______________________________________________________________________________

TRW and Social Security Administration                             May 12, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The credit bureau of TRW has been working with the Social Security
Administration to verify its database of 140 million names and Social Security
numbers.  In order to cover the cost, TRW is paying the Social Security
Administration $1 million, while Social Security Administration will provide a
matching $1 million.

Since the Social Security Administration is asking for a budget increase for
their computer and telecommunications systems, several legislators are outraged
by the fact they they are spending $1 million for this non-government project.
Claiming that the project is "as far away from the mission of the Social
Security Administration as anything I have ever come across," Senator David
Pryor (D-Ark) questioned the competence and credibility of Social Security
Administration Commissioner Dorcas R. Hardy and asked for an investigation by
the HHS inspector general.

In addition, several lawmakers such as Dale Bumpers (D-Ark) believe the project
to be a violation of civil liberties. Said Bumpers, "I don't like any public
institution releasing an individual's private information."  The American Law
Division of the Congressional Research Service has already concluded that the
project is a violation of the Privacy Act of 1974.

[A related article, "Verifying Social Security Numbers," (April 11, 1989)
appeared in Phrack World News Issue XXVI/Part 3 (as well as the New York Times
on the same date). -KL]
_______________________________________________________________________________

Phrack World News XXVII Quicknotes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1.  The current name assigned to the new network being created by the merger
    of BITNET and CSNET is ONENET.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.  NPA 903 Assigned to NE Texas (May 10, 1989) -- It was just announced that
    those portions of 214 outside Dallas will be changed to 903 in the Fall of
    1990.

    With 708 assigned to Chicago, 903 assigned to Texas, and 908 assigned to
    New Jersey, only 909 and 917 remain to be assigned before the format
    changes.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.  Details On New Area Code 510 (June 6, 1989) -- The press release from
    Pacific Bell, quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle, gives the phase-in
    dates for the new NPA 510.

    Inception is scheduled for October 7, 1991, with a four-month grace period
    when NPA 415 will still work for the affected numbers.  Final cutover is
    scheduled for January 27, 1992.

    NPA 510 will encompass Alameda and Contra Costa counties, which currently
    have 842,388 customers out of the current 2,005,687 customers in NPA 415.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. New Jersey Area Code To Be Split (April 27, 1989) -- The split is not
   supposed to occur until 1991.  The new NPA will be 908 and it will basically
   cover the southern "half" of the current 201 area.  The affected counties
   will be Warren, Hunterdon, Middlesex, Union, Monmouth and Ocean, and the
   southwest corner of Morris).  Counties remaining in 201 will be Sussex,
   Passaic, Bergen, Essex, Hudson, and the majority of Morris.

   New Jersey Bell will also start requiring area codes on calls into New York
   and Pennsylvania that have been considered part of New Jersey local calling
   areas.  This will apparently take effect October 2 and free up about 25
   exchanges.  Information from the Asbury Park Press.

       [This last line somewhat contradicts the first line as far as the
       dates are concerned.  More information as we get it.      -- KL.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. New Area Codes For London (April 27, 1989) -- British Telecom has announced
   that the area code for London is to be changed on May 6th, 1990, due to the
   increased number of lines needed in the capital.

   The existing code is 01-, and the new codes to be introduced are 071- for
   the centre of the city and 081- for the suburbs.  A list was published in
   the Evening Standard, showing which exchanges will fall in which area.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6.  Member Learns The Hard Way:  American Express Is Watching (May 4, 1989) --
    This article taken from the San Jose Mercury News describes how American
    Express called a member to voice their concern that he might not be able to
    pay his recent bill.  American Express was able to access his checking
    account and find that he had less than what was owed to them.  His card was
    temporarily "deactivated" after the member refused to give any financial
    information except that he would pay up the bill with cash when it came in.

    Apparently, the card application, in finer print, declares that "[American
    Express reserves] the right to access accounts to ascertain whether you are
    able to pay the balance."  After some arguments with the company, the
    member comments that "I learned a lesson:  My life is not as private as I
    thought."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7.  Southwestern Bell's QuickSource (April 24, 1989) -- Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company is running a one year trial (March 1989 89 - March 1990)
    of two information services:  QuickSource (audiotex) and Sourceline
    (videotext).  The latter requires a terminal of some type, but the former
    only requires a touch-tone phone for access.  The QuickSource number is
    323-2000, but cannot be accessed via 1+713+; SWBTCo has blocked access to
    "the Houston metro area served by SWBTCo," according to the script the
    woman reads to you when ask for help (713-865-5777; not blocked).  The help
    desk will send you a free QuickSource directory though.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8.  Telemail, MCI, AT&T Mail Interconnection (May 16, 1989) -- U.S. Sprint's
    subsidiary, Telenet has announced an interconnection agreement between
    Telemail, Telenet's electronic mail product, MCI Mail, and AT&T Mail.

    The new arrangement, scheduled to be in effect later this summer, will
    allow the 300,000 worldwide users of Telemail, the 100,000 users of MCI
    Mail and the 50,000 users of AT&T Mail to conveniently send email messages
    to each other.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9.  Illinois Bell Knocked Out For Four Hours! (May 18,1989) -- Service to over
    40,000 Illinois Bell subscribers in the northwest suburbs of Chicago was
    disrupted for about four hours because of problems with the computer in the
    switching center.

    Phones were either dead or inoperative for incoming and outgoing calls
    between 9:30 a.m. and 1:40 p.m. because of a software glitch at the central
    office in Hoffman Estates, IL.  Most of the disruption occurred in Hoffman
    Estates, Schaumburg, Arlington Heights, Hanover Park, and Streamwood, IL.

    The exact nature of the problem was not discussed by the Bell spokesman who
    reported that the outage had been corrected.  Apparently the backup system
    which is supposed to kick in also failed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. SRI Attacked By Kamikaze Squirrels (May 29, 1989) -- It seems that the Data
    Defense Network SRI's "no-single-point-of-failure" power system failed at
    the hands, or rather the paws, of a squirrel.  The power was off for
    approximately 9 hours and they experienced no hardware problems.  This was
    at least the third time that a squirrel has done SRI in.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11. New York Telephone Freebies (June 10, 1989)(San Francisco Chronicle, p. 2.)
    -- 24 pay phones along the Long Island Expressway were in fact free phones
    because of a programming/database screw-up.  They were being heavily used
    for long distance calls by those who had discovered the oversight,
    including many to Pakistan (Police found 15 Pakistani men using the phones
    when they went to investigate after a shooting).  There were no estimates
    on the unrecovered cost of the phone calls.
_______________________________________________________________________________